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LAW CLERK IN THE 
a C  G: ....l.-..._..~, 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO 
PANIKE & SONS FARMS, INC., 
RANDY SMITH and JANINE SMITH, husband and wife, 
individually and in their separate capacity, dba 
FOUR RIVERS PACKING CO., 
FOUR RIVERS PACKING CO., an ldaho Corporation, 
PlaintiffIRespondent, 
v. 
PANIKE & SONS FARMS, INC., 
Appealed from the District Court of the Third Judicial District 
of the State of ldaho, in and for Washington County. 
Honorable Stephen W. Drescher 
Lary C. Walker 
WALKER LAW OFFICE, PLLC. 
Weiser, ldaho 
Attorney for Appellant 
Bruce Birch 
BIRCH LAW OFFICES, CHD. 
Payette, ldaho 
Attorneys for Respondent(s) 
Filed this day of 2008 
Clerk 
By: Deputy C 
IN TI-IE SUI'KtME COLi-?T OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
PANIKE & SONS FARMS, INC., 
RANDY SMITH and JANINE SMITH, 
Husband and wife, individually and in their 
Separate capacity, dba FOUR RIVERS 
PACKING CO.. 
SUPREME COURT NO. 35062 
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PANIKE & SONS FARMS, INC., ) 
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of ldaho, in and for the County of Washington. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
1 
PANIKE & SONS FARMS, INC., 1 
) 
PlaintiffIAppellant, j 
) Supreme Court Case No. 35062 
-vs- ) 
1 Civil No. CV 2006-00567 & 
RANDY SMITH and JANlNE SMITH, ) CV 2006-00725 
husband and wife, individually and in their ) 
separate capacity, dba FOUR RIVERS ) 
PACKING CO., ) 












PANIKE & SONS FARMS, INC., ) 
) 
DefendantIAppellant. 1 
I, SHARON WIDNER, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for Washington County, do hereby certify: 
That the following is a list of exhibits which were offered and admitted (andlor 
rejected) into evidence during the court trial held October 29, 2007 in the above entitled 
matter: 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 CONTRACT TO BUY OR HANDLE (referred to as 
Present Contract), dated January 13, 2006. Admitted 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS C 1 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 Appleton Produce weigh slips of each truck 
load. Admitted 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 4 Summary sheet receipt of the onions from 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 3. Admitted 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 5 State of Idaho Inspection Certificate. Admitted 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 8 Letter from Walker Law Office to Bruce 
Birch dated September 25, 2006. Admitted 
Defendant's Exhibit E Letter from Four Rivers Packing to Panike & Son 
Farms, Inc., dated August 15,2006. Admitted 
Defendant's Exhibit F Letter from Four Rivers Packing to Panike & Son 
Farms, Inc., dated August 25, 2006. Admitted 
Defendant's Exhibit H Ujiiye Farms Purchase Order. Admitted 
Defendant's Exhibit I Settlement Sheet for Peterson Farms Admitted 
Defendant's Exhibit M USDA Report from ldaho Falls of Market 
Prices Admitted 
Defendant's Exhibit S Letter from Walker Law Office to Bruce 
Birch, dated September 20,2007. Admitted 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal 
this= day of zU\'f ,2008. 
SHARON WIDNER, 
Clerk of the District Court 
By: k( &uo~~Bl.e&k' 
Deputy Court Clerk 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
Date: 7/1/2008 T+d District Court -Washington County 
Time: 04:44 PM ROA Report 
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New Case Filed - Other Claims Stephen W Drescher 
Plaintiff: Panike & Sons Farms inc Appearance Lary C Walker Stephen W Drescher 
Filing: A1 - Civil Complaint, More Than $1000 No Prior Appearance Paid Stephen W Drescher 
by: Walker, Lary C (attorney for Panike & Sons Farms inc) Receipt 
number: 0004085 Dated: 11/22/2006 Amount: $88.00 (Cashiers Check) 
Verified Complaint Filed Stephen W Drescher 
Summons Filed Stephen W Drescher 
Filing: I IA  - Civil Answer Or Appear. More Than $1000 No Prior Stephen W Drescher 
Appearance Paid by: Bruce H Birch Receipt number: 0004278 Dated: 
12/8/2006 Amount: $58.00 (Cashiers Check) 
Defendant: Smith, Randy Appearance Bruce H Birch Stephen W Drescher 
Defendant: Smith, Janine Appearance Bruce H Birch Stephen W Drescher 
Defendant: Four Rivers Packing Company Appearance Bruce H Birch Stephen W Drescher 
Answer (Bruce Birch) Stephen W Drescher 
Notice of Service Stephen W Drescher 
Request For Trial Setting (Birch for def) Stephen W Drescher 
Motion for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Restraining Order Stephen W Drescher 
(Walker) 
Affidavit of Greg Panike in Support of Motion for Declaratory and lnjunctive Stephen W Drescher 
Relief and Restraining Order (Walker) 
Response To Request For Trial Setting (Walker) Stephen W Drescher 
Affidavit of Lary Walker it1 Support of Motion for Declaratory and lnjunctive Stephen W Drescher 
Relief and Restraining Order 
Notice of Hearing Stephen W Drescher 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/08/2007 01:50 PM) PI Mtn for Declaratory Stephen W Drescher 
& injunctive Relief and Restraining Order 
Acknowledgment of Service (Birch) Stephen W Drescher 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Declaratory and Stephen W Drescher 
lnjunctive Relief and Restraining Order (Birch) 
Affidavit in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Declaratory and lnjunctive Stephen W Drescher 
Relief and Restraining Order (Birch) 
Stipulation to Vacate and Reset Hearing Stephen W Drescher 
Ordervacating Stipulation and Reset Hearing Stephen W Drescher 
Hearing result for Motion held on 01/08/2007 01 :50 PM: Hearing Vacated Stephen W Drescher 
PI Mtn for Declaratory & lnjunctive Relief and Restraining Order 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 03/12/2007 01:30 PM) PI Mtn for Declaratory Stephen W Drescher 
& lnjunctive Relief & Restraining Order 
Notice of Service of Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Interrogatories, Stephen W Drescher 
Requests for Production of Documents and Requests for Admission 
(Walker) 
Hearing result for Motion held on 03/12/2007 01:47 PM: Hearing Vacated Stephen W Drescher 
PI Mtn for Declaratory & lnjunctive Relief & Restraining Order 
Notice of Service of Plaintiff's First Set of lnterroqatories and Request for Stephen W Drescher 
Documents (Walker) 
Date: 7/1/2008 Tt-'-4 District Court -Washington County 
Time: 04:44 PM ROA Report 
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Response To Request For Trial Setting (Walker) Stephen W Drescher 
Order Setting Case for Trial and Pretrial Stephen W Drescher 
Copies to: WalkerlBirch 
Hearing Scheduled (Civil Pretrial Conference 09/24/2007 01:30 PM) 3 Stephen W Drescher 
day JT set for 10129107 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 1012912007 09:OO AM) 3 day JT Stephen W Drescher 
Notice of Compliance (Birch) Stephen W Drescher 
Hearing result for Civil Pretrial Conference held on 09/24/2007 01 :39 PM: Stephen W Drescher 
Hearing Heid 3 day JT set for 10/29/07 
Motion to Vacate and Reschedule Trial (Birch) Stephen W Drescher 
Stipulation to Vacate and Reschedute Stephen W Drescher 
Notice of Unavailable Dates (Birch) Stephen W Drescher 
Pretrial Conference Order Copies to: Stephen W Drescher 
WalkerIBirch 
Witness and Exhibit List (Walker for Panike) Stephen W Drescher 
Stipulation to Waive Jury Trial (and have it tried by the Court) Stephen W Drescher 
Hearing Scheduled 3 day Court Trial Stephen W Drescher 
10/29/2007 09:OO a.m. 
Pre-trial Memorandum (Birch for Four Rivers with witness & exhibit list) Stephen W Drescher 
AMENDED Pre-trial Memorandum (Birch for Four Rivers with witness & Stephen W Drescher 
exhibit list) 
Trial Memorandum (Walker) Stephen W Drescher 
Hearing result for Court Trial held on 10/29/2007 09:OO AM: Court Trial Stephen W Drescher 
Started 3 day JT 
Closing Argument of Four Rivers Packing Company (Birch) Stephen W Drescher 
Post Trial Brief (Walker for Panike & Sons) Stephen W Drescher 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Comparing And Conforming A Prepared Stephen W Drescher 
Record, Per Page Paid by: Bruce H Birch Receipt number: 0008712 
Dated: 11/14/2007 Amount: $5.50 (Cash) 
Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order Stephen W Drescher 
Copies to: WalkerIBirch 
Civil Disposition entered for: Four Rivers Packing Company, Defendant; Stephen W Drescher 
Smith, Janine, Defendant; Smith. Randy, Defendant; Panike & Sons Farms 
Inc, Plaintiff. 
order date: 1/7/2008 
STATUS CHANGED: Closed Stephen W Drescher 
Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs Stephen W Drescher 
Judgment Stephen W Drescher 
Copies to: WaIkerlBirch 
2126.2008 M.scellaneous Payment: lstars Docket Page Paid oy: Walker Law Office Stephen W Drescrier 
Receipt number: 0010051 Dated: 2126.2008 Amoun:: $7.00 (Cash~ers 
Check) 
3/7/2008 Panike & Sons Farms Inc's Notice of Association of Counsel (Greener Stephen W Drescher 
Burke Shoemaker PA) 
~00003 
Date: 71112008 T'-'-d District Court - Washington County 
Time: 04:44 PM ROA Report 
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Appealed To The Supreme Court Stephen W Drescher 
Filing: T - Civil Appeals To The Supreme Court ($86.00 Directly to Supreme Stephen W Drescher 
Court Plus this amount to the District Court) Paid by: Greener Burke 
Shoemaker PA Receipt number: 0010212 Dated: 3/7/2008 Amount: 
$15.00 (Cash) For: Panike & Sons Farms lnc (plaintiff) 
Notice of Appeal Stephen W Drescher 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 10213 Dated 3/7/2008 for 100.00) Stephen W Drescher 
(Estimated cost of Clerk's Record) 
Order (Appellant to file an Amended Notice of Appeal - Rule 17 - Stephen W Drescher 
suspended to 4/28/08) (or Clerk's Record due in 14 days) 
Received Clerk's Certificate of Appeal Stephen W Drescher 
(Supreme Court #35062) 
Amended Notice of Appeal (Berg) Stephen W Drescher 
Received Amended Clerk's Certificate of Appeai (Supreme Court #35062 Stephen W Drescher 
Appeal Record due: May 22,2008 -the Attorneys - June 26,2008 -the Stephen W Drescher 
Supreme Court 
Transcript on Appeal (Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings of 10/29/07) Stephen W Drescher 
Motion for Extension of Time by Clerk of District Court was faxed to the Stephen W Drescher 
Supreme Court 
Order Granting Motion for Extension of Time by Clerk of District Court Stephen W Drescher 
Appeal Record Due: July 29,2008 - to the Attorneys - September 2,2008 Stephen W Drescher 
- to the Supreme Court 
Appellant's Notice of Substitution of Counsel (Walker substituted as sole Stephen W Drescher 
counsel) (Berg, Burke and Shoemaker are terminated on the appeal per 
request of client) 
Lary C. Walker, ISB No. 1303 
DeIton L. Walker, ISB No. 5839 
Walker Law Offices 
232 East Main Street 
Post Office Box 828 
Weiser, Idaho 83672 
Telephone: (208) 414-0390 
Facsimile: (208) 4 14-0404 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
PANIKE & SONS FARMS, INC., Case NO. cv *L,-Ofi,5(DT 
Plaintiff, 
1 
VS. ) VERIFIED COMPLAINT 
1 
RANDY SMITH and JANINE SMITH, 1 
husband and wife, individually and in their ) Fee Category: A(1) 
separate capacity, dba FOUR RIVERS ) Fee Amount: $88.00 pd 
PACKING CO., 1 
Defendants. 1 
COMES NOW, Plaintiff PANIKE & SONS FARMS, INC., and for its cause of action 
against the Defendants, complain and allege as follows: 
1. Plaintiff is an Oregon corporation, with its principal place of business in Ontario, 
Malheur County, Oregon. 
2. The Defendants is an Idaho Corporation, with its principal place of business in 
Weiser, Washington County, Idaho. 
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3. Plaintiff is a family corporation invoked in raising agricultural crops on real 
property owned in Malheur County, Oregon. 
4. The Defendant FOUR RIVERS PACKING CO. is a corporation, which 
purchases, sorts, bags and markets the agricultural products, onions. 
5. In January of 2006 the Defendants owner-manager RANDY SMITH, came to 
Plaintiffs farm in Oregon and discussed if Plaintiff would be interested in raising onions for the 
Defendants. 
6. The negotiations resulted in an understanding that Plaintiff would raise 25,000 
hundredweight-field run onions with 75% three-inch minimum requirements. No further terms, 
conditions, or limitations were discussed. 
7. The Defendants hand wrote the agreed upon terms in a standard typed with blank 
form contract prepared by the Defendants, which form also contained fine print along with lined 
out portions where current hand written terms could be and were written in by the Defendants. 
8. The hand written portion of the Contract, consistent with the discussions offered 
to give Plaintiff a field run contract for two years, the first year, 2006, the price was to be $4.75 
per hundredweight and the price for 2007 was to be a minimum of $4.50 per hundredweight. It 
was agreed that for both years, Plaintiff would deliver 25,000 hundredweight. 
9. Plaintiff advised the Defendants closing the discussion of the Contract that he 
would first fill his personal storage facilities and that they raise additional onions to be used for 
other purposes, as Plaintiff traditionally raised considerably more onions than Defendants 
contracted to purchase. 
10. Without objections or further discussion, the parties signed a contract on January 
13,2006. 
1 1. Defendants did not pay any consideration or furnish any supplies, fertilizer or 
seed to Plaintiff at the time of execution or to date. Plaintiff planted several fields of onions in 
the spring of 2006 to meet this Contract and other financial commitments Plaintiff had with other 
parties relating to the onion production. 
12. Plaintiff had raised onions for Defendants in 2002 and had similar discussion and 
signed the agreement prepared by Defendants and at harvest furnished the contracted onions with 
out any changes or difficulty. 
13. On August 15, 2006, Greg Panike, Plaintiffs manager, made a phone call to 
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Defendant Randy Smith advising him that he had wastewater running onto Plaintiffs field and 
he needed Randy to fix the problem. In that same phone conversation Randy Smith stated that 
he was selecting certain designated fields as per Paragraph (1)  of his Contract. Plaintiff advised 
Defendant Randy Smith that no such arrangements had been agreed to, and that Plaintiff would 
deliver onions only after filling its own f m  storage facilities, as Plaintiff represented at the time 
of the Contract execution and consistent with the contract between the parties in 2002. 
14. Several days later, Plaintiff received a letter from the Defendants attempting to 
confirm the oral conversation of the designating certain fields. 
15. Plaintiff had fields with larger and more valuable onions in addition to the fields 
of onions meeting the Contract specifications. The onion fields designated by the Defendants 
were fields containing considerably larger and more valuable onions than the onions specified 
and purchased by the Defendants in their Contract. 
16. In September 2006 and part of October 2006, Plaintiff proceeded to harvest the 
onions and placed a portion of them in its f m  storage facilities. Plaintiff then harvested 
additional onions and prepared to deliver them according to the contract specification. 
17. Pursuant to the contract terms which require the Grower to pay for inspection in the 
event of dispute, on September 29,2006, Plaintiff contacted Denise Hughes, the head of 
inspection service at the Idaho Department of Agriculture, to see if she was available to inspect 
onions he planned to deliver on October 3,2006 at 1:30 p.m. 
18. The best of Plaintiffs knowledge, on the morning of October 3,2006, Ms. Hughes 
contacted Four Rivers to see if they had scales she could use for this planned inspection. At that 
time, a Four Rivers representative told Ms. Hughes that if the onions did not come from the 
specified field, they would turn the trucks around. 
19. On the morning of October 3,2006, Ms. Hughes called Plaintiff and said that Four 
Rivers indicated that they would turn the trucks around and reject the onions. She then asked 
Plaintiff what he wanted her to do. Plaintiff told Ms. Hughes that they would attempt to deliver 
the onions to Four Rivers that afternoon and if they were rejected, he would like her to meet him 
at Appleton Produce to inspect the onions. 
20. On the aftemoon of October 3,2006, Plaintiff delivered approximately 500 
hundredweight onions which met the terms of the contract to Four Rivers packing. Plaintiff and 
his hired hand, Ken Adams, took two loaded trucks and parked them at Four Rivers. They went 
Page 3 of 7 - VERIFIED COMPLAINT 
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into the office and told Ms. Janine Smith, the only one in the office, that they had onions here to 
deliver on the contract. Ms. Smith said that if the onions are not from the specific fields that 
Randy designated, then we don't want them. Plaintiff said O.K. and left the office. These same 
onions were immediately delivered to Appleton Produce, and pursuant to their prior 
arrangements, Denise Hughes met Plaintiff at Appleton Produce and inspected the onions from 
the trucks that were rejected by Four Rivers. 
21. The balance of the onions that were to be delivered on the contract were instead 
delivered to Appleton Produce for storage and marketing, all of which were inspected by the 
Idaho Department of Agriculture and were determined to be 75% 3 inch minimum. In fact the 
onions far exceeded this contractual requirement. 
22. Plaintiff was prepared to deliver to the Defendants the full Contract amount of 
onions, meeting the Contract specifications, but Defendants rejected the onions harvested. Those 
very same onions were then delivered to the third party, which exceeded 25,000 hundredweight, 
and were approximately 89% and 90% three-inch minimum size, which exceeded the Contract 
quality specifications of 75% three-inch minimum. 
23. After rejecting the onions, the Defendants executed a lien entitled Agricultural 
Products Lien on the 29th day of September 2006, and filed the same in Washington County, 
Idaho. 
24. Over the next few weeks, the Defendants mailed letters and copies of the Lien to 
the various entities including Plaintiffs operating financial bank, which has a first contractual lien 
for all operating expenses. 
25. In order to obtain financing for the Defendants farming operation, Plaintiff was 
required to grant liens of first party positions to his lender whose security position is now being 
threatened and undermined by the Defendants' claim of lien. 
26. In order to comply with the Plaintiffs cash flow budget with his financial 
institution, income from crops harvested and sold, which is currently held by the lien, must be 
received and paid to the bank on or before December 1,2006 or Plaintiffs ability to obtain 
operating hnds for the coming production year will be severely limited and may cause 
irreparable financial damage. 
27. Plaintiff has harvested and delivered other crops to the market and is entitled to 
receive substantial payments, which are being interfered with because of Defendants liens. 
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28. The contract between Plaintiff and Defendant used in 2002 was identical lo the 
contract used in 2006 except for the handwritten portions. The 2002 contract was filled with no 
designation of fields and without any problems. 
DECLARATORY ACTION ON CONTRACT VALIDITY 
29. Plaintiff re-alleges the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 20 above. 
30. At the time of the execution of the Contract, there was no discussion relating to 
contract terms authorizing the Defendants to designate specified fields, obligating Plaintiff to 
furnish onions of a larger size than specified in the Contract or authorizing the Defendants to file 
a claim of lien against other commodities. 
3 1. There were other terms and provisions, in addition to the above, which were set 
forth in the adhesion Contract, a pre-printed form contract prepared by the Defendants without 
any negotiations or import by Plaintiff in small print, which were not discussed, reviewed, or 
pointed out to Plaintiff at the time Plaintiff executed the Contract. No such terms or conditions 
were discussed or carried out under the 2002 contract. 
32. On October 3,2006, the Plaintiff, consistent with the Contract terms discussed 
and agreed upon at the time of execution, delivered approximately 500 hundredweight to Four 
Rivers packing, and was prepared to deliver the remaining 24,500 hundredweight 75% three-inch 
minimum size onions to Defendants. 
33. The Defendants paid no consideration of any kind and yet rejected Plaintiffs 
tender and delivery of onions meeting the Contract specifications. Had Plaintiff delivered the 
larger onions to Defendants from designated fields it would have resulted in a wind fall of 
approximately $200,000. 
34. The Plaintiff therefore requests the Court to make a declaratory ruling as to the 
meeting of minds on the terms, conditions, and provisions of the onion Contract between the 
Plaintiff and Defendants. 
35. Plaintiff further request the Court to make a declaratory ruling on whether 
Plaintiff met the Contract specifications and requirements by delivering andlor attempting to 
deliver to Defendants the onions meeting the Contract specifications, and whether there was a 
result in breach of the Contract by Defendants in their rejection of those onions. 
DECLARATORY RULING ON LIEN VALIDITY 
36. Plaintiff re-alleges the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 27 above. 
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37. In the event the declaratory ruling on the enforceability of the Contract as above 
requested does not resolve all issues relating to the Contract or Defendants breach in rejecting 
the onions, Plaintiff request the Court to make a declaratory ruling on the enforceability of the 
Lien filed by the Defendants. The contract and lien are attached hereto as Exhibit A and B. 
38. In the event Defendants' Lien is found to be valid, Plaintiff request the Court to 
make a determination on the priority of this Lien in relation to the first party Lien executed by 
Plaintiff in favor of the entity furnishing financing for Plaintiffs farming operation. 
39. The Plaintiff further request the Court to rule on what agriculture crops as 
proceeds there from Defendant's lien would attach if found valid. 
PRAYER 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against the Defendants as follows: 
1. That Defendants breached the Contract in refusing and rejecting the onions 
meeting the Contract specifications even though not taken from the specific fields selected by the 
Defendants. 
2. That the Court enter a declaratory ruling on the enforceability of the terms of the 
adhesion contract consistent with the intent, meeting of the minds, and agreement between the 
Plaintiff and the Defendants. 
3. That the Court enter a declaratory ruling on the validity andlor priority of the Lien 
filed by the Defendants. 
4. That the Court enter a declaratory ruling on what crops are proceeds there from. 
5. That the Court enter a judgment for damages suffered by Plaintiff in attempting to 
enforce terms, condition and provision of an adhesion contract not negotiated, discussed or 
agreed to without any form of consideration being paid by Defendants. 
6. That the Court enter a judgment in favor of Plaintiff for reasonable attorney fees, 
cost and expense incurred by Plaintiff. 
7. That the Court grant such other and further relief as just and reasonable. 
DATED this the&ay of November 2006. 
WALKER LAW OFFICE 
~ t t o r n e ~  fohanike & Sons Farms, Inc. 
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REVIEWED AND AGREE that the information contained herein is true and accurate 
to the best of my knowledge: 
~anike & %ns Farms, Inc 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this &day of November 2006. 
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10/09,'?006 li:18 F.iZ 2085499290 FOUR RIYERS 
NOTrCE OF AGRICULTUUL PRODUCE LIEN 
NOTlCE IS H%PaBY GIYEN that FOUR RWERS PACKING CO., INC., (Buyer 
herein), 390 Felt l~am lld., Weiser, Idaho 83672, and PANKE & SONS FARMS, lNC. (Grower herein), 
416Peach Rd., Ontario, Oregon 97914, entered into a contract entitled "Contract To  Buy O r  Handle" 
(conitract herein) on January 13> 2006 whereby Grower agreed to sell ZS,OOO hundred weight (cwt) or 
oniqns to Buyer from its ilelds specified by Buyer a t  a priceof $4.75 pcr cwt. Grower Sailed to deliver 
oni4ns from specified fields to Buyer pursuant to its contractua~ obligations. 
As permitted'by the terms of the contrrct, Buyer replaced the onions which Groluer failed 
to deliver at a cost to Buyer of9;12.00 per cwt. Growcr owes Buyer %181,250.00, the diit'erencc between 
the price Buyer would have p%id Grower pursuant to tho terms of the contract and the cost to Buyer to 
replhce tlie onions Grower failed $0 deliver, plus legs1 fees and costs. The Grower granted Buyer a lien 
on its crops and produce and the proceeds thereof in the cvcnt of i ts default o r  brench and Grower 
assigned payment from the sale of said crops or produce to Buyer. 
WFIEREFBFUZ, the claimant, FOUR RIVERS PACKING CO:, INC., hereby clai~ns a Iien 
up010 all produce and crops owned by PANXKE & SONS FARMS, IWC., and the oroceeds thereof, 
wherever located, to, the extent of the following: 
Cost to Buyer tci rcplnce Grower's product: $300,000.00 
Less contract price: $118,750.00 
Add Recording Fees: 39,OO 
Add Attorney Fces: 1,250.00 
TOTAL DUE BUYER FROM GROWER: $182,539.00 
STATE OF IDARO ' j 
:!IS 
County of Payette 
I, Janino L. Smith, being first dilly sworn, on my oath, depose and say that I am the secretary- 
treasurer of atid that I am authorized to act for and on behalf of Four Rivers Paclcing Co., Inc. borein; that I 
hnve read the foregoing claim and know the contents thereof and know that the same are true and that it 
contains a correct statement of the demand of Four EUvers Packing Co., Xnc. after deducting all just credits and 
offsets; and that the claim herein stated is just. 
Birch Law OiGces, C S x  
P. 0. Box I57 
PFIYCIIC, Idaho 6360 I 
Instrmemt # 203i l i  
WISER, WABMSCITON, IDAMQ 
2006-1092 08:M).OO No. ol Pager: 1. 
Bruce H. Birch 
BIRCH LAW OFFICE, CHTD. 
143 1 South Main Street 
PO Box 157 
Payette, Idaho 83661 
Telephone: (208) 642-9071 
Facsimile: (208) 642-9072 
ISB# 2645 
Attorney for Defendants Filed 
s ~ p , ~ o ~  winwn 3: (L~M. ---- 
Clark i;istr18 Court 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TKE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 





RANDY SMITH and JANINE SMITH, ) 
husband and wife, individually and in 1 
their separate capacity, dba FOUR 1 
RIVERS PACKING CO., 1 
ANSWER 
Defendants. 1 1 
COMES NOW the Defendants, by and through their attorney, Bruce H. Birch, I 
and in response to the Verified Complaint (herein referred to as Complaint) filed herein do I 
admit, deny, and allege as follows: 
ANSWER - 1 
iXara\c\Corel\Suile8WOUR IVERS PACKJNG COVANIKEWANIKE v 4 RIVERS\ANSWER.wpd 
1. The Defendants admit the allegations of Paragraph 1. through 4. of the 
Complaint filed herein. 
2. As to the allegations of Paragraph 5. of the Complaint, the Defendants 
admit only that in January 2006 Randy Smith spoke to a representative of the Plaintiff 
corporation. 
3. The Defendants deny the allegations of Paragraphs 6., 7., 8. and 9. of the 
Complaint filed herein. 
4. As to the allegations of Paragraph 10. of the Complaint, the Defendant 
admits only that the parties signed a contract in January 2006. 
5. The Defendants admit the first sentence of Paragraph 11. of the 
Complaint filed herein; further, that the Defendants lack information sufficient to admit or 
deny the allegations set forth in the second sentence of Paragraph 11. of the Complaint and 
iherefore deny the same. 
6 .  As to the allegations of Paragraph 12. of the Complaint filed herein, the 
Defendants admit only that the Plaintiff raised onions for it in 2002. 
7. The Defendants deny the allegations of Paragraphs 13. through 28. of 
he Complaint filed herein. 
8. The Defendants respond to the allegation of Paragraph 29. of the 
:omplaint in a manner consistent with its responses to Paragraphs 1. through 20. as more 
~articularly set out above. 
9. The Defendants deny the allegations of Paragraphs 30. through 33. of 
he Complaint filed herein. 
10. The object to Plaintiffs request for a declaratory ruling on 
NSWER - 2  
<sra\c\C~rel\SuiteE\FOUR RIVERS PACKING COVANIKEWANIKE v 4 RIVERWNSWER.wpd 
I 
1 the validity of the Contract entered into between the parties as the same is valid on its face, the 
Plaintiff having given no reason why it is not valid. 
11. The Defendants object to Plaintiff's request for a declaratory ruling on 
whether the Plaintiff complied with the terms and conditions of the Contract as the Plaintiff 
admits it did not deliver onions from fields designated by Defendant Four Rivers Packing Co. 
12. The Defendants respond to Paragraph 36. of the Complaint in a manner 
consistent with its responses to Paragraphs 1. through 27. more particularly set out above. 
13. The Defendants join in Plaintiff's request for declaratory relief as is 
more particularly set out in Paragraphs 37. and 38. 
14. All allegations set forth in Plaintiffs Complaint which are not 
specifically admitted are denied. 
First Affirmative Defense 
That the Plaintiff has failed to allege a cause of action against Randy Smith or Janine 
Smith in their individual capacities for which reason they should be dismissed as parties to this 
, action. 
I Second Affirmative Defense 
I I That the Plaintiff, by and through its agent, read, understood and is bound by the terms 
of its Contract with Four Rivers Packing Co. 
Third Affirmative Defense 
That the Plaintiff breached the terms of its Contract with Four Rivers Packing Co. 
because it anticipated it could make more money on its 2006 onion crop by selling the same on 
the open market instead of honoring the terms of its contract with Four Rivers Packing Co. 
ANSWER - 3 
\U(ara\c\CorchSuite8WOUR RIVERS PACKING COWANIKEV'ANIKE v 4 RiVE.RS\ANSWERwpd 
Fourth Affirmative Defense 
That the Contract entered into between the parties was not an adhesion contract, as it 
was not an agreement between two parties of unequal bargaining strength, expressed in the 
language of a standardized contract, written by the more powerful bargainer to meet its own 
needs, and offered to the weaker party on a "take-it-or-leave-it basis". Further, Greg Panike 
contacted Randy Smith, General Manager of Four Rivers Packing Co. in January 2006 and 
requested that said company enter into a two year onion contract with Plaintiff. 
Fifth Affirmative Defense 
That the Contract entered into by the parties granted the Defendant corporation a lien 
on all of Plaintiffs crop or crop proceeds. 
WHEREFORE, the Defendants pray for judgment as follows: 
1. That the Court dismiss the Verified Complaint filed herein and grant 
the Plaintiff no relief thereunder. 
2. That the Defendants be awarded their reasonable attorney fees and 
sosts incurred in defense hereof. 
3. For such other and fiuther relief as the Court may deem just and 
:quitable. 
Dated this & day of December, 2 
NSWER - 4  
bra\c\Corel\Suite8iFOLIR RLVERS PACKMG CO\PANIKEVANIKE v 4 RLVERSL4NSWER.wpd 



























I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2 day of December, 2006, I caused to be 
sewed a true and correct copy of the foregoing document on the person set forth below by the 
method indicated: 
Lary Walker - X U.S. Mail 
Attorney for Plaintiff Overnight Mail 
P. 0. Box828 - Hand Delivery 
Weiser, Idaho 83672  Fax Transmission 
ANSWER - 5  
\K~(aFJ\corsl\Suse8WOUR RIVERS PACKING COWANIKEWANIKE v 4 RIVERSWNSWER wd 
QQ~O%@ 
Lary C. Walker, ISB No. 1303 
Delton L. Walker, ISB No. 5839 
Walker Law Offices 
232 East Main Street 
Post Office Box 828 
Weiser, Idaho 83672 
Telephone: (208) 414-0390 
Facsimile: (208) 414-0404 
- 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, I N  AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
PANIKE & SONS FARMS, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
RANDY SMITH and JANINEi SMITH, 
husband and wife, individually and in their 
















Upon reviewing the Stipulation to Vacate and to Reset Hearing Ned in the above- 
captioned matter and good cause appearing therefor: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the hearing previously set in the above-captioned matter 
to commence on Monday, J 
for Court and counsel. 
Page 1 of 1 - 
N:\CLENTS\Panike, Greg p o w  Rivers) 8922\Washington County Case\Order Vacating Stipulation and to Rcset Hearing.doc 
000a39 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I DO HEREBY certify that on the JJ day of January 2007, I caused to be served on 
the following a true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated 
below: 
Bruce H. Birch 
P.O. Box 157 
Payette, ID 83661 
By U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
By Overnight 
CI) By Hand 
[I] By Facsimile 642-9072 
Page 3 of 3 STIPULATION TO VACATE AND RESET HEARING 
N:\CLIENTS\Panike, Greg (Four Rivers) 8922\Washington County CaseiStipulalion to Vacate and Stipulation to Reset Hearing.doc 
0aQQ;Zo 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
PANIKE & SONS FARMS, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
RANDY SMITH and JANINE! SMITH, 
Husband and wife, individually and in their 




) CASE NO. CV2006-00567 
1 ORDER SETTING CASE FOR 






IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above entitled case is scheduled for a three (3) day Jury 
trial before the Honorable Stephen W. Drescher, District Judge, at 9:00 a.m. on October 29,2007 at 
the Washington County Courthouse, Weiser, Idaho. A pretrial conference is scheduled for 1:30 p.m. 
on September 24,2007 at the Washington County Courthouse. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all parties must comply with the following schedule: 
1. Join parties or amend the pleadings at least sixty (60) days prior to the date of trial. 
ORDER SETTING CASE FOR 
TRIAL AND PRETRIAL 1 
2. All discovery is to be completed at least twenty-eight (28) days prior to trial. 
3. All prekial motions are to have been filed and argued at least twenty-eight (28) days prior 
to trial. All motions for summary judgment shall be filed and noticed in compIiance with 
I.R.C.P. Rule 56(c). 
4. All parties must file with the Court at least seven (7) days before trial: 
A. A concise written statement of the theory of recovery or defense, the elements of that 
theory and supporting authorities. 
B. A written list identifying stipulated facts, all witnesses and all exhibits to be introduced 
at k i d  with a statement whether the exhibit is stipulated admissible. 
C. A written statement that the parties have discussed settlement or the use of exkajudicid 
procedures including alternative dispute techniques to resolve the dispute. 
D. Proposed jury instructions and verdict forms, if applicable. 
Attorneys attending the prekial conference must have authorization to enter into stipulations 
regarding factual issues and admission of exhibits. 
Each party is hereby notified that noncompliance with this Order may result in the Court 
imposing sanctions. 
day of May, 2007. 
----_. -. 
District Judge Stephen W. 
ORDER SETTING CASE FOR 
TRIAL AND PRETRIAL 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing order was forwarded to 
the following persons on this @ 'day of May, 2007. 
Lary C. Walker 
Walker Law Offices 
P.O. Box 828 
Weiser, Idaho 83672 
Bruce H. Birch 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 157 
Payette, Idaho 83661 
SHARON WIDNER 
Clerk of the District Court 
ORDER SETTING CASE FOR 
TRIAL AND PRETRIAL 
7 SHARON WlDNEfl o2 :/o P, M. 
pb$ Dlstriot court. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
PANIKE & SONS FARMS, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
RANDY SMITH and JANINE SMITH, 
Husband and wife, individually and in 
their separate capacity, dba FOUR 
RIVERS PACKING CO., 
Defendants, 
) J 
CASE NO. CV-2006-0567 & 
) CV-2007-0725 
1 









FOUR RIVERS PACKING CO., 1 






PANIKE & SONS FARMS, INC., ) 
) 
Defendant. 1 
The above-entitled matter came on for pretrial conference September 24,2007. Lary Walker 
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE ORDER I 
4626011 Llne 1 
Oct.19. 2007 ll:59AM W? n g t o n  C o o n t v  C l e r k  
was present on behalf of the Plain.tiff, Bruce Birch was present on behalf of the Defendant. Based 
upon the representations of the parties ITIS ORDERED: 
1. . Issues in Dispute: Whether conkact was breached by conforming or nonconforming 
2. Msoovexy i s  substantively complete. No Court intervention is required, 
3. The'three (2) day Jury Trial is set for October 29,2007. 
4. The parties are to comply with the remainder ofthe Order Setting Case for Tfid and 
Pretrial filed the 8' and 10' day of May, 2007. 
8. Objections to this Pretrial Order shall be Ued withia fourken (14) days. 
.*ED *p of 
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE ORDER 2 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Pretrial Conference Order 
was forwarded to the following persons on this -Pi& /day of October, 2007. 
Lary Walker 
Walker Law Offices 
P.O. Box 828 
Weiser, Idaho 83672 
Bruce H. Birch 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 157 
Payette, Idaho 83661 
SHARON WIDNER 
Clerk of the District Court 
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE ORDER 3 
000@;26 
Bruce H. =rch 
BIRCH LAW OFFICE, CHTD. 
39 South Main Street 
PO Box 157 
Payette, Idaho 83661 
Telephone: (208) 642-9071 
Facsimile: (208) 642-9072 Piled 
ISB# 2645 W A & e i  t?.i$% 
Clerk Dlstrii Coufl* 
/I 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
l o  I1 THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THZ COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
PANlh2 b SONS FARMS, INC., 
1 Plaintiff, 
RANDY SMITH and JANDYE SMITH, 
husband and wife, individually and in 
their separate capacity, dba FOUR 
RIVERS PACKING CO., 
Defendants 
FOUR RIVERS PACKING CO., 
an Idaho Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
PANIKE & SONS FARMS, INC., 
Defendant. 
* * a * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  
Case No. 2006-00567 / 
PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM 
I. THEORY OF CASE - BREACH OF CONTRACT 
28 PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM - I I/ 
Four Rivers Packing Company shall be referred to herein as "Plaintiff' and 
Panike & Sons Farms, Inc. shall be referred to herein as Defendant. In its Pleadings, 
Defendant names Janine Smith and Randy Smith dba Four Rivers Packing, however, Four 
Rivers Packing Company is not an assumed business name for Janine and Randy Smith. It is an 
Idaho corporation. On January 13, 2006, the parties entered into a field run contract entitled 
"Contract To Buy Or Handle" (Contract herein) whereby Defendant agreed to sell onions to 
Plaintiff. This agreement was executed by an authorized representative of Plaintiff, Randy 
Smith (Smith herein), and by the majority shareholder and vice-president of Panike & Sons 
Farms, Inc., Greg Panike (Panike herein). After the Contract was signed, there was no further 
discussion between Smith and Panike until the following August. 
In August 2006, Smith exercised Plaintiffs contractual right to designate 
Defendant's fields from which onions were to be harvested to fill the Contract. He wrote 
Panike two letters, the latter of which specifically identified those fields from which Defendant 
was to deliver onions to Plaintiffs packing shed. Panike received and read these letters and 
acting for Defendant, Panike refused to honor Plaintiffs designation of fields. On a later date, 
Panike attempted to deliver onions to Plaintiffs Weiser, Idaho packing shed that were 
harvested from non-designated fields. Because these onions were not from the designated 
fields, they did not conform to the terms of the Contract and Plaintiff did not accept them for 
processing. 
The dispute between the parties arises over the first words of Paragraph 1. of 
the Contract, "Buyer shall designate fields". Onion packers, such as Plaintiff, are known to 
insert provisions in their pre-season contracts reserving the right to designate the fields from 
which the grower must deliver onions to fulfil its contract obligation. ARer the grower's crop 
is planted and as it matures, the packer inspects the grower's fields to determine which of those 
fields will yield the best produce. The packer then notifies the grower that delivery is to be 
made from those specific fields. Panike is familiar with the trade practice of designating fields. 
Defendant asserts that the contract provision obligating Defendant to deliver onions from 
'RETRIAL MEMORANDUM - 2 QQQ028 
designated fields is not valid because those fields were not identified at the time of contracting. 
To identify fields at the time of contract would render the practice meaningless 
Had the Defendant delivered the designated onions to Plaintiff it would have 
been paid the contract price of $4.75 per hundred weight or an amount not exceeding 
$1 18,750.00. The 2006 onion crop brought record prices with the market price for onions 
exceeding $50.00 per hundred weight in February 2007. 
By reason of Defendant's breach of contract, Plaintiff had to purchase 
replacement onions on the open market at a price significantly greater than the $4.75 per cwt. 
it would have paid Defendant. 
11. STIPULATED FACTS 
None 





Miscellaneous employees of Four Rivers Packing Co., including office personnel, sales 








Any other person identified in Defendant's or Plaintiffs discovery response. 
N. POTENTIAL DEFENSE EXHIBITS 
(No exhibits have been stipulated as admissible) 
All documents provided to the Plaintiff by Defendant in discovery 
All documents provided to the Defendant by the Plaintiff in discovery. 
Any documents referred to by either party during a deposition or 
which may have been marked as a deposition exhibit 
Deposition of any party to this action 
V. RESOLUTION EFFORTS 
'RETRIAL MEMORANDUM - 3 
Counsel for the parties discussed the use of alternative dispute resolution techniques and 
%greed that the same would not be of benefit in this case. 
VI. PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND VERDICT FORMS 
Not applicable. 
Dated this a day of October, 2007. 
B ~ Z H .  Birch 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
d 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of October, 2007, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document on the person set forth below by the 
method indicated: 
Lary Walker - U.S. Mail 
Attorney for Defendant - Overnight Mail 
P. 0 .  Box 828 - Hand Delivery 
Weiser, Idaho 83672 X F a x  Transmission 
secretary(& Mr. Birch 
PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM - 4 
Bruce H. Birch 
BIRCH LAW OFFICE, CHTD. 
1431 South Main Street 
PO Box 157 
~ G e t t e ,  Idaho 83661 
Telephone: (208) 642-9071 
Facsimile: (208) 642-9072 
ISB# 2645 ' . 
Attorney for Plaintiff Piled ,dM!hn~ =I$, 7 
SHARON WlDMER 3:93?. M. P 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THJRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
TKE STATE OF LDAHO, WAND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
PANIKE & SONS FARMS, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
RANDY SMRH and JANINE SMITH, 
husband and wife, individually and in 
their separate capacity, dba FOUR 
RIVERS PACKING CO., 
Defendants. 
FOUR W E R S  PACKING CO., 
an Idaho Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
PANIKE & SONS FARMS, INC., 
Defendant. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Case No. CV-2006-00567 /' 
AMENDED 
PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM 
Case No. CV-2007-00725 
I. THEORY OF CASE - BREACH OF CONTRACT 
AMENDED P W 1 U  MEMORANDUM - 1 
Four Rivers Packing Company shall be referred to herein as "Plaintiff' and 
Panike & Sons Farms, Inc. shall be referred to herein as Defendant. In its Pleadings, 
Defendant names Janine Smith and Randy Smith dba Four Rivers Packing, however, Four 
Rivers Packing Company is not an assumed business name for Janine and Randy Smith. It is 
an Idaho corporation. On January 13,2006, the parties entered into a field run contract 
entitled "Contract To Buy Or Handle" (Contract herein) whereby Defendant agreed to sell 
onions to Plaintiff. This agreement was executed by an authorized representative of Plaintiff, 
Randy Smith (Smith herein), and by the majority shareholder and vice-president of Panike & 
Sons Farms, Inc., Greg Panike (Panike herein). After the Contract was signed, there was no 
further discussion between Smith and Panike until the following August. 
In August 2006, Smith exercised Plaintiffs contractual right to designate 
Defendant's fields from which onions were to be harvested to fill the Contract. He wrote 
Panike two letters, the latter of which specifically identified those fields from which 
Defendant was to deliver onions to Plaintiffs packing shed. Panike received and read these 
letters and acting for Defendant, Panike refused to honor Plaintiffs designation of fields. On 
a later date, Panike attempted to deliver onions to Plaintiffs Weiser, Idaho packing shed that 
were harvested from non-designated fields. Because these onions were not from the 
designated fields, they did not conform to the terms of the Contract and Plaintiff did not 
accept them for processing. 
The dispute between the parties arises over the first words of Paragraph 1. of 
the Contract, "Buyer shall designate fields". Onion packers, such as Plaintiff, are known to 
insert provisions in their pre-season contracts reserving the right to designate the fields from 
which the grower must deliver onions to fi~lfil its contract obligation. After the grower's 
crop is planted and as it matures, the packer inspects the grower's fields to determine which of 
those fields will yield the best produce. The packer then notifies the grower that delivery is 
to be made from those specific fields. Panike is familiar with the trade practice of designating 
fields. Defendant asserts that the contract provision obligating Defendant to deliver onions 
AMENDED PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM - 2 
from designated fields is not valid because those fields were not identified at the time of 
contracting. To identify fields at the time of contract would render the practice meaningless, 
Had the Defendant delivered the designated onions to Plaintiff it would have 
been paid the contract price of $4.75 per hundred weight or an amount not exceeding 
$1 18,750.00. The 2006 onion crop brought record prices with the market price for onions 
exceeding $50.00 per hundred weight in February 2007. 
By reason of Defendant's breach of contract, Plaintiff had to purchase 
replacement onions on the open market at a price significantly greater than the $4.75 per cwt. 
it would have paid Defendant. 
11. STIPaATED FACTS 
None. 




~ r u c e  Johnson 
Miscellaneous employees of Four Rivers Paclung Co., including office personnel, sales 
re~resentative, Robert Hert. Judy Sterling. Delores Bennett, Marianne Danilson -. 







Any other person identified in Defendant's or Plaintiffs discovery response. 
IV. POTENTIAL DEFENSE EXHIBITS 
(No exhibits have been stipulated as admissible) 
A11 documents provided to the Plaintiff by Defendant in discovery 
All. documents provided to the Defendant by the Plaintiff in discovery. 
Any documents referred to by either party during a deposition or 
which may have been marked as a deposition exhibit 
Deposition of any party to this action 
Pleadings or correspondence of the Defendant 
AMENDED PRETRLQL. MEMORANDUM - 3 
1 11 V. RESOLUTION EFFORTS 
V1. PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND VERDICT FORMS 
Not applicable. 
Dated this&day of October, 2007. 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Counsel for the parties discussed the use of alternative dispute resolution techniques and 
agreed that the same would not he of benefit in this case. 
+ 
I HBREBY CERTIFY that on the day of October, 2007, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document on the person set forth below by the 
method indicated: 
Lary Walker 
Attorney for Defendant 
P. 0. Box 828 
Weiser, Idaho 83672 
AMENDED PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM - 4  
- U.S. Mail 
- Overnight Mail 
- Hand Delivery 
X Fax Transmission - 
Lary C. Walker, ISB No. 1303 
Delton L. Walker, ISB No. 5839 
Walker Law Offices 
232 East Main Street 
Post Office Box 828 
Weiser, Idaho 83672 
Telephone: (208) 414-0390 
Facsimile: (208) 414-0404 
Attorneys for Panike & Sons, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
1 





) TRIAL MEMORANDUM 
RANDY SMITH and JANINE SMITH, ) 
husband and wife, individually and in their ) 
separate capacity, dba FOUR RIVERS ) 
PACKING CO., ) 
1 
Defendants. 1 
FOUR RIVER PACKING CO., ) 










UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (UCC) 
1. The contract between the parties in this litigation was for the purchase and sale of 
goods, namely onion crops which clearly falls within the scope of the UCC, section 28-2-102. 
I 
I See Magic Valley Foods, Inc. v. Sun Valley Potatoes, Inc., 134 Idaho 785,788,lO P.3d, 734. 
I 
Page 1 of 7 - TRIAL MEMORANDUM 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
2. Early in 2006, Four Rivers Packing Co., (Four Rivers) and Panike & Sons Farms, 
Inc., (Panike). Wherein Panike sold 25,000 hundredweight of the onions to Four Rivers pursuant 
to the terms and conditions of the contract. See Exhibit 1 attached. 
3. The contract, paragraph 1 states: "Buyer will specify fields", however no 
designation was made at the time the contract was executed, even though testimony will show 
that the fields in which Panike was going to plant onions were available for reviewing, were 
bedded and fertilized for onion crop for the 2006 year. 
4. Panike grows onions for other purposes, including storage in their own air 
regulated storage facilities in order to store sufficient onions to pay his operating costs and 
expense for farming. 
5. The contract does not specify that the buyer, late in the growing season, after the 
onions have nearly reached maturity can make a designation without some mutual agreement 
between the parties. No such mutual agreement was made in August when Four Rivers 
attempted to make a designation of the fields they desired. 
6 .  Further, Four Rivers as the buyer is not entitled to pick and choose a field that 
would yield onions of a more valuable and larger size than designated in the contract. 
7. Therefore, when Panike was notified in August that Four Rivers was attempting at 
that late date to make a designation, through legal counsel, Four Rivers was clearly notified that 
they would be furnished onions that meet the contract specifications, but not out of the field Four 
River had designated. The claimed field was a different variety of onions of significantly greater 
value than what was purchased under the contract. 
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8. Consistent with the contract terms, and the communication about field designation 
Panike tender delivered onions at a reasonable time and place as designated in the contract, 
meeting the contract specifications in all particulars. This tender of delivery was consistent with 
UCC 28-2-503 and buyer had a reasonable opportunity to take possession, inspect, and 
determine that the onions did in fact meet the contract specific actions. 
9. Section 28-2-507 states that tender or delivery is a condition of buyer's duty to 
accept and the pay if the tender andlor delivery of the goods is in conformity with the contract 
specifications. 
10. The contract was for 2006 onions, with no field designation and no time dates for 
delivery. Panike therefore in delivering the onions meeting the contract specifications met all the 
agreed upon contract terms thus fulfilling his obligation under the contract. 
11. It is Panike's position that the attempted designation of a particular field late in 
the season without mutual agreement between the parties was an attempt to modify the contract 
in writing between the parties without reaching mutual agreement. 
12. Panike was therefore entitled to deliver onions &om any field meeting the contract 
specifications of size and quality. 
13. Each load which was rejected by Four Rivers was delivered to Feltham Growers 
and each load was inspected by the federal and state agriculture inspectors verifying that all 
onions, in excess of 25,000 hundredweight delivered to Feltham, after the rejection did in fact 
meet the contract specifications. 
14. UCC 28-2-513 does not give Four Rivers an absolute right to reject, they have a 
reasonable opportunity to inspect and accept or reject the goods if they are not in conformity 
with the contract. The contract does not give them a right to reject delivery of conforming 
onions. 
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15. Four Rivers did not even inspect the loads taken to their facility by Panike but 
simply ask if they were out of the field designated by them in August which Panike said no, but 
they did meet contract specifications. At that, they simply indicated that if they were not from 
the designated field they were going to reject all deliveries, which they did without any further 
inspection. This is not in a reasonable determination of their right to reject the goods. 
16. UCC 28-2-703 provides sellers with remedies which are available to them if the 
buyer wrongfully rejects the goods. In this case Panike had the right to sell the goods in a good- 
faith reasonably commercial manner. See also 28-2-706, UCC. 
17. At the time the contract was executed no money was exchanged or paid by Four 
Rivers to Panike. Four Rivers did not designate or advance any variety of onion seed, fertilizer, 
or carry out any other provisions of their contract. 
18. At the time of harvest Four Rivers did not tender any payment, or make any 
payment whatsoever to Panike. They did not offer the contract price at any time to Panike, if he 
delivered onions meeting the contract specifications. 
19. After wrongfully rejecting the goods purchased under the contract, Four Rivers filed 
and agricultural commodities lien against Panike without a legal right, therefore causing 
damages to Panike. 
20. Panike was forced to file their case against Four Rivers in order to resolve the 
problems caused by the agricultural commodities lien, which delayed Panike fkom receiving 
payment for agricultural products marketed through other purchasers, including sugar beets, 
onions grain and other crops totaling in excess of $100,000.00. 
21. Panike was required to retain legal counsel and negotiate with these commodity 
dealers and was finally able to obtain payments after those commodity dealers determined that 
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the agricultural commodity lien was not validly filed or recorded with the Secretary of State of 
the State of Idaho. 
22. Panike ultimately received the funds in excess of $100,000.00, but only after 
expending attorneys fees and approximately a 60 day delay and some of the funds Panike has not 
yet received to date. These are consequential damages as provided under the UCC 28-2-713 
which authorize the recovery of incidental and consequential damages. 
23. This same section 713, provides that Panike is entitled to damages of the difference 
between market price at the time of tender and the wrongll rejection by buyer. The onions 
stored with Appleton Produce which had been designated for delivery to Four Rivers were 
ultimately and reasonably commercially marketed at a price greater than the contract price, thus 
Panike sustained no damages relating to the market price. 
24. Incidental andlor consequential damages is defined under the UCC section 28-2-715 
as those damages that could not be recovered by or prevented by proper cure andlor delivery. 
Panike's inability to pay and repay his operating loan for more than 60 days resulted in 
substantial interest accrual on his existing operating financing for which he is entitled to recover. 
25. Panike contends that Four Rivers only basis for rejection was there attempt to 
wrongfully designate a field, when it was not agreed upon in the contract, because they wanted a 
bigger onion out of the designated fields which were of much more value and would have 
resulted in a windfall under the contract. 
26. That is not a reasonable basis to reject the goods that were purchased and 
designated in the contract as 75% 3-inch minimum onions of USDA quality as word tendered for 
delivery by Panike. 
27. Panike intends to rely on the UCC and case law relating to the same and attaches 
for the court's convenience the Magic Valley Foods case above-referenced, the Lickley v. Max 
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Herbold, hc., 133 Idaho 209, a case dealing with delivery and acceptance under the UCC of 
nonconforming potatoes, where the purchase price had not been agreed upon. 
28. The Keller v Inland Metals AII Weather Conditioning, Inc. 139 Idaho 233, 76 P3d 
977, case involved the sale of unit that removed humidity from the air which turned out to be too 
small. As the supreme court held, a buyer's rejection of the smaller unit did not entitle them to 
damages equal to the value of the larger unit. 
29. Finally, the Figueroa v. Kit-San Co., 123 Idaho 149; 845 P.2d 567, relates to the 
requirements to have in the meeting of the minds as to the terms of the contract and any 
modifications or amendments to that agreement. This case also deals with the law relating to 
acceptance or rejection of goods under the UCC. 
30. Because of the stipulation between the parties to vacate the trial setting, and the 
shortness of time when finding out the case was going to go ahead to trial has not allowed 
adequate time to prepare for trial, review witnesses, exhibits and complete a more thorough 
briefing of these cases. 
Respectfully submitted. 
DATED this the *day of October, 2007. 
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C] By Overnight 
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MAGIC VALLEY FOODS, INC., a corporation; and Rolland Jones Potatoes, Inc., a corporation, Plaintiffs- 
Respondents-Cross Appellants, v. SUN VALLEY POTATOES, lNC., a corporation, Defendant-Appellant-Cross 
Respondent. 
[Cite as Magic Valley Foods, Inc. v. Sun Valley Potatoes, Inc., 134 Idaho 7851 
No. 24840. 
Supreme Court of Idaho, Twin Falls, March 2000 Term. 
Rehearing Denied Oct. 12,2000. 
Potato buyer and its "sister corporation" brought an action alleging seller's breach of installment contracts for sale of 
goods. After a bench trial, the District Court, Minidoka County, Daniel B. Meehl, J., found that both buyer and seller 
had reasonable grounds for not performing the contract. Cross-appeals were taken. The Supreme Court, Kidwell, J., 
held that: (1) seller did not waive contractual requirement of payment within 30 days of delivery; (2) seller justifiably 
withheld delivery after buyer refised to pay for past deliveries; and (3) buyer's anticipatory repudiation was not 
justified. 
Reversed and remanded. 
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John A. Bradley, Burley, for appellants. 
Bollar & Goodman, Rupert, for respondent. Alan C. Goodman argued. 
KIDWELL, Justice. 
This case involves a contract dispute arising from the non-delivery of and non-payment for potatoes. Plaintiffs 
alleged that defendants failed to deliver the potatoes contracted for, while defendant charged that it was excused %om 
delivery because of plaintiffs' refusal to pay for past deliveries. Following a bench trial, the district court held that both 
sides had reasonable grounds for not performing the contract. We reverse and remand. 
FACTS AiYD PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Appellant Sun Valley Potatoes, Inc. (Sun Valley) is a fresh packer of potatoes. Respondent Magic Valley Foods, 
Inc. (Magic Valley) is a processor of potatoes. Sun Valley and Magic Valley entered into three written contracts 
wherein Sun Valley agreed to sell and deliver and Magic Valley agreed to purchase potatoes. Subsequent to the written 
contracts, the parties also entered into a fourth contract which was not reduced to writing. The contracts were identified 
by the parties as 9415, 9416, 9418 and the oral contract 9470. During the negotiations on these contracts, Sun Valley 
was represented by its president, A.R. "Gus" Blase. Magic Valley was represented by Richard Johnson, a purchasing 
agent for Magic Valley. 
The written contracts, which were all drafted by Magic Valley, were intended to follow the cycle of the potato crop 
for the 1994-1995 year. Thus, when c ery under one contract ended, delivel. ier the next contract would begin. 
The first contract, 9416, called for dellvery of 200,000 hundred weight (cwt.) of potatoes to be delivered starting in 
August of 1994 and ending when delivery was complete. Even though Sun Valley did not deliver the entire 200,000 
cwt., the parties agreed that the contract had been llfilled when Sun Valley advised Magic Valley that it had ended its 
early season run. 
The ledger sheet kept by Magic Valley showed that under contract 9416, Sun Valley provided nine weekly 
invoices, but none of those invoices were paid according to the t m  in all of the contract's "net thirty (30) days on 
amounts delivered on a weekly basis." Sun Valley was paid on three of the invoices on November 16, 1994. Sun Valley 
was paid for the remaining invoices under contract 9416 on January 19, 1995. Both of these payments were made to 
Sun Valley from a third corporation, Rolland Jones Potatoes, Inc. (Rolland Jones), a "sister company" of Magic Valley. 
At the time of the payments, Sun Valley owed money on an open account to Rolland Jones. To make payments, 
Rolland Jones would pay Sun Valley 
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for potatoes delivered to Magic Valley, but only if Sun Valley agreed to "trade checks" with Rolland Jones for the 
amounts that Sun Valley owed to Rolland Jones. Richard Johnson of Magic Valley testified that Sun Valley was "held 
hostage" under the trading of checks, which had been initiated by Rolland Jones. None of the contracts between Magic 
Valley and Sun Valley provided for a trading of checks for payment. 
The second contract, 9415, called for another 200,000 cwt. of potatoes to be delivered starting in September of 
1994 and running until February of 1995. The parties agreed that this contract was filled when Sun Valley delivered 
200,154.3 cwt. of potatoes. Magic Valley's invoices under contract 9415 totaled 25 in all. As with contract 9416, none 
of the contracts were paid pursuant to the contract's 30-day provision. On January 19,1995, Rolland Jones paid Sun 
Valley for 11 of the 25 invoices by trading checks. This was the last time Sun Valley traded checks with Magic Valley; 
thereafter Magic Valley simply mailed a check to Sun Valley without requiring Sun Valley to tender a check back to 
Rolland Jones. Each of the deliveries to Magic Valley was accepted and processed by Magic Valley. At trial the parties 
stipulated that Magic Valley still owed Sun Valley $109,478.63 on contract 9415. 
The third written contract was number 9418 which called for 300,000 cwt. of potatoes to be delivered by Sun 
Valley between February 1995 and July 1995. Prior to the commencement of contract 941 8, however, the parties 
entered into an oral contract, 9470. This contract called for either 30,000 or 50,000 cwt. (the parties did not agree at 
trial) of potatoes to be delivered at a price of $2.50/cwt. compared to the $1.13/cwt. of the three written contracts. The 
need for this contract arose because Sun Valley was having difficulty in obtaining potatoes from growers on 
consignment to deliver at the low contract price. Sun Valley began delivering under contract 9470 on January 3, 1995 
and completed delivery on February 28, 1995. Even though the parties could not agree at trial as to how many cwt. 
were to be delivered, Magic Valley accepted and processed 56,536.4 cwt. of potatoes that Sun Valley delivered under 
contract 9470. The parties agreed that contract 9470 was fulfilled and did not dispute the price owed to Sun Valley. 
Due to deliveries under contract 9470, deliveries under contract 9415 were interrupted. The parties contemplated 
this when they entered into contract 9470. The parties agreed to extend the delivery date of contract 941 5 until May of 
1995. Sun Valley filled contract 9415 prior to May of 1995. 
On May 3 1,1995, Sun Valley commenced delivery on the last contract, 941 8. Since contract 941 5 had extended 
late, it was agreed that contract 9418 could also be extended. The extension was until either September or October of 
1995 (the parties did not agree at trial as to the length of the extension). 
Sun Valley continued to deliver under contract 9418 until August 8,1995, when Sun Valley ceased its deliveries 
under contract 941 8 because it had not been paid for any of the ten invoices under contract 941 8, nor for 14 invoices 
remaining on contract 9415. Thus, as of August 9, 1995, Magic Valley owed Sun Valley $234,070.44 for deliveries 
under contracts 9415 and 9418. In August of 1995, Sun Valley informed Magic Valley that no more potatoes would be 
delivered under contract 941 8 unless Magic Valley made a significant payment on the delinquent accounts. Magic 
Valley did not make any further paw ! to Sun Valley on the $234,070.44 d~ 'it trial, Sun Valley admitted that it 
still owes Rolland Jones $31.304.47. During the time Sun Valley delivered on cor~cract 9418 from May 31 to August 8 
of 1995, Sun ~allev&vered to o t h d u c e r s  for a higher than that in the contracts. These potatoes we& of 
t h k a d e  as those calEd for in c o n t r a c t m i g u s t  30, 1995, Magic Valley made a written demamL@r 
2elive v s  that Sun Valley owed under contract 941 8. Sun Valley replied that 
it w-t. Because of a lack5ff p b t  
ceas in August of 1995, ,until it was able to procure potatoes from another source. 
In September of 1995, Magic Valley and Rolland Jones brought suit against Sun Valley. Following a two-day court 
trial in Feb- 
ruary of 1998, the district court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law on May 8, 1998. The district court 
concluded that because Sun Valley had not insisted on strict compliance with the 30-day payment rule, it could not 
unilaterally repudiate the contract due to late payments. Thg district court also ruled that Magic Valley was entitlqd to 
offset the $236,904.44 it owed Sun Valley against the $231,660.60 it incurred as a result of its processin~lant being 
14 days and the loss of profits m . o s . a h U h a ~  .-I h  e distnct court also ruled that Magic Valley was not 
entitled to the amount it expended to get potatoes @om the other s u p ~ ~ & @ % & k g i c  Valley sought cover a t h e  
qnnhof-e Sun Valley had to deli-inally, the district court ruled that after Magic Valley's offset, Sun Valley 
still owed Rolland Jones $26,060.63. 
On July 9, 1998, Magic Valley filed its notice of appeal. Sun Valley filed its notice of cross-appeal on July 19, 
1998. 
IT. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[I-41 This Court will defer to the district court's findings of fact if they are supported by substantial and competent 
evidence; however this Court will freely review the conclusions of law reached by stating legal rules and applying them 
to the facts found. Great Plains Equip. v. N.K Pipeline, 1E&€&aho 734,760,979 P.2d 627,633 (1999). In a case tried 
before the court, the court's findings will be liberally construed on appeal in favor of the judgment entered. Conley v. 
Whittlesey, 133 Idaho 265,269, 985 P.2d 1127,1131 (1999). Where the findings of facts are based on substantial 
evidence they will not be overturned on appeal, even if the evidence is conflicting. Id. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Sun Valley Was Entitled To Withhold Delivery On Contract 9418 Because Of Magic Valley's Chronic 
Delinquency And Non-Payment On Prior Contracts. 
Sun Valley contends that it was entitled to cancel contract 941 8 or withhold delivery because Magic Valley 
breached the contract by failing to comply with the contract's payment terms. The district court held that Sun Valley 
could not unilaterally repudiate the contract because it had failed to require strict compliance with the 30-day payment 
requirement. However, the district court also held that by August 9, 1995, Magic Valley was so delinquent that Sun 
Valley was justified in withholding further deliveries. 
Because this case i n v g -  
adopm in Idaho. LC. $28-2-102; Lickley v. MaxHerbold, Inc., 133 Idahc&XB, 212,984 P.2d 697.700 (1999). The, 
p m s j r  the va-&+but rather contend that the contracts 
m w .  - 
1. Sun Valley did not waive tl D-day payment requirement. 
[S, 61 In each of the contracts draRed by M&c Valley and agreed to bv Sun Vallev. the payment terms were "net 
-delivered on a w e e @ ~ s i s . ' '  The distnct court held that since Magic Valley had been late on * 
every payment, "strict compliance of the payment term was waived" by Sun Valiey, and thus Sun Valley could not use 
Magic Valley's late payments as an excuse to unilaterally repudiate the contract. 
[7] In order to find a waiver of a contract provision. the "party asserting the waiver must show that he acted in 
re-uponwd his position to his detriment." Margaret H. Wayne Trust v. 
Lipsky, 123 Idaho 253,256,846 P.2d 904,907 (1993110 -1ttention to waive must be clearly present, Id. - 
In this case, Magic Valley asserted that its reliance on Sun Valley's waiver of the 30-day payment requirement 
should be inferred because of Sun Valley's lack of demand for payment. Magic Valley also argues that it detrimentally 
relied upon Sun Valley's waiver when it made arrangements to purchase cover potatoes .from other suppliers. 
Magic Valley's argument is not logical. The fact that Magic Valley sought cover in case Sun Valley did not deliver 
enough potatoes does not show that Magic Valley detrimentally relied upon Sun Valley's acceptance of late payments. 
The fact that Magic Valley sought cover only shows that Magic Valley was concerned that Sun Valley would not 
deliver all of the potatoes contracted tor. Inus, Magc Valley has failed to show that it detrimentally relied on S& 
Valley's alleged waiver. 
2. Magic Valley was not justified in its anticipatory repudiation. 
[fl] As outlined by Defendant's Exhibit A, -- Magic Va l l e~w -- ts to - Swn.Vallcpa& month kom 
Janum to June of 1995. However, the monay  payments d ~ x n e v e r  enough to eradicate the growing . - .  - - - 
balance being carried by Sun valley. Even with these o a w  balance Sun ~ d l . e y G  carryin- 
$236,90 ~ g 5 9 & % 9 5 .  Thus, e%n if -Valley bad waived 1 .  
. . - p's payment, it was M e d  at 
-ding deliveries due to Magic Valley's failure to bring its account current. 
The district court held that even though "the contract was repudiated in mid September by MVF," and "MVF in 
effect repudiated 9418 by not paying in response to SW's demands," Magic Valley was eventually justified in 
withholding payment to Sun Valley and was also entitled to damages because Sun Valley anticipatorily repudiated the 
contract by withholding deliveries past August 6, 1995. To support this holding, the district court pointed out that: (1) 
Sun Valley had stopped deliveries under contract 9418 on August 9, even though Sun Valley had until at least the end 
of September to complete the contract; and (2) that during the time of delivery under contract 9418, Sun Valley was 
sending potatoes to other producers at a higher price. 
The UCC provides that when a buyer under an installment contract makes installments which "substantially impairs 
the value of the whole contract there is a breach of the whole." LC. 5 28-2-612(3). As explained in the comments to 
that section: 
[A] seller may withhold a delivery pending payment for prior ones, at the same time delayjng his decision 
as to cancellation. A reasonable ttme tor not~Ffpng of cancellation, judged bv commercial standards unde? 
t& section on good faith, extends of course to include the time covered by any reasonable n e g o t l a t m  
g 6 d  faith. 
.. 
4----- 
I.C. 5 28-2-612 (comment 7). 
As of August 9, 1995, Sun Valley had delivered 108,169 cwt. (at the contract price of $1.13 cwt.) of potatoes to 
Magic Valley under contract 9418. Magic Valley, on the other hand, had withheld payments totaling $236,904.44 on 
contracts 9415 and 9418. During this time, Sun Valley had also been providing potatoes to other suppliers at a higher 
price. 
The district court found that sometime in August (the exact time was not determined) a meeting was held between 
Gus Blase of Sun Valley and Richard Johnson of Magic Valley. At this meeting "Blase made it clear no more potatoes 
would be delivered absent s i g n i f i w t . "  
-
--h 
Thus, Sun Valley had the right on August 9,1995 to cancel contract 941 8 because Magic Valley breached the 
contract. Sun Valley justifiably withheld delivefy under contract 9418 on August 9, 1995, by refusing to deliver more .- . 
potatoes absent payment by Magic vi1ley. Sun Vallev then -Vaky . . %its intent to can&1ky 
informing -mat it would not make -ent. The district court 
correc --y bas  juskhed in withholding deliveries under contract 941 8 because of Magic 
Valleys lacK of significant m e n t .  
- 
'.---- --- 
3. Sun Valley could have completed contract 9418. 
[9] The district court found that during the time Sun Valley was making deliveries under 941 8, it was also making 
deliveries to other producers at a higher price. Therefore, the district court held that because "[iJt was obvious that SVP 
was either unable or unwilling to tender complete performance, even within the extended time frame," Magic 
Page 790 
Valley "was eventually justified in withholding payment. ever, the district court's reasoning is not supported by 
its fii;din,P.sAXwt+ 
r 
%'bile not included in the district court's findings of fact, both Gus Blase and Richard Johnson testified that they 
understood the completion date under contract 9418 had been extended. Both sides testified at trial: Johnson that he 
thought it had been extended into September, and Blase that it was extended for 60 to 90,days. Thus, even under Magic 
Vallev's understandinz. Sun Vallev still had until the end of Seutember to complete performance. Furthermore, Blase - - 
t e s ~ i f h a t  the 1994 crop year ended on August 8, but that the new crop year-would begin only a few days later. 
- - -- Therefore, it was conceivable that Sun V a y m c o m p E t t g l ~ v  . ~ ~ X 8 b v i  I_____, thm the exte5ded 
In fact, the district court ruled that "SVP did have at least through September to perform as best it could or would. 
Maybe though October Either time was ahcr MVF in effect r e p u d r d  9418 by not paying& rRponse to SVP's 
demads." The district cou>ti~en proceeded to & = E v a  ey was entltled to setoff agamst Sun valley -, 
because Sun Valley breached the contract. However, there isno evidence in the record to show that Sun Valbv mukd 
not have completed the contract by delivering potatoes from the new 1995 c r o p .  ' f i e  district court erred in holding 
that because Sun Valley was70t going i-y, that Magic Valley was justified in withholding 
payment. 
4. Magic Valley failed to seek adequate assurances before repudiating the contract. - 
[lo] In an attempt to justify withholding payment, Magic Valley claims that beca 
C 
C 
In such a situation the UCC provides that " [ y l - p  the 
-rformance and until he- 
any performance for which he has not already - 
r m e  agreed return." I . C . W Q ( 1 )  a 
I 
M a g j f a i l e d p e c t s .  First, Magic Valley did not seek assurances until 
the end of August 1995, but withheld payment fiom Sun Valley mobs prior to that. Thus Magic Valley had already 
f i f l ~ # L r B  4 0 
http://66.161.141.177/cgi-bin/texis/web/idcaselaw/+wdeFRdtebmeUlfen7MqEcGcMvA W... 10/19/2007 
began =pending its performance to mmthqdior to seekin2 ass- un Valley would deliver. Second, at 
t h ' w a g l c  Valley was seeking assurances in Aupust, it had alreadv receivsa a e  potatoes for whch payment was 
owed. The statute allow io~ae r fo rmance  o-which he has not already received the ameed 
~ e c a u s e % a g i c  V already rece~ved the potatoes under contract 9418 and the previous contracts, it wa 
obligated to pay Gthout regards to ~u&alle~'s assurkces of completion of contract 9418.- 
/ 
should have sought 
other  processor^ - 
In conclusion, Magic Valley breached contract 9418 by unreasonably withholding payment to Sun Valley on 
contract 941 8 and previous contracts. Sun Valley did not anticipatorily breach because it had completed the 
requirements of the previous contracts and had at least through the month of September to compete contract 941 
Magic Valley had no justifiable reason to withhold payment on either of the previous contracts or 9418. Because 
Valley breached the contract by not paying Sun Valley's invoices, Sun Valley was justified in withholding the 
remaining potatoes under contract 9418. The district court erred in holding that Sun Valley breached the contract an 
that Magic Valley was entitled to offset its damages against the amount owed to Sun Valley. 
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B. Magic Valley Was Not Entitled To Withhold Payments To Sun Valley For Sun Valley's Debt To Rolland 
Jones. C 
[ll] Sun Valley claims that one of the reasons Magic Valley withheld payment was because Sun Valley refused to 
trade checks. Magic Valley asserts that Sun Valley's failure to trade checks was only one of the reasons why it withheld 
payments. 
At trial Bill Schow, Vice President of Magic Valley, testified that Magic Valley did not pay on contract 941 8 
because Sun Valley refused to trade checks. 
Q: In connection with contract 9418, do you have some indication as to payment by Magic Valley Foods 
or Rolland Jones Potatoes under contract 9418 for the potatoes that were delivered? Do you know whether 
any payment was made or not? 
A: There was no payment made .... well, it goes back to trading their checks again. We tried to make a 
payment-at least a partial payment-and we weren't able to make the trade in checks. And then it become 
[sic] obvious to me that I was going to be way short on contract 9418 and I suggested that maybe we'd 
better - if we can't trade checks, then we'd better be talking about [not] paying at all, because we're going to 
get hurt in this deal. 
Regarding the trading of checks, at trial Richard Johnson was asked on cross-examination "Basically you're holding 
Sun Valley hostage then, are you not Richard?" to which Johnson replied, "Well, I guess for lack of terms, that's what 
was happening." 
Thus, Magic Valley representatives testified that Magic Valley was not willing to make payment to Sun Valley 
unless Sun Valley traded checks with Magic Valley for money Sun Valley owed to Rolland Jones. As previously 
mentioned, the cont F c  Valley did not include a requirement that Sun Valley trade 
candition of payment. In fact, as the district court round, Rolland Jones was not a party 
-7 
While it appears that Idaho courts have not considered this issize before, :iic UCC does provide some guidance. 
Section 28-2-610 of the Idaho Code deals with anticipatory repudiation. Comncnt 2 of this section explains: - . . .. .- . . - 
U n d ~ n e . . o r  both parties o r  more than the contract calls for ~ I I  
,- .- -. . 
http:/166.161.141.1 77/cgi-binltexis/web/idcaselawl+~~~~t~~bmeU1ffen7M~~FqEcGcMvAW $A A d  hi;*, . .  10/19/2007 
the---performanc g t  in itself a repudiation nor does it L idate a plain expression of 
desire for future performance, Homver, w h g n d e d i r  reading it amounts to a statement of in- 
n z o p e r f o m  except on conditions which r.: 5eyond the contract, it becomes a repudiation. . 
- - 
LC. 8 28-2-610 (comment 2) (emphasis added). 
In this case, Magic Valley's representatives testified they would not make payments to Sun Valley unless Sun 
Valley agreed to trade checks for money it owed to Rolland Jones. Since Magic Valley did not pay because of Sun 
Valley's refusal to submit to conditions outside the contract, it amounted to a repudiation by Ma& Valleg- 
& 
C. Magic Valley Has No Damages With Which To Seek An Offset. 
Magic Valley argues that since Sun Valley anticipatorily repudiated the contract, Magic Valley has a statutory right 
to offset its damages against the amount owed to Sun Valley. However, since we have determined that Magic Valley 
was the party in breach, we hold that Magic Valley does not have any damages upon which it may seek an offset. 
D. The District Court Did Not Err In Holding That Magic Valley Was Not Entitled To Its "Cost of Covq," 
erc - Y 
[12] Magic Valley claims that the district court erred in holding that the cost of Magic Valley's cwer w 
speculative to be included in Ma$c Valley's d a m m e s A & i i c e  an anticiwa* 
esta-t of covexis a statutory remedy. 
The district court ruled that: 
MVF is not entitled to extra moneys (sic) expended to ' ~ c o v e ~ w c ~ e e x p ~  potatoes. 
While this court finds that all of the 191,000 + cwt contractual& 
required would not have been delivered, it cannot find that none of the amouatwoud&mdwmMiYer~bSVP 
been paid. The market place also fluctuated. Hence, it is unduly speculative to award damages lost by MVF because of 
t h a t  upswing. SVP did have at least through September to perform as best it could or would. Maybe through 
October. Either time was after MVF in effect repudiated 9418 by not paying in response to SVP's demands. 
As determined in issue A it was Magic Valley who repudiated the contract by not timely paying Sun Valley. Thus, 
Magic Valley is not entitled to any damages against Sun Valley. Magic Valley has argued that it was Sun Valley who 
breached the contract by not delivering potatoes through August of 1995. Yet Magic Valley points out that it began 
seeking cover in June of 1995. At the earliest, Sun Valley could not have breached until it stopped deliveries on August 
9, 1995. Thus, prior to that time there was no need for Magic Valley to seek cover. 
The Idaho Code provides that: 
(1) Afier a breach within the preceding section the buyer may "cover" by making in good faith and without 
unreasonable delay any reasonable purchase of or contract to purchase goods in substitution for those due 
from the seller. 
(2) The buyer may recover from the seller as damages the difference between the cost of cover and the 
contract price together with any incidental or consequential damages as hereinafter defined ... but less 
expenses saved in consequence of the seller's breach. 
LC. 5 28-2-712(1)-(2) (emphasis added). 
The Idaho Code clearly sets out t lover may be awarded if sought after ach of contract has occurred. In the 
present case, Magic Valley admitted that it began seeking cover months before bun Valley's alleged breach. Therefore, 
Magic Valley is not entitled to recover its cost of cover. We affirm the district court's decision inasmuch as it found the 
same. 
F. Sun ValIey Is Entitled To Prejudgment Interest. 
1131 Prejudgment interest is available only when the damages are liquidated or are ascertainable by mere 
mathematical process. Doolittle v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 128 Idaho 805,811,919 P.2d 334,340 (1996). In 
the present case, the district court determined factually that "[als of August 9, 1995, MVF owed to SVF under contracts 
9415 and 9418 an aggregate of $234,070.44." Thus, we hold that Sun Valley's damages were liquidated, entitling Sun 
Valley to an award of prejudgment interest. The problem, however, is that the district court also noted that it was 
"admitted that MVF owes SVF $236,904.44." Therefore, we cannot determine £rom the record which amount was 
ascertainable by at least August 9, 1995. Thus, we remand the matter to the district court for a determination of the 




Sun Valley was justified in withholding further deliveries under contract 9418 because of Magic Valley's refusal to 
eradicate its growing balance despite demands fiom Sun Valley. The district court erred in holding that Magic Valley 
was justified in withholding payments because of Sun Valley's lack of deliveries past Magic Valley's breach. 
Attorney fees are not awarded on appeal. Costs are awarded to Sun Valley. 
Chief Justice TROUT, Justices SILAK, SCHROEDER and WALTERS concur. 
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Lonnie LICKLEY, Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Appellant, v. MAX HERBOLD, INC., an Idaho corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant-Cross Respondent. 
[Cite as Lickley v. Max Herbold, Inc., 133 Idaho 2091 
No. 24615. 
- 
Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, March 1999 Term. 
July 21, 1999. 
Rehearing Denied Sept. 16, 1999. 
Potato farmer brought action against processor for breach of growing and sales contract. The Fifth Judicial District 
Court, Cassia County, George Granata, Jr., J., entered judgment for farmer. Processor appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Trout, C.J., held that: (1) processor accepted all 23 shipments of potatoes, majority of which were substandard, and 
thus was obligated under Idaho version of Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) to pay contract price for potatoes; (2) fact 
that contract was open as to price for substandard potatoes did not render contract unenforceable; (3) evidence 
supported finding that market price at time of delivery was reasonable price; (4) contract allowed for each day's 
deliveries to be treated as a whole, and thus allowed rejection of all loads on one day if combination of loads on that 
day did not meet grade; (5) farmer was not entitled to prejudgment interest; but (6) farmer was prevailing party and 
thus entitled to attorney fees. 
Affirmed. 
Schroeder, J., dissented and filed opinion. 
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Chisholm Law Office, Buriey, for appellant. Donald J. Chisholm argued. 
Parsons, Smith & Stone, Burley, for respondent. Richard K. Smith argued. 
TROUT, Chief Justice. 
This appeal involves a contract dispute. Lonnie Lickley (Lickley), a potato grower, entered a preseason potato 
growing contract with Max Herbold, Inc. (Herbold). After harvest, a dispute arose as to the price to be paid. Following 
a bench trial, the court awarded Lickley $33,000 in damages. The trial court found that because a substantial portion of 
the potatoes delivered failed to meet agreed upon standards, the contract required the parties to renegotiate a price. 
However, the parties could not agree, so the trial court set the price for the substandard potatoes at $7.55 per cwt., the 
market price at the time of delivery. Herbold appeals and Lickley cross-appeals. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In 1995, Lickley entcred a "One Year Potato Growing and Sales Contract" with Herbold. Lickley agreed to plant, 
cultivate, harvest, and deliver 12,000 cwt. of Russet Burbank potatoes. The contract set a base price of $6.15 per cwt. 
Then, depending on the quality of the potatoes delivered, the contract provided for price adjustments. 
- Page 2 of 6 
To determine the quality of each I, and establish a purchase price, the cox, .ct provided for inspection by the 
"Federal-State Inspection Service." Paragraph (C)(4)(b) of the contract set minimum quality standards providing: 
Any load or combination of loads inspecting below fifty percent (50%) well shaped U.S. NO. 1, two inch 
or 4 ounce minimum will be rejected under the contract. 
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The contract also contemplated that an inspection might not be completed until after a load had been delivered and the 
potatoes commingled. In such instances, paragraph (C)(4)(e) provides: 
The price for any load or combination of loads already delivered and placed in Company storage 
subsequently determined by inspection to be rejectable under this contract will have to be renegotiated 
between Grower and Company. 
Over six days, Lickley delivered twenty-three truckloads totaling just over 12,000 cwt. of potatoes. Herbold 
accepted the shipments and commingled the potatoes with deliveries from other growers. Results fiom the inspections 
showed that the combination of loads delivered on each of the first four days failed to meet the minimum standards. 
Viewing all six days deliveries as a whole, eighty-five percent of the potatoes graded below the "US. No 1 two inch or 
4 ounce minimum" standard. 
Herbold notified Lickley that the potatoes were substandard and calculated a net price of $3.22 per cwt. using the 
pricing formula set out in the contract. Because a number of the accepted potatoes were "rejectable," Lickley sought to 
renegotiate the price under the contract insisting upon $8.00 per cwt. Herbold rejected the offer. At a second meeting, 
Lickley requested $5.00 per cwt. and Herbold countered offering to waive the freight charges of $4,096 or to increase 
the initial $3.22 per cwt. offer to reflect that amount. Lickley refused, and this litigation ensued. 
In January 1996, Lickley filed a complaint alleging that Herbold breached the contract by failing to renegotiate a 
price for the "rejectable" potatoes. Lickley asserted that he suffered more than $80,000 in damages, the market value of 
the potatoes at the time of delivery. Herbold answered claiming that Lickley failed to deliver conforming potatoes. 
While it accepted the goods, Herbold argues that Idaho law only requires that it pay the contract price. 
Following a bench trial, the late Judge Granata found that the contract only required LicMey to deliver 12,000 cwt. 
of "field run potatoes" and that Lickley fully performed his obligations under the agreement. Herbold accepted all 
shipments. Because Herbold accepted "rejectable" potatoes, the contract required the parties to renegotiate a price for 
those potatoes. Judge Granata ultimately concluded that Herbold failed to negotiate in good faith and, as a result, 
determined that a reasonable price would be $7.55 per cwt., the market price at the time.(.fnl) The lower court awarded 
Lickley damages based on the market price for the rejectable potatoes and $4.1 1 per cwt. for the conforming potatoes- 
less costs, freight, and an amount previously tendered. The lower court also awarded costs and attorney fees to Lickley 
but denied Lickley's request for prejudgment interest. 
Both parties appeal. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[I-41 Herbold brings this appeal asking this Court to review the district judge's interpretation of the potato growing 
contract. Where the language of the contract makes clear the intentions of the parties, the interpretation and legal effect 
of the contract are questions of law over which we exercise free review. First Security Bank of Idaho v. Murphy, 131. 
Idaho 787,791,964 P.2d 654,658 (1998). When interpreting any one contract provision, we must view the entire 
agreement as a whole to discern the parties' intentions. Id. However, this Court will not set aside findings of fact unless 
they are clearly erroneous. Hunter v. Shields, 131 Idaho 148, 151,953 P.2d 588,591 (1998). If the district court's 
- Page 3 of 6 
factual determinations are supported L. Jubstantial and competent, albeit confli ,g, evidence, we will not disturb 
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those findings. Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 675,679,946 P.2d 975,979 (1997). 
DISCUSSION 
[S] The Contract. This dispute involves a contract for sale of goods governed by the Uniform Commercial Code. 
See LC. $8 28-2-102, 105(1). There is no dispute as to the existence or validity of the contract, only the purchase price. 
Lickley agreed to plant, cultivate, harvest, and deliver 12,000 cwt. of Russet Burbank potatoes. Lickley delivered 
twenty-three loads over six days totaling just over 12,000 cwt. The purchase price depended upon the quality of the 
potatoes delivered. Under the contract's terms, Herbold could reject any load or combination of loads that failed to meet 
specific minimum requirements, that is, "fifty percent (50%) well shaped U.S. NO. 1, two inch 4 ounce minimum." The 
Federal-State Inspection Service examined the combined loads .From each day, but did not return the results until 
Herbold had accepted each delivery by commingling the potatoes in its storage facilities. See LC. $28-2-606. Only the 
deliveries over the last two days met the contract requirements. In fact, viewing all shipments as a whole, eighty-five 
percent fell below the contract standard. Neither party challenges the inspection results. 
The contract contemplated just this event, providing the following: 
u 
The price for any load or combination of loads already delivered and placed into Company storage pe 
subsequently determined by inspection to be rejectable under this contract will have to be renegotiated 
between Grower and Company. 
Using the contract's pricing formula for conforming potatoes, Herbold calculated the purchase price for each day's 
deliveries. The net result was $3.22 per cwt. for all the potatoes delivered. Lickley rejected Herbold's initial offer for 
this amount. The parties met twice and failed to agree upon a price. 
The district judge found that Herbold breached the contract by failing to renegotiate in good faith. Herbold 
challenges this conclusion on appeal. However, whether or not Herbold negotiated in good faith is ultimately of no 
consequence in this case. The fact remains that Herbold accepted the goods and that Lickley is merely attempting to 
recover what he believes to be the contract price. The only issue, then, is whether the district judge properly concluded 
$7.55 per cwt. to be the contract price for the rejectable potatoes. 
[6] Open Price Term. By commingling and failing to reject any deliveries, Herbold accepted all twenty-three loads. 
See LC. $ 28-2-606. Consequently, it is obligated to pay the contract price. See LC. $ 28-2-607. Paragraph C of the 
contract provided a specific formula to calculate the purchase price. However, under paragraph C(4)(e), if Herbold 
accepted "rejectable" potatoes, the contract required the parties to renegotiate the price. The parties do not dispute that 
at least Lickley's first four days, deliveries were rejectable, but Lickley contends that all the potatoes were rejectable. 
Consequently, the parties left the contract price open as to the rejectable potatoes. 
[7,8] So long as the parties intend to enter a contract, their agreement will not fail for indefiniteness where they do 
not settle the price. I.C. $ 28-2-305. It is clear from the record that Herbold and Lickley intended to enter an 
enforceable agreement. Where the contract leaves the price open for negotiation and the parties fail to agree, 5 28-2- 
305(1) provides: "In such a case the price is a reasonable price at the time for delivery. . . ." Lickley and Herbold failed 
to agree upon a price. Lickley argued below that the market price, approximately $7.50 per cwt. at the time for 
delivery, was the reasonable price. Herbold argued that the market price is not a reasonable price. Instead, a reasonable 
price could not exceed the price as calculated under paragraph C of the contract. 
[9] The district judge determined the market price of $7.55 per cwt. to be a reasonable price at the time for delivery. 
- Page 4 of 6 
So long as this factual determination I.. >rlpported by substantial and competent ,dence, we will not disturb this 
finding on appeal. Without 
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providing an express distinction between the two, the Uniform Commercial Code uses the terms "reasonable price" and 
"market price" in a number of contexts. As is evident from their use, their meanings are not necessarily 
interchangeable.(fnT) The question facing us, however, is whether substantial and competent evidence in the record 
supports the trial court's hding. Under the limited circumstances presented in this case, we conclude that there is. At 
the time Lickley delivered potatoes to Herbold, he also sold potatoes from the same field on the open market and 
received between $7.50 and $8.00 per cwt, Although, as Herbold contends, the intent of the parties as reflected in the 
contract's pricing structure might lead to a lower price, we cannot, as a matter of law, hold that the trial court erred. 
1101 QuantiQ of Rejectable Potatoes. The district judge found that 7,532.30 cwt. or the f is t  four days' Ioads of the 
potatoes were rejectable. Lickley cross-appeals arguing that the district judge erred by not finding all twenty-three 
loads rejectable. The contract provides that "Any load or combination of loads" failing to meet grade will be rejected. 
Lickley contends that viewing all six days' deliveries in combination, the potatoes inspected well below "fifty percent 
(50%) well shaped U.S. NO. 1, two inch or 4 ounce minimum." In fact, eighty-five percent of all potatoes failed to 
meet the standard. Consequently, Lickley argues all six days' shipments were rejectable. 
However, a more reasonable interpretation of this provision leads to the ultimate conclusion reached by the trial 
court. The "combination of loads" language reflects the fact that multiple loads could be and were delivered on a given 
day. However, the inspection service, as is reflected in the record, sampled each day's deliveries as a whole. The 
"combination of loads" received on each of the first four days did not conform while the "combination of loads" 
delivered on the last two did. Therefore, the trial court properly concluded that only the loads delivered on the first four 
days were rejectable. 
Ill ,  121 Prejudgment Interest Lickley also cross-appeals arguing that the trial court erred in failing to award 
prejudgment interest on the award. Idaho Code 5 28-22-104(1) entitles a party to interest for money due under an 
express contract. However, prejudgment interest may only be awarded when the "principal amount of liability under 
the contract is liquidated or ascertainable by a mere mathematical calculation." Bott v. Idaho State Bldg. Auth., 128 
Idaho 580,592,917 P.2d 737,749 (1996). In the present case, the amount due under the contract was a reasonable 
price at the time for delivery. While we agree with the district court that the market price at the time of delivery was a 
reasonable price, that figure was not readily known or calculated until after the court rendered its decision. 
Consequently the trial court properly denied Lickley's claim for prejudgment interest. 
1131 Attorney Fees Below and on Appeal. This case involves a dispute over an amount due under a commercial 
transaction. Consequently, an award of reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party, both below and on appeal, is 
mandatory under both I.C. 5 12-120(3) and the express provisions of paragraph 0 in the contract. Herbold argues that 
because Lickley originally requested $81,000 in damages and was ultimately 
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only awarded $33,000, the trial court abused its discretion under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B) by concluding that Lickley 
prevailed. A review of the record reveals no error in the trial court's conclusion. By far the greatest issue in the case 
below entailed whether Lickley was entitled to the market price for the rejectable potatoes-an issue on which Lickley 
I prevailed both below and on appeal. Therefore, we uphold the decision awarding fees below and award attorney fees as 
( well as costs to Lickley on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
OBOQZ5 - ,, * - : - l I + N R S 1 f  enhowwwxFaEd+r95V Mol cttV6p. 10/22/2007 
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For the reasons stated above, we a,.,m the decision of the trial court. Pursu, , to Appellate Rules 40 and 41, we 
award costs and reasonable attorney fees to Lickley on appeal. 
Justices SILAK, WALTERS and KIDWELL, concur. 
Justice SCHROEDER, dissenting. 
I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the Court affirming the district court's determination that the market price 
was the reasonable price for the rejectable potatoes. It is contrary to the purpose of the contract and commercially 
unreasonable to award Lickley more for rejectable potatoes than he would have received had he delivered conforming 
potatoes. The district court recognized this in its initial decision which was amended without explanation. Finding of 
Fact No. 32 in the first decision stated the following: "The 'open price term' is found by the court to be $5.05 per cwt., 
as reflected in Defendant's Exhibit F; the court rejects the use of the $7.50 per cwt." The district court explained its 
rationale in Conclusion of Law No. 17: 
17. The reasonable price for the "rejectable" potatoes delivered by the plaintiff to the defendant in 
October, 1995, is $5.05 per cwt., based upon this court's determination in Finding of Fact No. 32. An 
award greater than $5.05 per cwt. would be unreasonable under all of the facts and circumstances of this 
case, as well as in consideration of the purpose of the parties' entering into this contract. Additionally, any 
award of a higher price for the plaintiffs "rejectable" potatoes than the contract price for conforming 
potatoes would not fall within reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade. Idaho Code, 
Section 28-2-103(b). This conclusion of law also hereby incorporates Findings of Fact Nos. 32 and 33. 
Palmer v. Idaho Peterbilt, Inc., 102 Idaho 800,802-03,641 P.2d 346,348-49 (Ct.App.1982). 
The reason buyers and sellers enter contracts such as this is to lock into a predictable price. The potato grower 
wants to ensure his costs are covered in case of a poor market, and the buyer wants to ensure a supply at a predictable 
and affordable cost in case of high demand, By entering pre-season contracts the grower takes the risk that the market 
price will exceed the contract Similarly, the buyertakes the risk that the contract price will exceed the crop's 
value at the time for delivery. In this case the contract provides a formula to calculate the price for non-rejectable 
potatoes. Lickley could not ;easonably have expected to be paid more for rejectable than he waifor the 
potatoes meeting the contract's minimum standards, and Herbold could not have expected to pay more for rejectable 
potatoes than for conforming potatoes. As an illustration, Herbold could have rightfully rejected the potatoes, and if 
Lickley could not fulfill his obligations, Herbold would have been able to recover the difference between the market 
price and the contract price for conforming potatoes. See LC. 5 28-2-713. The reasonable price of rejectable potatoes at 
the time for delivery must be determined with regard to the contract price for acceptable potatoes. If a third person 
reading this contract had asked, "Does this mean Lickley can make more money by delivering rejectable potatoes than 
by delivering conforming potatoes?," the answer surely would have been "no" fkom both parties. The purpose of the 
contract is defeated by such an interpretation. In the amended decision the district judge found that $7.55 cwt. was a 
reasonable price at the time for delivery, an amount higher than the contract price for conforming potatoes. In 
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light of the parties' intentions as reflected in the contract, this Court should conclude that the district court erred in 
finding the market price to be a reasonable price under the contract. The parties' agreed to a specific pricing structure 
for conforming potatoes. Their intention as to what constitutes a reasonable price for rejectable potatoes can be inferred 
&om that pricing structure. As the quality of the potatoes decreased, so did Lickley's expected return. 
I 
This Court should vacate the decision of the district court and remand the case for a determination that reflects the 
1 purpose of the contract and the clear intent of the parties. Affirming the district court gives Lickley a benefit he could 
not have contemplated under the contract. 
Footnotes: 
Page 6 of 6 
I. The district judge initially found t h ~  asonable price to be $5.05 per cwt.  no^, ,that setting the price for rejectable 
potatoes higher than the maximum allowed for conforming potatoes would be commercially imreasonable. For reasons 
not apparent in the record, Judge Granata amended his findings of fact and conclusions of law and awarded damages 
based upon the fair market value of the rejectable potatoes. 
2. Idaho Code $ 28-2-305(2) will recognize a contract as valid where the price is to be fixed at a later date by either the 
buyer or the seller. That subsection also requires the party fixing the price to do so in good faith. I.C. $ 28-2-305(2). 
Comment three to $28-2-305 provides that "in the normal case a . . . 'market price,' or the like satisfies the good faith 
requirement." LC. $ 28-2-305 cmt. 3 (emphasis added). However, this Court is presented with a case where the buyer 
and seller were to agree on a price but failed to do so. 
Moreover, if a buyer wrongfully rejects goods, the seller's damages generally include the difference between the 
marketprice and the unpaid contract price. LC. $ 28-2-708. However, under $ 28-2-709 the seller may recover the 
contract price if the seller is unable to resell the goods at a reasonable price. I.C. § 28-2-709(1)(b). If the seller 
successfully finds another buyer, its damages include the difference between the contract price and the resale price-but 
only if the goods were resold in a commercially reasonable manner. LC. $ 28-2-706(1). Where the seller fails to 
deliver the goods under the contract, the buyer's damages include the difference between the marketprice and the 
contract price. I.C. Ij 28-2-713. 
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BRIAN KELLER and CLARICE KELLER, husband and wife, &la ADCOPE L.L.C., an Idaho Limited Liability 
Company, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. INLAND METALS ALL WEATHER CONDITIONING, INC., a Washington 
corporation, Defendant-Appellant. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Docket No. 26246 
Boise, April 2002 Term 
2003 Opinion No. 99 
Filed: August 29,2003 
Frederick C. Lyon, Clerk 
Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District, State of Idaho, Nez Perce County. Hon. Carl B. Kenick, 
District Judge. 
The judgment is affirmed as modified. 
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Edwin L. Litteneker, Lewiston, for appellant. 
Clark & Feeney, Lewiston, for respondents. Paul T. Clark argued. 
EISMANN. Justice. 
This is an appeal kom the award of damages for the breach of a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose in the 
sale of a dehumidifier for an athletic club. We affirm the judgment as modified. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL =STORY 
The defendant-appellant Inland Metals All Weather Conditioning, Inc. (Inland Metals) is a heating, ventilation, and 
air conditioning contractor located in Clarkston, Washington. From January 1991 to July 1999, the plaintiffs- 
respondents Brian and Clarice Keller owned and operated a business known as Adcope Athletic Club located in 
Lewiston, Idaho. They conducted their business in leased premises. On July 1, 1999, the Kellers sold the athletic club 
to Adcope L.L.C. 
In December 1995 the Kellers extensively remodeled the building in which they operated their athletic club, 
including replacing the aboveground swimming pool with a belowground pool. Once the remodeling was completed 
and the club reopened in January 1996, the Kellers began receiving complaints from their customers that the air in the 
pool area was hot, humid, and had a bad odor. 
Seeking to remedy the odor and humidity problems, in November and December 1996 the Kellers solicited and 
received bids eom two heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning contractors. Inland Metals submitted a bid to sell and 
install a 7 112 ton dehumidifier at a total cost of $30,081.00, and the other contractor submitted bids to sell and install a 
10-ton dehumidifier at a total cost of $40,740.00 or a 12-ton dehumidifier at a total cost of $39,300.00. After a period 
of continued discussions with representatives of Inland Metals, on March 11,1997, Mr. Keller accepted its bid to 
install the 7 112 ton dehumidifier. Inland Metals installed the dehumidifier on June 20, 1997. At the time of the 
installation, the Kellers were out of town. Upon their return on July 2, 1997, their employees informed them that the 
dehumidifier was not working well. The Kellers f Inland Metals that they would not pay for the dehumidifier b m 8 ~ a  
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until it was working properly. In resp ,e to complaints during the ensuing mc .s, Inland Metals employees visited 
the club many times, but they were unable to make the dehumidifier perform to the Kellers' satisfaction. 
On October 30, 1997, Adcope L.L.C. filed this action seeking to rescind the contract with Inland Metals and to 
recover damages. Inland Metals counterclaimed to foreclose its mechanic's lien. The case was tried to the district court, 
and it found that Inland Metals had breached express and implied warranties that the dehumidifier was fit for its 
intended purpose and that the Kellers had timely rejected the dehumidifier. It awarded the Kellers(fn1) damages in the 
sum of $13,452.00 plus costs and attorney's fees totaling $74,400.28 and denied Inland Metals any recovery on its 
counterclaim. Inland Metals then timely appealed. 
11. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. Did the district court err in finding that Inland Metals breached a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose? B. 
Did the district court err in finding that the Kellers rightfully rejected the dehumidifier? 
C. Did the district court err in awarding damages? 
D. Did the district court e n  in finding that the Kellers were the prevailing party? 
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E. Did the district court err in failing to award Inland Metals damages equal to the contract price of the rightfully 
rejected dehumidifier? 
F. Is either party entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal? 
III. ANALYSIS 
A trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. Bramwell v. South 
Rigby Canal Co., 136 Idaho 648,39 P.3d 588 (2001); IDAHO R. CIV. P. 52(a). When deciding whether findings of 
fact are clearly erroneous, this Court does not substitute its view of the facts for that of the trial court. Id. It is the 
province of the trial court to weigh conflicting evidence and to judge the credibility of witnesses. Rowley v. F u h a n ,  
133 Idaho 105,982 P.2d 940 (1999). On appeal, this Court examines the record to see if challenged findings of fact are 
supported by substantial, competent evidence. Id. Evidence is regarded as substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would 
accept it and rely upon it in determining whether a disputed point of fact has been proven. Bramwell v. South Rigby 
Canal Co., 136 Idaho 648,39 P.3d 588 (2001). 
A. Did the District Court Err in Finding that Inland Metals Breached a Warranty of Fitness for a Particular 
Purpose? 
The district court found that a letter dated January 28,1997, sent by the president of 
Inland Metals to Mr. Keller created an express warranty of fitness for a particular purpose in the sale of the 
dehumidifier. In that letter, Inland Metals' president stated: 
As you already know the air in your pool area is very stale and offends the eyes and throat because of the elements 
in the air. Mr. Ash pointed out that although you do have a wondertl remodeled pool, the job was just never totally 
completed. As in any indoor pool, the air needs to be treated with outdoor fresh air, dehumidified, air conditioned in the 
summer, and heated in the winter. This ducted system will rid you of the sweating walls, (that will by the way 
eventually ruin the structure), and eliminate those offensive odors, and overall "bad air". This is not an uncommon 
problem, and all commercial pool owner's [sic] face the same thing until they install one of these systems. 
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Once you complete this installati jour air problems should be over, and. r customer's [sic] should be satisfied 
and happy. 
Inland Metals contends on appeal that the letter cannot constitute an express warranty because it did not contain an 
affirmation of fact or promise, but was merely puffery. Whether or not the letter created an express warranty must be 
determined by considering the circumstances in which the statements in the letter were made. 
In an attempt to remedy the odor and humidity problems, Mr. Keller solicited and received bids from two heating, 
ventilation, and air-conditioning contractors. Inland Metals submitted a bid to sell and install a 7 112 ton dehumidifier 
at a total cost of $30,081.00. The other contractor submitted bids to sell and install a 10-ton dehumidifier at a total cost 
of $40,740.00 or a 12-ton dehumidifier at a total cost of $39,300.00. Before Inland Metals had submitted its bid, its 
president visited the athletic club and discussed the humidity and odor problems with Mr. Keller. 
Upon receiving the bids, Mr. Keller again contacted the president of Inland Metals because he was concerned that 
Inland Metals had recommended a 7 112 ton dehumidifier and the other contractor had recommended at least a 10-ton 
dehumidifier. He wanted to make sure that the dehumidifier recommended by Inland Metals was of sufficient size to 
take care of the problems. In response, Inland Metals' president arranged to meet with Mr. Keller and to have Jim Ash, 
a representative of the manufacturer of the dehumidifier listed in Inland Metals' bid, also attend that meeting. He 
wanted Mr. Ash to reassure Mr. Keller that the 7 112 ton dehumidifier was the proper size, and Mr. Ash did so. 
Following that meeting, Inland Metals' president sent Mr. Keller the letter quoted above. Based upon the 
representations by Inland Metals' president, including those in the above-quoted letter, Mr. Keller accepted Inland 
Metals' bid for the 7 112 ton dehumidifier on March 11, 1997. 
An express warranty by the seller can be created by any aarmation of fact or 
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promise made by the seller to the buyer that relates to the goods and becomes pa-- of the bargain. IDAHO 
CODE 5 28-2-313(1)(a) (2001). In order to create an express warranty, the seller need not use formal words such as 
-antH or%arantee." nor n%d the seller have a specific intention to make a warrantv. ID- C O B  6 2 U 3 1 3  -  - IC (w warranty is not created by a sdlerls mere affmation of the value of the goods or statemen7 
purporting to bcmere y the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods. Id.; Jensen v. s'S Mobile Homes Group, 
105 Idaho 189,668 P . E &  (1983). q e t h e r  a statement by the seller was'an express warranty is a question of fact. 
67A AM. JUR. 2d Sales 5 729 (1985). 
The issue Mr. Keller wanted addressed at the meeting did not concern the value of the 7 1/2 ton dehumidifier, or its 
quality, or whether it was better than those from other manufacturers, or whether that particular brand was, in general, a 
good dehumidifier. The issue Mr. Keller wanted addressed was whether a 7 112 ton dehumidifier was large enough to 
remedy the odor and humidity problems in the athletic club. Inland Metals' president and Mr. Ash both orally assured 
Mr. Keller that, based upon calculations made, the 7 112 ton dehumidifier was large enough to remedy the problems. In 
the above-quoted letter sent after the meeting, Inland Metals' president stated, "This ducted system will rid you of the 
sweating walls, (that will by the way eventually ruin the structure), and eliminate those offensive odors, and overall 
'bad air.' " There was substantial, competent evidence supporting the district court's finding that Inland Metals made an 
express warranty that the 7 112 ton dehumidifier was fit for the particular purpose of eliminating the odor and humidity 
problems at the athletic club. 
Inland Metals also argues that the district court erred in finding that the Kellers relied upon the representations 
made by its president when deciding to accept Inland Metals' bid. It argues that the evidence shows that the Kellers 
relied upon statements by Mr. Ash and purchased the least expensive of the dehumidifiers offered. "[TJhe buyer of 
goods need not rely on an 'affirmatign of fact or .promise1 or 'description' for the same to become 'part of the basis of 
the b a r g m r e s s  warranty." Jensen v. s m i l e  Homes Group, 105 Idaho 189, 195,668 P.2d 65;- 
71 (1983) (emphasis in original). 
OaoQGz 
Finally, Inland Metals contends t the district court erred in finding that. eached the express warranty. It 
argues that any failure of the dehumidifier resulted from the Kellers' failure to maintain the air temperature in the pool 
area two to four degrees higher than the water temperature, as anticipated by the manufacturer of the dehumidifier. 
The primary issue in the trial was whether the dehumidification system failed to properly maintain humidity 
because it was too small or because the Kellers failed to maintain the air and water temperatures within the appropriate 
range. The trial court found, based upon the evidence presented, that the 7 112 ton dehumidifier was inadequate to 
maintain relative humidity in the pool area according to the industry standard and that the persons upon whom Inland 
Metals had relied when sizingjke dehumidifi ade numerous incorrect assumptions when making their 
calcu1ations~-It is.tK6F6e of the trial co conflicting evidence and to judge the credibility of witnesses. 
~ 5 3 6  v. Fuhrman, 133 Idaho 105,982 P. ). 'Jhe district court's finding that Inland Metals breached the 
express-warranty 1s supporte6~~~bstantialyco~etent evidence. Because we have upheld the findings that Inland 
Metals breached the express warranty, we need not address whether there was also an implied warranty of fitness for a 
particular purpose. 
B. Did the District Court Err in that the Kellers Rightfully Rejected the Dehumidifier? 
If the goods fail in any respect to conform to the contract, the buyer may reject them. IDAHO CODE $28-2-60l(a) 
(2001). The rejection must occur within a reasonable time after delivery and is ineffective unless the buyer seasonably 
notifies the seller. IDAHO CODE $ 28-2-602(1) (2001). Where the parties have not agreed upon a time within which 
an action must be taken. it 
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is taken "seasonably" if it is taken within a reasonable time. IDAHO CODE 8 28-1-204(3) (2001). What constitutes a 
reasonable time within which the buyer must inspect the goods and determine if they are conforming is a question of 
fact. Figueroa v. Kit-San Co., 123 Idaho 149,845 P.2d 567 (Ct. App. 1992). A buyer can be held to have accepted 
goods if the buyer fails to make an effective rejection after a reasonable time and opportunity to inspect the goods, or 
does any act inconsistent with the seller's ownership. IDAHO CODE $ 28-1-204(3) (2001). 
Inland Metals argues that the Kellers delayed longer than reasonable before rejecting the dehumidifier. As the 
district court found, the Kellers needed to operate the dehumidifier in the athletic club to determine whether it 
conformed to the express warranty that it was fit for that particular purpose. Four days after the unit was installed, one 
of the Kellers' employees notified Inland Metals the dehumidifier was not working properly. After the Kellers returned 
from their vacation, Ms. Keller notified Inland Metals that if the problems could not be corrected, it should remove the 
unit. On July 17 and August 11,1997, the Kellers' attorney wrote to Inland Metals demanding that the problems be 
corrected. Finally, on October 30, 1997, Adcope L.L.C. filed its complaint in this action, in which the Kellers formally 
notifiedInland Metals that they were rejecting the dehumidifier. In response to complaints following the installation of 
the dehumidifier, Inland Metals employees made numerous visits to the athletic club, made some occasional minor 
adjustments to the unit, and made repeated assurances that it was operating properly. 
When decid.in:ggwhat was a reasonable time for the inspection.andxej.e~:~ia~ district court considered the four 
factors ~ i s t e d i n ~ i ~ e r o a  .. . .... v. Kit-San . - Co., _. . .  123 Idaho 149, *,,.-" ..-- 158 "-2 ..---.--.--A. 845 P.2d 567 5 m .  ";. App. 1992), which are: "(1) the 
difficulty in discovering tk~defc~:'(2)~tb~Erms~af'the contract; (3) the relative perishability of the goods; and (4) the 
course of performance after the sale and before the formal rejection." The district court also considered that the period 
for rejecting nonconforming goods can be extended if, after giving notice of the nonconformity, the buyer retains and 
uses them on the understanding that the seller will cure the nonconformity. 67 AM. JUR. 2d Sales $ 649 (1985). The 
district court's finding that the rejection in this case occurred within a reasonable time after delivery is supported by 
substantial, competent evidence. 
Inland Metals also argues that by continuing to use the dehumidifier and by having Inland Metals' competitor make 
adjustments to it in an attempt to improve its performance, the Kellers accepted the dehumidifier because such conduct 
was inconsistent with ~ n l a n d ~ e t a l s ~ o w n e r s ~ ~ .  "[A] bu i r  ma use goodsbithout accepting them if the.use is a 0@60~d 
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reasonable attempt to mitigate darna, ' Figueroa v. Kit-San Co., 123 Idaho . , 158, 845 P.2d 567,576 (Ct. App. 
1992). When Inland Metals installed the 7 112 ton dehumidifier, it removed the existing 5-ton dehumidifier. The district 
court found that after the Kellers rejected the dehumidifier, Inland Metals did not seek to remove it, and the Kellers 
could not remove it themselves. It also found that had the Kellers simply turned the humidifier off, humidity would 
have increased in the pool area to the point of causing physical and structural damage to the club facilities and the 
increased humidity would have been so uncomfortable that customers would no longer use the pool. The district court 
concluded that the Kellers' continued use of the dehumidifier was necessary to mitigate its damages and was not an act 
inconsistent with Inland Metals' ownership. That finding is supported by substantial, competent evidence. 
C. Did the District Court Err  in Awarding Damages? .'.. 
'\.,. 
When a buyer rightfully rejects goods, the buyer may: (a) recover so much of the purchase price as the buyer 
paid, IDAHO CODE $ 28-2-71 l(1) (2001); and 
(b) either cover and recover as damages the difference between the wst of cover and the contract price, less 
expenses saved as a consequence of the seller's breach, IDAHO CODE $5 28-2-71 l(l)(a) & 28-2-712(2) (2001), or 
recover as damages the difference between the market price at the time the buyer learned of the breach and the 
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contract price, less expenses saved as a consequence of the seller's breach;IDAHO CODE $$28-2-711(1)(b) & 28-2- 
71 3 (2001); and 
(c) recover any incidental or consequential damages, IDAHO CODE $5 28-2-71 1(1), 28-2-712(2), 28-2-71 3(1),\& 
28-2-715 (2001); and \ 
(d) resell the goods as an aggrieved seller in order to recover any portion of the price paid and any expenses 
reasonably incurred in their inspection, receipt, transportation, care and custody, IDAHO CODE $ 28-2-71 I(3) 
In this case, the Kellers had not paid any portion of the purchase price, they did not cover, nor did they resell the 
goods as an aggrieved seller. They were entitled to recover as damages: (a) the difference betwe&market;price at -__. ---. -I_ 
th-slewed of the bea~Tii iGfie  contract price, less expenses saved as ti consequence of Inland Metals' 
%reach and (b) any incidental or consequential damages. 
,'- ----- - 
1. Did the district court err  in awarding as damages the difference in cost between the 7 112 ton dehumidifier 
and a 10-ton dehumidifier? 
Thedistrict court awarded as damages the sum of $10,659.00, which represents the difference in price between the 
7 112 ton dehumidifier installed by Inland Metals and the 10-ton dehumidifier bid by the other contractor. The district 
court erred in awarding such sum. 
The damages recoverable include "the difference between the market price at the time when the buyer learned of 
the breach and the contract price." IDAHO CODE $28-2-7I3(1) (2001). 
The issue is what is meant by "market price"? Is it the market price of the goods specified in the contract or the 
market price of some other, more expensive goods? This Court has frequently given substantial weight to the 
comments to the official text of the UCC when determining the meaning of the statute. Walker v. American Cyanamid 
Co., 130 Idaho 824,948 P.2d 1123 
(1997). Comment 2 to the official text of Idaho Code $28-2-713 states: 
The market or current price to be used in comparison with the contract price under this section is the price of goods 
Q@O@Gi$ 
http:/166.161.141.177lcgi-bin~texis/web/idcaselaw/+0ew7X2eJ4kGwBmeRffeFqEcGcMvA . 1011 912007 
- Page 6 of 11 
of the same kind and in the same bra of trade. 
The market price mentioned in Idaho Code 5 28-2-713(1) is the price of goods "of the same kind." In this case, 
goods of the same kind would be a 7 112 ton dehumidifier as specified in the parties' contract. 
There is a significant difference between contracting for a fixed price to sell and install equipment that the seller 
represents will produce a specific result and contracting for a fixed price to attain that specific result regardless of the 
equipment or labor necessary to do so. In this case, Inland Metals submitted a bid to remove the existing dehumidifier 
and to install a 7 112 ton dehumidifier for the sum of $30,081.00. The bid stated: 
We are pleased to present to you this proposal for installing a DESERT AIR Model De-Humidifier Air 
Conditioning System in the Swimming Pool area at Adcope located at the above address. 
Installation will consist of the following: 
Removal of teh [sic] existing 500 unit. 
Install a IH-7SORR (Larger Unit) in its place. 
Wiring of the unit. 
Install complete overhead duct system (All Aluminum Duct). 
Install 10 Shoemaker 950VM 12 x 6 Aluminum Supply Air Diffusers. 
Install Outdoor Fresh Air. 
Units include full controls, deactivator filters, discharge electric duct heater and remote condenser. 
Install a 7 112 ton Outdoor Condensing Unit. 
Refrigeration Piping. 
Wiring of the unit. 
Necessary Permit. 
Material and Labor to install the above system. 
Inland Metals also later warranted that the 7 112 ton dehumidifier would be fit for the particular purpose. The 
district court found, "On March 11, 1997, Brian Keller accepted [Inland Metals'] proposal for installing a 7 112 ton 
unit." The district court did not find that Inland Metals agreed, for $30,081.00, to provide whatever equipment and 
labor was necessary to eliminate the odor and humidity problems in the pool area. 
When a buyes rightfully rejects goods, the buyer can either cover and recover as damages the difference between 
, the cost of cover and the contract price or recover as damages 
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the difference between the market price and the contract price. These are alternative remedies intended to place the 
buyer in the same position. As stated in comment 3 to the official text of Idaho Code 4 28-2-712, "The buyer is always 
free to choose between cover and damages for non-delive der the next section [Idaho Code § 28-2-7131." "The 
00%8~5 
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damage remedy provided by Section 13 ideally should yield the same recol as the cover remedy of Section 2- 
712, because the cover price is simply another way of conclusively stating what the market price is." 2 WILLIAM D. 
HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES $ 2-713.3 (2002). If the buyer covers by purchasing 
substitute goods, he must do so in good faith by making a reasonable purchase "of goods in substitution for those due 
from the seller." IDAHO CODE $ 28-2-712(1) (2001). The goods due from the seller are those specified in the 
contract, which in this case is the 7 112 ton dehumidifier, "[Tlhe buyer cannot claim he covered when he made 
replacement by purchasing more expensive goods than the ones called for by the original contract." 67A AM. SUR. 2D 
Sales 5 1176 (1985). It would be anomalous to hold that a buyer who covers must purchase goods of the same kind, but 
one who instead seeks the alternate remedy of damages can recover based upon the value of different, more expensive 
goods. 
Inland Metals agreed, for the sum of $30,081, to sell and install a 7 112 ton dehumidifier, which it warranted would 
correct the Kellers' problems. The dehumidifier itself was not defective. It was simply not large enough to correct the 
odor and humidity problems. Because a 7 112 ton dehumidifier was not fit for the particular purpose, the Kellers were 
entitled to reject the dehumidifier and recover damages. The damages recoverable by the Kellers under the Uniform 
Commercial Code are the difference between the market price and the contract price together with any incidental and 
consequential damages. IDAHO CODE 9 28-2-713(1) (2001).(fn2) There was no contention that the market price for a 
7 112 ton dehumidifier of the type described in the parties' contract was higher than the contract price for that 
dehumidifier.(fn3) Therefore, the only damages the Kellers were entitled to recover were incidental and consequential 
damages as defined in Idaho Code $28-2-715. The district court's damage award must be reduced by $10,659.00. 
2. Did the district court err  in awarding incidental damages? 
The incidental damages that the Kellers were entitled to recover include expenses reasonably incurred in inspection, 
receipt, transportation and care and custody of the dehumidifier and any reasonable expense incident to the delay or 
breach. IDAHO CODE 9 28-2-715(1) (2001). The district court awarded as incidental damages the sum of $1,092.00 
for the time one of the Kellers' employees spent gathering temperature and humidity data during the period between the 
installation of the dehumidifier and the filing of this lawsuit and $1,001 .OO for the time another employee spent 
transporting water samples for testing during the same time period. The damages were awarded at the employees' 
respective hourly rates based upon the time they spent on these tasks. The district court also awarded as incidental 
damages the sum of $700.00 spent to have additional testing of the water and air done in September 1997. The district 
court found that such expenses were reasonably incurred in inspecting the dehumidifier to establish whether it 
conformed to the express warranty and that they were caused by Inland Metals' breach. There is substantial, competent 
evidence supporting the district court's findings, and we affirm this award of damages. 
D. Did the District Court Err in P i d i i g  that the KeUers Were the Prevailing Party? 
The district court awarded the Kellers court costs, including reasonable attorney fees, in the sum of $74,400.28. On 
appeal, Inland Metals simply states that the Kellers should not have been the prevailing party. The determination of 
who is a pre- 
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vailing party is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent abuse of discretion. 
Bolger v. Lance, 137 Idaho 792,53 P.3d 121 1 (2002). Inland Metals has not shown an abuse of discretion in the district 
court's determination of the prevailing party and the resulting decision to award court costs and attorney fees. 
E. Did the District Court Err in Failing to Award Inland Metals Damages Equal to the Contract Price of the 
Rightfully Rejected Dehumidifier? 
Inland Metals contends that it is entitled to recover the $30,081 contract price pursuant to Idaho Code $$ 28-2-709 
(3) and 28-2-708. These statutes provide for damages if the buyer has wrongfully rejected acceptance of the goods and 
the seller is not entitled to recover the price. They have no application in this case because the Kellers did not Qgy \O??G 
'Lv %a 
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wrongfully reject acceptance. 
F. Is Either Party Entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees on Appeal? 
Both parties claim attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code $ 12-120(3), which mandates the award of a 
reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party in any civil action to recover on a contract relating to the purchase or 
sale of goods. Because both parties have prevailed in part on appeal, we will not award attorney fees on appeal. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We reduce the damages awarded to the sum of $2,793.00, and affirm the judgment in all other respects. We do not 
award either costs or attorney's fees on appeal. 
Justices SCHROEDER, WUTERS and KIDWELL CONCUR. 
Chief Justice TROUT, DISSENTING: 
Because I believe the Court is misapplying the provisions of the UCC, I respectfully dissent from section C.l of the 
Court's opinion. 
The Court relies on Section 28-2-713 of the Idaho Code to conclude that the Kellers, who rightfully rejected a 7 112 
ton dehumidifier because it did not accomplish the warranted purposes for which they had contracted with Inland 
Metals, are entitled only to incidental and consequential damages and are not entitled to the value of the difference 
between the contract price of that 7 112 ton dehumidifier and the market price of one that would have accomplished the 
purpose of the contract, as the trial court found. I believe that given the facts of this case and the language and purpose 
of the UCC, the Kellers are in fact entitled, according to $28-2-713, to the additional damages found by the trial court. 
The Kellers and Inland Metals came to a clear meeting of the minds as to what would constitute a "conforming 
good" in the language of the UCC. The Kellers simply wanted a dehumidifier that would clear the humidity and odor 
from their athletic club. They relied on the skill and expertise of Inland Metals to determine what size dehumidifier 
would be required to accomplish this task. After making its own calculations and determinations, Inland Metals 
submitted a bid to install a dehumidifier that it expressly warranted would meet the Kellers' needs.(fn4) The Kellers 
rightfully regarded the underlying purpose of the contract - that the dehumidifier would solve the humidity problems in 
their athletic club - as the basis of the bargain.(fnS) When, after delivery, the Kellers saw 
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that this dehumidifier was not accomplishing the requirements of the contract, they rightfully rejected, as the Court's 
opinion indicates. 
However, the Court bases its decision to reduce the trial court's damages award on a reading of 528-2-713 that 
entirely disregards the basis of the bargain. This Court finds that the market price under $28-2-713 can only be the 
going price of a 7 112 ton dehumidifier and not the cost of the dehumidifier Inland Metals warranted it would deliver. 
This logic excludes from consideration the fact that the whole purpose of $528-2-713,28-2-712, and 28-2-71 1 - all 
sections upon which the Court relies - is to ailow the buyer to put himself in as good a position as if the buyer had 
received the benefit of the bargain.(fn6) 
By severing the underlying purpose of the contract and, instead, focusing only on the value of the 7 112 ton 
dehumidifier simply because it is listed in the written contract, the Court obviates the need to enter into this analysis in 
the first place. If all the parties had contracted for was a 7 1/2 ton dehumidifier, and if all Mand Metals had been 
required to provide was a 7 112 ton dehumidifier, then the Kellers would have been wrong in the first place to reject 
such goods and Inland Metals should have prevailed below and on appeal.(fn7) The Court's opinion finding that there 
was a breach of an express warranty is a direct contr d'ctip Q e later conclusion that the Kellers received the only bb~b&9 
thing to which they were entitled, a . ton dehumidifier. 
The underlying policy behind the buyer's remedies in the above-cited sections is to give the buyer an opportunity to 
receive the benefit of the bargain. The UCC operates on the principle of expectation damages as evinced by these and 
other provisions.(fn8) One of the clearest manifestations of this is the option of cover, which the Court ironically relies 
upon greatly in its reasoning. The Court's opinion cites Hawkland in explaining that the damage remedy provided by 
Section 2-713 "ideally should yield the same recovery as [cover] because the cover price is simply another way of 
conclusively stating what the market price is." I would readily agree with this principle, and applying it to the facts of 
this case, had the Kellers covered, they would have purchased a 10-ton dehumidifier - one that fulfilled the 
requirements of their contract with Inland Metals - and obviously not a 7 112 ton dehumidifier, which they already 
knew did not fulfill this requirement. Additionally, the Court's opinion states that if the buyer covers, he must do it by 
making a reasonable purchase "of goods in substitution for those due &om the seller." Again I agree. Had the Kellers 
covered, they would undoubtedly not have purchased a 7 112 ton dehumidifier, where the good due from Inland Metals 
was not simply a 7 112 ton dehumidifier in and of itself but, according to their bargain, was a dehumidifier that would 
take care of the humidity and odor problems at the athletic club. To dismiss this fact is to negate the finding of a breach 
of express warranty in the first place. 
Furthermore, the Court expresses a basic concern that a 10-ton dehumidifier would cost more than one that is 7 
tons, but allowing this fact to control merely excuses Inland Metals for submitting a low bid based on bad computations 
and estimates and does not reflect the true intent behind the principle - that if a buyer covers, he cannot purchase a good 
that is unreasonably beyond what he had contracted with the seller for and expect the seller to absorb the difference. In 
the present case, what the parties contracted for 
was a dehumidifier that would solve the Kellers' humidity problems, and a 10-ton dehumidifier reasonably falls into 
that category of good. 
Under the Court's reasoning, had the Kellers accepted the nonconforming dehumidifier, they would have been able 
to pursue the damage remedy in LC. (i 28-2-71 4, which would have allowed them the difference in value. Under that 
statutory provision, when the buyer accepts nonconforming goods, the contract remedy is the difference "between the 
value of the goods accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted" (emphasis added).(h9) 
Instead, because the Kellers were observant and prudent in the course of their business dealings and promptly rejected 
the nonconforming goods, they are denied that compensation here. It places a strange premium on acceptance if buyers 
can only get their warranties honored when they accept nonconforming goods. Rather than force buyers to accept 
nonconforming goods to protect their interests in enforcing a warranty, LC. (i 28-2-713 provides the same remedy when 
nonconforming goods are rejected and no acceptance made. In both cases, the buyer's remedy is the difference in price 
between what the buyer would have received if there had been no breach, and what the buyer actually received from 
the breaching seller. What the buyer would have received was the good as warranted. I.C. (i 28-2-713 provides this 
remedy and protects the buyer's expectation interest regardless of whether the buyer has rejected or accepted 
nonconforming goods.(hlO) 
Finally, to award the Kellers a contract remedy for the breached warranty does not expand a seller's liability for 
damages beyond our State's statutory fiamework. To the contrary, such a remedy comports with the letter and spirit of 
our contract damages jurisprudence. See LC. 5 28-1-106 ("[Rlemedies . . . shall be liberally administered to the end that 
the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party had fully performed."); LC. (i 28-2-71 1 cmt. 3 
("[Tlhis Act requires its remedies to be liberally administered."); see also Jensen v. Seigel Mobil Homes Group, 105 
Idaho 189, 194,668 P.2d 65,70 (1983) ("[Tlhe Uniform Commercial Code requires that revocation remedies be 
liberally administered to put the buyer in 'as good a position as if the other party had fully performed . . . !"). Clearly, 
the buyer's expectation interest is protected through the availability of benefit of the bargain remedies. The Kellers' 
bargain included receiving a dehumidifier that would eliminate the odor and humidity problems in their athletic club. 
The fact that the size of the dehumidifier is listed in the contract should not deprive the Kellers of the warranted 
performance for which they bargained. ~a ~ i - ~ y a  kJ i3 
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Because I believe the Court's opi , does not provide the appropriate reni ;s to the Kellers for the breach of 
warranty caused by Inland Metals, I respectfully dissent. 
Footnotes: 
FNl The complaint named Adcope L.L.C. as the plaintiff, and it remained the named plaintiff until entry of the 
judgment prepared by counsel for the Kellers. The judgment listed Brian and Clarice Keller, d/b/a Adcope L.L.C., as 
the plaintiffs. 
FN2 Because the Kellers had not paid any portion of the purchase price, their damages could not include so much 
of the price as had been paid. 
FN3 To recover damages based upon the difference between the market price and the contract price, the market 
price must be shown to be higher than the contract price. 67A AM. JUR. 2d Sales $ 1292 (1985). 
FN4 The Court recounts in detail in Part A of its opinion how the relieving of humidity and odor in  the athletic club 
was the underlying purpose behind the contract, and that the Kellers did not accept Inland Metal's bid until they were 
repeatedly assured the 7 112 ton dehumidifier would accomplish this task. 
FN5 I.C. 528-2-3 13 clearly states: (a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which 
relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall 
conform to the affirmation or promise; (b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain 
creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description. See also Comment 1 to the Official Text 
("'express' warranties rest on 'dickered' aspects of the individual bargain, and go so clearly to the essence of that 
bargain..."). This principle is so weighted that disclaimers and other language tending to null an express warranty are 
"repugnant to the basic dickered terms" and are found inoperative unless they can be reconciled to the basis of the 
bargain. Id.; See also I.C. $28-2-316(1); Jensen v. Seigel Mobile Homes Group, 105 Idaho 189, 196,668 P.2d 65,71- 
72 (1983). 
FN6 See LC. 528-1-106. 
FN7 Where, in response to Inland Metals' appeal, this Court has analyzed the timeliness of the Kellers' rejection in 
Part B of its opinion, it has implicitly endorsed the reason behind the Kellers' rejection under I.C. $28-2-601, which 
allows rejection only when "the goods or the tender of delivery fail in any respect to conform to the contract.. .." In 
doing so, this Court has accepted that the 7 112 ton dehumidifier was a defective good in accordance with the contract, 
though it acknowledges that "[tlhe dehumidifier itself was not defective." 
FN8 This point is well established in I.C. $28-1-106: "Remedies to be liberally administered. (1) The remedies 
provided by this act shall be liberally administered to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position 
as if the other party had hlly performed ..." (emphasis added). 
FN9 For a stark example of this principle of the UCC, see Chatlos v. National Cash Register Corp., 670 F.2d 1304 
(3rd Cir. 1982). In Chatlos, the defendant was a computer sales company that held itself out to be an expert in 
computers, and after plaintiff expressed its particular computer needs defendant recommended and subsequently sold 
plaintiff a system that it warranted would fulfill those needs. After paying for the system and then realizing that it was 
inadequate in fulfi1Iing its needs, plaintiff brought suit against defendant for breach of warranty. The court found that 
plaintiff was entitled to the difference in value between what it had paid for the computer it received ($46,000) and a 
computer that would have fulfilled its needs as warranted (over $200,000). 
FNlO Several cases from other jurisdictions clearly bear this out. In Borman's, Inc., v. Olympic Mills, Inc., 1993 
WL 190344 (S.D.N.Y.), under New York's Uniform Commercial Code 52-713 (which is identical to Idaho's) where a 
buyer rejected nonconforming hand towels, the court awarded the difference between the contract price and the value @ @ Q ~ L G ~  
httu:N66.161.141.177lcgi-bin/texislweblidcaselaw/+Oew7X2eJ4kGwBmeRffeqEcGcMvA.. 1011 912007 
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of goods as they had been warrantec ich difference was $89,656.86. In WL i V. Tom Growney Equip., Inc., 721 
P.2d 1302 (N.M. 1986), where a tractor dealership offered a low price in a contract to sell a backhoe to the plaintiff and 
then refused to deliver claiming the offered price was an error, the court awarded the plaintiff the difference between 
the contract price ($15,818.65) and the market value of the backhoe ($31,500) on the basis of New Mexico's UCC $2- 
7 13 (also identical to Idaho's). 
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Manuel FIGUEROA, dba Friendship Truck Express, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. KIT-SAN COMPANY, aka Kit-San 
Amsa, Inc., and the Travelers Indemnity Company, Defendants-Appellants. H & H BENTONITE AND MUD, INC., 
Plaintiff-Respondent, v. KIT-SAN COMPANY, aka Kit-San Azusa, Inc., and the Travelers Indemnity Company, 
Defendants- Appellants. 
[Cite as Figueroa v. Kit-San Co., 123 Idaho 1491 
Nos. 18325. 18872. 
Court of Appeals of Idaho. 
July 6, 1992. 
Rehearing Denied Dec. 11, 1992. 
Petition for Review Denied Feb. 18, 1993. 
Seller of bentonite and trucking company which shipped bentonite sued buyer 
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for breach of contract. The District Court, Benewah County, Gary M. Haman, J., entered judgments in favor of seller 
and trucking company, and buyer appealed. The Court of Appeals, Walters, C.J., held that: (1) formal written contract 
submitted by seller to buyer containing additional terms fiom that of parties' prior oral agreement constituted new offer; 
(2) notice of rejection of goods was not made until buyer's statement sufficiently notified seller of buyer's intent and of 
need for seller to cure or remove goods; (3) buyer's rejection of goods 200 days fiom date goods were first delivered 
was made within reasonable time after delivery; (4) buyer's use of 34 tons of total shipment of bentonite was not 
acceptance of total shipment; (5) seller expressly warranted that its product was equal to or better than another 
supplier's product; and (6) there was no agreement between buyer and trucking company regarding payment. 
Reversed. 
Randall, Blake, Cox, Risley &; Trout, Lewiston, for defendants-appellants. Kim Jay Trout, argued. 
Marcus, Merrick &; Montgomery, Boise, for plaintiffs-respondents. Gale M. Merrick, argued. e. 
WALTERS, Chief Judge. 
This is a breach of contract case involving the seller of a special type of clay called bentonite, the trucking company 
that shipped the clay, and the buyer who intended to use the clay to line a sewage treatment lagoon. The clay was 
supplied and shipped, but ultimately was not used because it allegedly did not meet specifications. The buyer did not 
pay for the clay or the shipping. The seller and the trucking company sued the buyer, who defended and filed a third- 
party action against the seller asserting that the clay was not the quality promised and the seller was the only party who 
had contracted with the trucking company. The cases were consolidated, the third-party complaint was dismissed, and 
the district court entered judgments in favor of the seller and the trucking company. The buyer appeals. We reverse. 
FACTS AND PR 8&8bv& c BACKGROUND 
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In July, 1984, appellant Kit-San &ma Company (Kit-San), defendadthira-party plaintiff below, won a contract to 
expand the wastewater treatment facilities for the city of St. Maries, Idaho. The first step in the project was to build a 
24 acre "polishing lagoon." Due to weather and the water table at the site, the lagoon had to be built in the late summer 
or early fall, when the ground was driest. To build the lagoon, Kit-San was required to use a type of clay called 
bentonite, which occurs naturally in Wyoming and Utah and is used because it swells when exposed to water and 
makes a good natural sealant. Sometimes, however, bentonite must be treated with inorganic polymers to provide a 
good seal. 
Brown and Caldwell, the city's engineering firm, specified that Kit-San use a "high swelling sodium based 
Wyoming bentonite containing an optimum level of anionic or non-ionic organic polymer," having a specif- 
ic fineness grade and not allowing a seepage rate in excess of 1 x 10-7 centimeters per second. Kit-San was required to 
submit test results from the bentonite supplier showing that bentonite similar to that furnished was tested within the last 
year and met all the specified requirements, including a 200 day permeability test. 
During the spring of 1984, H &; H Bentonite and Mud, Inc., (H &; H), the respondenffplaMWthird-party 
defendant, learned of Kit-San's involvement in the project. On April 25, 1984, a salesman at H &; H, Robert McClung, 
sent a letter to Kit-San addressed "To Whom It May Concern" and quoting prices for various types of bentonite. The 
letter stated that H &; H had been in contact with Brown and Caldwell about the project and enclosed a brochure 
describing some of the qualities of H &, H bentonite, which was available from Salina, Utah. The brochure stated that, 
"It usually takes 2-3 lbs. per square foot of this bentonite to meet the EPA requirement of 10-7 In the letter, McClung 
stated, "We ask that you pay freight companies directly. If you can help get better rates, great!" 
Kit-San also considered a proposal from another supplier, American Colloid, for the use of Wyoming polymered 
bentonite. Kit-San eventually was awarded the contract for the construction of the sewage lagoon upon its proposal to 
use American Colloid's bentonite at prices quoted to Kit-San by American Colloid. The projected application rate was 
2.3 lbs. per square foot based on this product. Unfortunately, when the time came for actual purchase and delivery, no 
trucks were available, causing a construction delay. The delay was exacerbated by extra time spent dealing with a soil 
compaction problem and an error setting grade stakes for the lagoon. Ultimately, because of the trucking problem, Kit- 
San sought an alternative supplier of bentonite, resulting in renewed negotiations with H &; H. 
Richard Imus, the person at Kit-San responsible for the project, became aware of McClung's letter from H &; H. On 
October 9, 1984, Imus phoned H &; H and talked to its president, Douglas Hawke. Gene Johnson, the project engineer 
from Brown and Caldwell, was with Imus during the conversation. Before the call was made, Johnson told Imus that 
he, Johnson, did not know the quality of the H &; H bentonite, that it would have to equal the quality of American 
Colloid's product, and if Imus ordered the material from H &; H he was doing so at his own risk. He also told Imus that 
the H &; H bentonite would have to be tested upon arrival and would have to meet specifications. 
During the phone call, Hawke offered Imus a delivered price of $80.00 per ton, including freight. Based on Kit- 
San's urgent need and H &, H's representations that its bentonite was "as good or better than American Colloid 
bentonite," Imus accepted the offer, E0.b. St. Maries, and ordered 1,150 tons. This amount was based upon the 2.3 lbs. 
per square foot estimated application rate for the American Colloid product, even though Kit-San and H &; H were 
aware that the soil compaction problem might require a higher application rate. 
The same day, Hawke sent a handwritten note to Imus to confirm the details of their telephone agreement. The note 
stated: 
Dear Dick: I am writing long hand in time for Federal Express. Delivered price is $80.00 per ton [i] 
ncluding freight less 2.00 [sic] a ton discount if paid within 30 days. Thanks Douglas M. Hawke 
The letter was received by Kit-San on October 10 1984. On October 11, Hawke sent another letter to Kit-San 
e;4ao&pb;y2 
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accompanied by duplicate sales contrn~ts. In the letter of October 11, Hawke wide that the product being shipped was 
Utah bentonite, "a high-grade sodium bentonite which has been approved by several government agencies" and 
described as " 118th inch to minus 200 mesh grade of bentonite which will work very well in your St. Maries sewage 
lagoon project." The letter referred to test results conducted previously by two independent laboratories and already 
mailed to Imus. Imus had sent the results to Brown and Caldwell, which returned them on October 16, 1984, essentially 
saying that the tests were insufficient 
because they did not address a 200 day test, laboratory permeability, application rate, or what type polymers were used 
and in what percentage. In other words, the submitted test results did not show that the bentonite complied with project 
requirements. 
The contracts which Hawke sent to Imus recited a sale of 1,150 tons of bentonite for $38 per ton, Eo.b., Salina, 
Utah. They also stated that Kit-San would be responsible for paying freight costs of $42 a ton to the trucking firm. 
within ten days after delivery and that H &; H was "responsible for delivery of the bentonite to the project site," but 
was not responsible for the "design, application, hnctioning or operation of the project." Imus became concerned that 
the freight charges had been separated from the overall price and that Kit-San would be directly responsible for paying 
the trucking firm within ten days of delivery. He was also concerned that Kit-San was, in his view, disclaiming any 
warranty for the bentonite. However, Imus did not notify H &, H of his disagreement with the proposed contracts. He 
wanted time to test the bentonite. Therefore, he did not comunicate his objections or return the contracts to H &; H, 
but left them unsigned in his files. 
Delivery of the bentonite began on October 10, 1984. Thereafter, Kit-San hired the engineering firm of Budinger 
and Associates (Budinger) to test and compare the H &; H and American Colloid bentonite. Imus was concerned that 
the H &; H bentonite be of equal quality to the American Colloid bentonite so that the contract specifications would be 
met, no greater quantity would be needed, and no greater cost would be incurred by Kit-San. Evidence indicates that 
although Kit-San had won the contract based on an American Colloid bentonite application rate of 2.3 lbs. per square 
foot, it did not actually know what rate would be required considering the soil compaction problems it had encountered. 
On October 31, 1984, Budinger sent a letter to Brown and Caldwell telling them that the H &; H bentonite, using an 
application rate of 3.8 lbs. per square foot, produced test results indicating that the permeability (seepage rate) value 
was approximately three times greater than the value allowed by the specifications. Brown and Caldwell notified Imus 
at Kit-San, and Imus called H &; H to stop shipment. 
From the time shipping started until it was stopped on October 31, thirty-nine truck loads (approximately 983 tons) 
had been delivered to St. Maries by Manuel Figueroa and his company, Friendship Truck Express (Friendship). At trial, 
Imus testified that he stopped the deliveries because of the unfavorable test results. He also testified that he and Hawke 
talked about the lack of polymers in the bentonite and that Hawke responded by saying no polymers were needed and 
mailed some information to support the claim. On the other hand, Hawke testified that Imus stopped the deliveries 
because wet, winter weather had set in precluding construction until the spring. Evidence indicates that there was some 
discussion regarding the quality of the bentonite during the phone call on October 3 1, however, Brown and Caldwell's 
daily inspection notes for the project also reveal that the weather was becoming cold and wet, with occasional rain, and 
snow the next day. 
On November 8, 1984, Budinger sent a second letter to Brown and Caldwell advising them that another test of the 
American Colloid sample produced the required permeability at an application rate of 3.1 lbs. per square foot. Budinger 
also told the engineers that the H &; H product would require a greater application rate, but that further testing was 
required. A letter followed on February 11, 1985, in which Budinger stated that the H &; H bentonite required an 
application rate roughly twice as high as American Colloid. Importantly, the tests revealed that neither product would 
achieve the originally estimated 2.3 lbs. per square foot application rate, and that the quality of H &, H bentonite was 
very dependent on how carefully it was mixed. 
0QO07'8 
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On March 22, 1985, Brown and  aidw well wrote to Imus advising him their tests indicated that from 55 to 96 
percent more H &; H bentonite was required to achieve the 
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same permeability as American Colloid and that the H &, H bentonite was more sensitive to mixing. The letter 
included an authorization for a change in product or application rate. Essentially, however, Brown and Caldwell was 
telling Kit-San to use American Colloid bentonite or pay for the extra H &; H material required 
Ultimately, Kit-San used 34 tons of the H &; H material in non-critical areas. The lining of the lagoon was 
completed in September, 1985, using 2,127 tons of American Colloid bentonite applied at 4.08 lbs. per square foot. At 
trial, Mr. Budinger stated that the contractor did a better than average job of mixing since the tests indicated a moderate 
mix would require an application rate of 8.3 lbs. per square foot. Over 900 tons of H &; H bentonite was reportedly left 
unused at the project site. 
Meanwhile, Friendship and H &; H had not been paid. Both submitted claims under I.C. F) 54-1927 against Kit- 
San's performance bond and filed complaints on February 8, 1985, and March 8,1985, respectively. On May 10, 1985, 
Kit-San sent a letter to H &; H formally objecting to the written contracts, denying liability, claiming that H &, H had 
misrepresented its product, supplied unsuitable bentonite, and that H &; H must make the bentonite conform to the oral 
contract or remove it. 
Kit-San answered Friendship's complaint, counterclaimed, and filed a third-party action against H &; H. The cases 
were consolidated and the third-party action dismissed. The district court granted judgment to H &; H for $69,910.90 in 
principal and interest, and to Friendship for $65,324.93 in principal, interest, and costs. Kit-San appeals from both 
judgments. The cases have been consolidated for disposition on appeal. 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
1. Did the district court err when it determined the terms of the contract between Kit-San and H &; H? 
2. Did the court err when it found that Kit-San did not seasonably reject the goods and therefore accepted 
them? 
3. Did the court err when it found that there was a breach of an express warranty but that it was nullified by 
Kit-San's acceptance of the goods? 
4. Did the court err when it determined that there was no breach of a warranty for a particular purpose? 
5. Did the court err when it found a contract existed between Kit-San and Friendship? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[ l ]  This case presents questions of fact as to the negotiations and actions of the parties, but questions of law as to 
whether the actions formed a contract. An appellate court will defer to the trial court's findings of fact based upon 
substantial evidence, but will review freely the wnclusions of law reached by stating legal rules or principles and 
applying them to the facts found. Staggie v. Idaho Falls Consol Hospitals, 110 Idaho 349,715 P.2d 1019 
(Ct.App.1986); see, e.g., City ofBurley v. McCaslin Lumber Co., 107 Idaho 906,693 P.2d 1108 (Ct.App.1984); 
Standards ofAppellate Review, IDAHO APPELLATE HANDBOOK $3.2.2 (Idaho Law Foundation, Inc. 1985). 
Accordingly, in the present case, we will uphold factual findings made by the district court as long as they are not 
"clearly erroneous." Staggie, supra. We will review freely any statements of law and the court's conclusion that the 
facts as found did not entitle Kit-San to any relief. Id. 
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1. Contract Terms 
Initially, we examine whether the court erred in its determination of the terms of the contract between H &; H and 
Kit-San. Our resolution of this issue also will determine whether a contract existed between Kit-San and Friendship. 
[2] This case involves a contract for the sale of movable goods worth over $500, therefore, chapter two of Idaho's 
Uniform Commercial Code (the code) applies. LC. 8 28-2-105; Borges v. Magic Valley Foods, Inc., 101 Idaho 494, 
616 P.2d 273 (1980). Generally, contracts for the sale of goods over $500 must be in writing to be 
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enforceable. LC. 8 28-2-201. However, an oral contract may be enforceable if a party admits in pleadings or in court 
that a contract was made. LC. 4 28-2-201(3)(b). Here, both H & H and Kit-San admitted in their pleadings and in court 
that a contract existed. Further, it is undisputed that Kit-San ordered bentonite which H & H had delivered. Therefore, 
the dispute concerns only the terms of the contract. H & H maintains that the terms of its formal contract of October 11, 
1984, govern, even though Kit-San never signed or expressly accepted that version. Kit-San, however, argues that the 
contract must rest on H & H's oral agreement established by the telephone conversation of October 9, 1984, and the 
confirmatory memorandum written and mailed by Hawke that day. 
[3] Parties to a contract must have a mutual understanding or meeting of the minds regarding essential contract 
terms in order for the contract to be binding. Thomas v. Schrnelzer, 118 Idaho 353,796 P.2d 1026 (Ct.App.1990); 67 
AM.JUR.2D Sales 5 129, p. 398 (1985). A meeting of the minds requires an expression of assent or conduct 
to show agreement. 67 AM.JUR.2D Sales 8 129, p. 398. 
H & H provided Kit-San with several preliminary price statements before the latter placed an order. Robert 
McClung's letter of April 25, 1984, quoted different prices for unpolymered Utah bentonite delivered f.0.b. Utah and 
Idaho, and stated, "We ask that you pay freight companies directly." It also quoted a price for Wyoming polymered 
bentonite. H & H's letter of June 22,1984, quoted a price of $80.50 a ton delivered to St. Maries, with a discount of 
two dollars a ton if paid within twenty days of invoice. The actual acceptance of any offer, however, did not take place 
until Imus called Hawke on October 9, 1984. During that conversation, Hawke offered Utah bentonite at $80 per ton 
including freight, which Imus assented to with delivery of 1,150 tons f.0.b. St. Maries. The same day, Hawke sent a 
confirmatory memorandum stating, "Delivered price is $80 a ton [ilncluding freight less $2 a ton discount if paid in 30 
days." Evidence indicates that the parties discussed paying the freight company directly, but only that Kit-San 
"expressed a willingness to consider such a payment method." On October 11,1984, however, Hawke mailed H & H's 
formal contract which differed from the oral contract in that it divided the product and freight charges and required that 
Kit-San pay the freight company directly on a different schedule. It also stated that H & H was responsible for delivery 
of the bentonite to the project site, but not responsible for the design, application, knctioning or operation of the 
project. 
[4] The court found that the different price, freight, and delivery terms of the proposed written contract controlled, 
that the oral agreement established a product price of $38 per ton, and that any changes to the oral agreement by the 
written contract were ratified by Kit-San when it failed to notify H & H of any objections to the terms of the written 
contract. 
We fmd the court's conclusions not to be supported by substantial evidence. Both Imus and Hawke testified that the 
oral agreement was for $80 a ton delivered. The April 25th letter stating a $38 price and relied on by the court as a 
basis of understanding between the parties was merely a preliminary price quote made six months before the actual 
order. Hawke's handwritten note of October 9 confirmed the details of the oral contract and prevails over the 
preliminary discussions. 
[5-71 In the same regard, Hawke's formal contract of October 1 1, 1984, was not a confirmatory memorandum 
stating additional terms that were assented to by Kit-San, but was a completely new offer. The court found this offer 
accepted by Kit-San's failure to object. This Silence ordinarily does not establish acceptance 
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without knowledge that silence is a m ~ d e  of acceptance and the offeree intends ,d accept. Vogt v. Madden, 110 Idaho 6, 
713 P.2d 442 (Ct.App.1985); Eimco Dtv., Envirotech Corp. v. United Pacific Ins. Co., 109 Idaho 762, 710 P.2d 672 
(Ct.App.1985); See J. CALAMARI AND J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS $2-21, p. 63-68 (2nd ed. 1977). A party cannot 
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state an agreement on his own terms and unilaterally form a contract. D.R. Curtis Company v. Mason, 103 Idaho 476, 
649 P.2d 1232 (Ct.App.1982). Kit-San did not assent to the terms in the formal contract and apparently did not intend 
to assent. 
[8,9] If, however, one takes the view that the formal contract was in fact a written confmation with additional 
terms, the additional terms "are to be construed as proposals for addition to the contract." I.C. $ 28-2-207(2). In this 
regard, the district court's position is supported by Comment 6 to $ 28-2-207, which states that additional terms may be 
deemed accepted if no objection or answer is received within a reasonable time. However, commentators have 
suggested that "it is doubtful that this comment relates to the first sentence of subdivision 2. CJ Restatement, Contracts 
(2d) $ 60, Comment a; U.C.C. $ 2-201, Comment 3." J. CALAMARI AND J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS, supra, p. 70, 
n. 63. Notwithstanding such doubt, the oral agreement, confirmed by the October 9 handwritten note, contradicted the 
later written contract. Additional or different terms will not become part of the agreement if they materially alter the 
original bargain. LC. $ 28-2-207, Comment 3. The additional terms here materially altered the terms in that they 
affected the price, the schedule of payment, who to pay, and the risk of loss during delivery. The record indicates that 
Kit-San did not assent to dividing the cost and to paying the trucking company directly or to the attempt to disclaim any 
warranty for the goods or the operation of the project. At the time shipping started, Kit-San did not know who the 
trucking company was, for it had not been named in any of H & H's communications with Kit-San. In this case, then, 
the contradicting terms in the formal agreement "fall out." See J. WHITE AND R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE $ 1-3, p. 41-46 (3rd ed. 1988). 
2. Acceptance/Rejection of Goods 
Having determined that the district court erred when it found that the terms of the oral contract had been modified 
by the later formal contract, the issue remains whether Kit-San became obligated to pay for the bentonite and its 
delivery under the oral contract when it failed to reject the goods until May 10, 1985, over six months after delivery 
and nearly a month after Kit-San had actually appeared in the legal actions brought by H & H and Friendship. 
The court found that six months was not a reasonable time for rejection, the rejection was ineffective, and Kit-San 
had accepted 34 of the 983 tons of bentonite shipped, and therefore was liable for the entire shipment. Kit-San argues 
that it notified H & H of its rejection on October 31, 1984. It also asserts that its use of 34 tons was in mitigation and 
does not constitute acceptance. 
[lo] If the goods or the tender of delivery in a contract for the sale of goods fail to conform to the contract, the 
buyer may reject or accept the whole, or may accept any commercial unit or units and reject the remainder. LC. $ 28-2- 
601. Acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer fails to make an effective rejection after a reasonable time and 
opporhmity to inspect the goods, or does any act inconsistent with the seller's ownership. I.C. $ 28-2-606(1)(b), (c); G 
& HLand & Cattle Co. v. Heitzman &Nelson, Inc., 102 Idaho 204,628 P.2d 1038 (1981). Upon acceptance, the buyer 
must pay at the contract rate for any goods accepted and loses his right to reject. I.C. $ 28-2-607(1), (2). 
[ l l ,  121 A rejection of goods must be within a reasonable time after their delivery or tender, and the buyer must 
seasonably notify the seller of the rejection. LC. $28-2-602(1); G & HLand & Cattle, supra. In other words, the buyer 
must take affmative action to avoid acceptance. LC. $ 28-2-602, Comment 1. An action taken within a reasonable 
time is taken "seasonably." I.C. 8 28-2-204(3). 
113-151 As with rejection, after delivery and before acceptance the buyer is given a reasonable time to inspect the 
goods. I.C. $ 28-2-513(1); I.C. $ 28-2-606(1)(b); G & HLand & Cattle, supra; ANNOT., Sale- 
B0OOtY6 
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Inspection by Buyer, 52 A.L.R.2d 900 (1957). If the goods do not conform in kind, quality, condition, or amount they 
may be rejected. 67 AM.JUR.2D Sales 5 610, p. 901. What is a reasonable time is primarily a question of fact; 
however, where the facts are not substantially in dispute, it becomes a question of law to be resolved by the court. 67 
AM.JUR.2D 5 72, p. 333-34; G & H Land & Cattle, supra. See also ANNOT., Time, Place, and Manner ofBuyer's 
Inspection of Goods Under UCCJ 2-513, 36 A.L.R.4th 726 (1985). The code does not define what is a "reasonable" 
time, either in the context of inspection or rejection. However, several factors relevant to whether a reasonable time has 
passed for inspection and rejection are: (1) the difficulty in discovering the defect; (2) the terms of the contract; (3) the 
relative perishability of the goods; and (4) the course of performance after the sale and before the formal rejection. J. 
WHITE AND R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE $8-3, p. 362 (3rd. ed. 1988). 
2A. Rejection Occurred On May 10, 1985 
[16,17] The court found the goods were rejected on May 10, 1985. Kit-San claims that it rejected the goods orally 
on October 3 1, 1984, when Imus phoned Hawke and told him to discontinue deliveries because the bentonite did not 
conform to the contract or H & H's representations. 
Evidence indicates that when Imus stopped the shipments on October 3 1, 1984, he did so at least partly because of 
the dubious suitability of the bentonite. On the other hand, Hawke testified that the shipments were stopped because of 
bad weather. The court stated: 
There is no question that, on October 31, 1984, Kit-San, through Imus, notified H & H that the bentonite 
did not appear to be of the same quality as the American Colloid product with respect to permeability. 
However, Kit-San did not reject the material at the time. No notice was given to H & H at that time which 
would have initiated any action on the part of the seller. 
We fmd the court's conclusion correct that notice of rejection was not made until May 10, 1985. Kit-San's statement 
of October 3 1, 1984, was merely an expression that the goods were non-conforming. We also conclude that Kit-San's 
statement of rejection in May was sufficiently formal to notify H & H of Kit-San's intent, and of the need for H & H to 
cure or remove the goods. 
2B. i%e Timing of the Rejection was Reasonable 
1181 The question remains, however, whether the court erred when it found that the rejection was not made within a 
reasonable time after delivery. In this regard, we hold that the court erred. 
Kit-San hired Budinger and began the inspection process as soon as the bentonite was delivered. By October 31, 
1984, initial results were communicated to Kit-San, which called H & H to discuss the quality of the product and stop 
deliveries, possibly for the combined reason that winter was setting in. Thereafter, a period of silence prevailed 
between Kit-San and H & H. However, during that time Kit-San received results of furfher testing on November 8, 
1984, and February 11, 1985. Brown and Caldwell notified Kit-San on March 22, 1985, of a permitted change order as 
a result of the latest tests. Kit-San did not reject until 1 112 months later. Within this time, both Friendship and H & H 
had filed actions against Kit-San. The court found that a possible reason for the delay by Kit-San was because the 
company was waiting to see if it could obtain replacement bentonite from American Colloid. 
I Because the contract did not specify a time for rejection, the code provision for a reasonable time governed. The 
goods were not perishable, so no immediate action was necessary. Kit-San did nothing inconsistent with H & H's 
ownership. Accordmg to Hawke's own testimony, it was Kit-San's responsibility to test the product to see if it met 
requirements. Given Hawke's knowledge of the industry and his company's asserted knowledge of EPA require- 
,- ".-.-- Page 159 - -.- 
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ments and the specifications for the Sr. ~vIaries project, it is logical to assume it would have reason to know of the type 
of testing required for the project, including a 200 day permeability test, and that these tests could not be completed 
overnight. As the court stated: 
When Kit-San ordered the bentonite from H & H, it was patently obvious that the Brown and Caldwell 
requirements had not been complied with, nor could they be for a period of time. For example, it seems 
clear that Imus ordered the bentonite without any assurance that the H & H product had been tested for a 
minimum of 200 days within the preceding 12 months to assure that it met the requirements, and that 
testing was begun immediately after the first delivery in order to satisfy Brown and Caldwell. Clearly, if 
the specifications were adhered to, nothing could be done for at least 200 days thereafter. 
Moreover, the quality of the bentonite could not be determined without scientific testing and comparison with 
American Colloid bentonite, given the fact that the project specifications were based on American Colloid and H & H 
had essentially represented that its product could replace that bentonite directly because it was "as good or better than 
American Colloid." 
Hawke testified that he had not received the project specifications. Still, he submitted to Kit-San results of tests he 
had previously commissioned on the H & H bentonite, in an attempt to provide Kit-San with "a certified test result" for 
the St. Maries project. However, Hawke also testified that testing was Kit-San's responsibility. As the court pointed out, 
H & H's tests did not contain any data for a 200 day permeability test and the bentonite could not be used without that 
test. Two-hundred days Erom the first delivery is approximately the time Kit-San rejected. Although Kit-San may have 
waited until it could find replacement bentonite Erom American Colloid before rejecting, we do not find this fact 
dispositive or unreasonable, because testing had continued. 
2C. Use of Some Bentonite Was Not Acceptance of All 
[19] The district court found that Kit-San used 34 tons of the total shipment and concluded that this use amounted 
to an acceptance of all of the goods delivered. The court based its conclusion on the view that the pile of bentonite 
sitting at St. Maries, consisting of all of the bentonite ordered, was a single commercial unit. We find this conclusion to 
be contrary to the law. 
Acceptance occurs when the buyer accepts any part of a commercial unit. I.C. 5 28-2-606(2). However, a party may 
elect to accept a commercial unit and reject the rest. I.C. 5 28-2-601(c); G & HLand & Cattle, supra. A commercial 
unit is defined as: 
a single whole for purposes of sale and division of which materially impairs its character or value on the 
market or in use. A commercial unit may be a single article (as a machine) or a set of articles (as a suite of 
hrniture or an assortment of sizes) or a quantity (as abale, gross, or carload) or any other unit treated in 
use or in the relevant market as a single whole. 
LC. 5 28-2-105(6). Regarding partial acceptance, Comment 1 to LC. 5 28-2-601 states that 
A buyer accepting a non-conforming tender is not penalized by the loss of any remedy otherwise open to 
him. This policy extends to cover and regulate the acceptance of a part of any lot improperly tendered in 
any case where the price can reasonably be apportioned. Partial acceptance is permitted whether the part of 
the goods accepted conforins or not. The only limitation on partial acceptance is that good faith and 
commercial reasonableness must be used to avoid undue impairment of the value of the remaining portion 
of the goods. . . . In this respect, the test is not only what unit has been the basis of contract, but whether 
the partial acceptance produces so materially adverse an effect on the remainder as to constitute bad faith. 
-- Page 160 --- 
See also Epn-Delaval, S.A. v. Inter-Equip, Inc., 542 F.Supp. 238,34 U.C.C. 130 (S.D.Tex.1982). 
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[20] Here, the basis of the contract ~vas bentonite by the ton. The price of t h ~ ,  contract was apportioned on a per ton 
basis. There is no evidence that Kit-San's use of 34 tons produced an adverse effect on the remainder of the bentonite- 
except to reduce it-and the quality of the product or its resale value was not impaired. For these reasons, we conclude 
that Kit-San accepted only the 34 tons it used. 
[21,22] Further, a buyer may use goods without accepting them if the use is a reasonable attempt to mitigate 
damages. 67 AM JUR 2D Sales $ 635, p. 929. The evidence is undisputed that Kit-San used the 34 tons for testing and 
in "non-critical" areas as allowed by Brown and Caldwell, after initial notification to H & H that the bentonite did not 
correspond to representations and after Kit-San had been notified by Budinger that the bentonite did not meet 
specifications. A use of approximately three and one-half per cent of the whole does not amount to acceptance of the 
whole in this case. Additionally, a reasonable use of goods for testing to determine if they are conforming is not a use 
that is inconsistent with the seller's ownership and does not constitute acceptance. 67 AM JUR 2D Sales $ 634, p. 928. 
3. Breach of Express Warranty 
[23] The trial court found that H & H had expressly warranted its bentonite, had breached that warranty, but that the 
breach was nullified by Kit-San's acceptance of the goods. Although we agree that a warranty existed, we fmd the 
court's conclusion regarding acceptance to be erroneous. 
In this case, the court properly found that the essential basis of the litigation was Kit-San's "contention that H & H 
expressly warranted that its bentonite would be equal to or better than the American Colloid product with respect to 
application rate." Clearly, Kit-San was concerned that the H & H bentonite be of sufficient quality that no more would 
be required than had been estimated using American Colloid bentonite as a basis. If the H & H bentonite was of lesser 
quality, its application rate would be greater and Kit-San would be forced to buy more than contemplated by its 
contract with the city. 
The record indicates that Hawke of H & H had expressed to Imus of Kit-San that the H & H material was as good 
or better than American Colloid material. As the court found, Hawke's expression amounted to an affirmation of fact 
relating to the bentonite, became a basis for the bargain, and constituted an express warranty by H & H that its 
bentonite would be equal in quality to the American Colloid bentonite with respect to permeability. See LC. 5 28-2- 
313. However, it was not equal in quality, as shown by the Budinger tests. 
The court also found that because Kit-San did not seasonably reject and had accepted the entire shipment by using 
34 tons, the breach of warranty provided no basis for relief. We have concluded that the court erred regarding the 
seasonableness of the rejection and the use of only some of the bentonite. Thus, we find further error in the court's 
denial of the breach of express warranty as a basis for recovery. LC. $28-2-714(1) (buyer may recover damages for 
breach in regard to accepted goods); De Weber v. Bob Rice Ford, Znc., 99 Idaho 847,590 P.2d 103 (1979). 
4. Breach of Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose 
The district court found that no implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose existed, and thus was not 
breached. In view of our holding reversing the judgment for other reasons, we decline to address this issue. 
5. Alleged Contract Between Buyer and Trucker 
Our conclusion that their oral agreement constituted the basis of the contract between Kit-San and H & H requires a 
finding that the trial court erred when it concluded that a contract also existed between 
-.-,-- Page 161 -. 
Kit-San and Friendship. The court found that as early as April 25, 1984, H & H advised Kit-San that Kit-San would 
be paying the freight company directly and could, if possible, negotiate better rates with them. The court also found: 
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Friendship Truck considered thP, it was dealing directly with Kit-San. Dt,pite the fact that Mr. Hawke did, 
in his October 9, 1984, handwritten letter, quote a price of $80.00 per ton including fieight, the tendered 
formal contract left no doubt that Kit-San would be paying the freight costs directly to Friendship Truck 
and Kit-San never advised either H & H or Friendship to the contrary. Finally when problems developed 
concerning the unloading of the bentonite, Kit-San dealt with Friendship Truck and ultimately sent that 
firm a bill for what it considered to be legitimate reimbursement costs associated with unloading. No such 
demand was made at the time upon H & H. 
The record reveals that H & H contacted Friendship about hauling the bentonite, and Friendship provided a rate to 
H & H. Mr. Figueroa of Friendship testified that he did not speak with anyone at Kit-San about the trucking and did not 
have any written contract with Kit-San, but kept in contact with H & H. Friendship's invoices sent to Kit-San indicated 
that H & H placed the order for shipment. A Mr. Oakes, a former employee of Friendship, testified that he was 
contacted by Hawke to provide a freight rate Hawke could quote to Kit-San. On the other hand, when Kit-San 
encountered problems unloading the trucks at the project site, it notified Friendship directly, and went so far as to 
demand payment for the time and effort spent unloading the trucks. 
124,251 We have concluded that the tendered formal contract was not effective as a means of defining the 
obligations of the parties, but the terms of the prior oral agreement controlled. The oral agreement was that H & H 
would arrange the shipping and Kit-San would make an undivided payment of $80 a ton to H & H, which would then 
pay Friendship. Discussions between Kit-San and H & H that Kit-San should pay Friendship directly were merely 
negotiations. At the most Kit-San agreed to consider such a payment method, but no final agreement was made. Also, 
the only communications between Friendship and Kit-San occurred when Friendship contacted Kit-San to obtain credit 
references and later when Kit-San contacted'riend~hi~ about its alleged failure to d o a d  the trucks. We find these 
actions insufficient to establish an ameement between Kit-San and Friendshin Therefore. we find that the district court 
erred when it concluded that K i t - ~ a i  was responsible for directly paying ~rikndshi~.  under the terms of the oral 
agreement, Kit-San's payment obligations went only to H & H. 
CONCLUSION 
Here, the provisions of the U.C.C. apply to determine that the governing terms between the parties were those of 
the oral agreement. Kit-San inspected and rejected the goods within a reasonable time, and its use of a small number of 
commercial units did not constitute an acceptance of every unit. Further, H & H expressly warranted its product to be 
as good as the product it was replacing, a warranty which was breached when the product was determined to be of 
lesser quality. We find no contract existed between Kit-San and Friendship. For these reasons, we reverse the judgment 
of the court and remand for a determination of damages claimed by Kit-San. 
1261 Finally, Kit-San is entitled to an award of attorneys fees against H & H and Friendship Truck Express on 
appeal pursuant to I.C. 8 12-120(3), as the prevailing party in an action based on a contract relating to a sale of goods, 
together with its costs to be determined under I.A.R. 40 and 41. 
SWANSTROM and SILAK, JJ., concur. 
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I 
This matter came before the Hon. Stephen Drescher for trial by the Court on 
Monday, October 29,2007. Panike & Sons Farms hc.  (Plaintiff herein) was represented by Lary 
Walker and Randy Smith and Janine Smith, individually and doing business as Four Rivers 
Packing Co. (Defendant herein) were represented by Bruce H. Birch. The case of Four Rivers 
Packing Co., an Idaho Corporation, v. Panike & Sons Farms, k c .  was originally tiled in Payette 
County and by stipulatiou venue was transferred to Washington County. The panies further 
gtipulated that these cases be consoiidated for the purpose of trial as they deal with similar issues. 
kt the outset of trial, Plaintiff represented to the Court that it was not proceeding against Randy 
Smith and Janine Smith in their individual capacities. 
FACTS 
Panike & Sons Fanns, Inc. (Plaintiff herein) raises onions in Oregon. Greg Panilce 
:Panike herein) i s  the majority shareholder and runs the business. Four Rivers Packing Company, 
[nc. (Defendant herein) purchases onions from local growers, packs and sells them to buyers 
worldwide. The corporation is owned by Janine Smith and Dennis Ujiiye. Randy Smith (Smith 
mein) is general manager and field man for the corporation. 
On January 13,2006, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a Contract to Buy or 
3andle (Contract herein), (Plaintiffs Exhibit #I) .  Panike read the Contract as Smith reviewed it 
vith him. After mutually agreeing to delete Paragraph 6, ofthe Contract, Panike and Smith 
;igned for Plaintiff and Defendant respectively. Plaintiff contracted to deliver 25,000 hundred 
veight (cwt) (2,500,000 pounds) of yellow onions to Defendant during the 2006-2007 and a 
iimilar amount during the 2007-2008 crop. years. The parties' respective obligations for the 2007- 
!008 crop year were not at issue before the Court.' 
The dispute between the parties arose over the first four words of Paragraph 1. of 
he Contracr "Buyer shall specifyfield(s)". In August 2006 Smith advised Panike by letter of the 
ipecific fielcls from which Plaintiff was to meet iis contract obligation. (Defendants Exhibits "F' 





























and "F"). Panike, acting for Plaintiff, refused to deliver onions from those fields specified by 
Smith. 
Defendant sells onions to buyers throughout the United States and worldwide. To 
fill its contracts, Dcfendant enters into pre-season contracts with local growers. Onions 
Dcfendant contracted to buy from Plaintiff had been pre-sold before Plaintiff planted its crop. 
Defendant reserved the right to specify fields to insure that Plaintifrs onions would meet the 
specifications of the contracts it had with its buyers. Panike didn't ask Smith why certain fields 
had been specified and he made no effort to compromise with Defendant. Plaintiff assens Smith 
identified fields of onions which contained larger and more valuable even though no evidence was 
produced regarding the exact size or value of all of the onions from specified fields relative to tile 
value of other onions produced by Plaintiff. In August 2006 nobody in the onion business knew 
what thc price of onions would be. Smith inspected all of Plaintiffs onion fields and specified 
those fields which would best meet Defendant's contractual obligations with its buyers. 
After Plaintiff refused to deliver onions from specified fields, both parties retained legal counsel 
who communicated and negotiated back and fonh. Correspondence continued into late 
September. The p d e s '  negotiations terminated with Panike's attempted delivery of non- 
conforming onions on October 3,2006. No further deliveries were made by Plaintiff to 
Defendant. 
On or about October 3,2007, the market price for yellow onions was $18.00 per 
hundred in the Malheur County, Idaho area. (Defendants's Exhibit #M) Defendant's cost to 
pack a hundred weight of onions was $6.00. To meet its contractual obligations, Defendant 
purchased 15,000 cwt. onions from Peterson Farms and 10,000 cwt. onions from Ujiiye F m s  at 
the market price of $580.,000.00, $461,250.00 more &an i t  would have paid Plaintiff for onions 
conforming to the Contract. Defendant did not pay to pack the 10,000 cwt, replacement onions 
purchased from Ujiiye Farms as they were already boxed. The price paid Peterson farms for 
15,000 cwt. replacement onions, $24.00 cwt. included the packing cost to Defendant of $6.00 per 
cwt. The replacement onions purchased by Defendant enabled it to fulfill its sales contracts. 
Many local onion packers specify fields &om which growers are to fill their 
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contracts. Applcton Produce specifies fields on a limited basis. Parrners Produce and Lynn 
Josephson Produce, Payette, Idaho onion packing companies, use a contract with a field 
iesignation clause. Defendant has used a contract with a specification clause since it was formed 
In 1999. Defendant specifies fields in August, Partners Produce specifies fields in July and Lynn 
losephson Produce specifies fields at harvest t h e .  Every grower or packer who testified, 
ncluding Panike, is awarc of the trade practice of specification or designation of flelds. 
Plaintiff's pleadings do not allege that Defendant breached its contractual 
,bligation to purchase onions during the 2007-2008 crop year. 
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE 
IN SUPPORT OF ITS CAUSE OF ACTION 
The Verified Complaint filed by the Plaintiff alleges that the Contract entered into 
)y the parties on January 13,2006, is an "adhesion" contract. It goes on to request a declaratory 
uling as to meeting of minds on the terms, conditions and provisions of the Contract, a 
leclaratory ruling as to whether the Plaintiff met contract specifications and a declaratory 
udgment on lien validity. The Plaintiffpresented no evidence that the Contract is an adhesion 
:ontract. The Idaho Supreme ~ o u k  defined an adhesion contract as an agreement between two 
~arties of unequal bargaining strength, expressed in the language of a standardized contract, 
vrirten by the more powerful bargainer to meet i ts own needs, and offered to the weaker party on 
: "take-it-or-leave-it basis." Lovey V. Regenca Blueshield ofldaho, 139 Idaho 37 (2003). 
'laintiff presented no evidence that it and Defendant are of unequal bargaining power. Plaintiff 
lresented no evidence that the Contract was offered by Defendant to meet its own needs on a 
'take it or leave itl'basis. Smith testified that he approached Panike about purchasing 2005 
inions from its storage and that Panike agreed to the sale of 2005 onions on the condition that 
Iefendant give Plaintiff a contract for the 2006-2007 and the 2007-2008 crop seasons. The 
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contract for 2005 onions and the Contract at issue herein were signed the same day. Panike, who 
has a college education, testified that he read the Contract and he requested that one provision, 
Paragraph 6.. be deleted because he didn't want ir in the agreement. He did not ask that any other 
provision, specifically the specification language of Paragraph l., be deleted. Panike testified tha 
he considered the Contract to be binding. ~ h e i e  i s  no factual basis for a finding that the Contract 
was adhes~ve in nature or that there was no meeting of the minds. The very fact that Panike 
requested that Paragraph 6 .  be deleted from the agreement as Smith read through the Contract 
with him and then signed it indicates bis assent to the Conwct terms and provisions. 
In the prayer of its Verified Complaint, the Plaintiff requests an award of damages. 
The Plaintiff presented no evidence of damages. There was some testimony suggesting that 
Defendant's lien caused Plaintiff to be late in payment of some obligations, however, here was nc 
:vidence of monetary loss to Plaintiff. Plaintiff did not allege nor did it present evidence 
iupporting an award of damages having to do with the second year of the Contract. 
DEFENDANT HAD THE RIGHT TO 
SPECIFY FXELDS IN AUGUST 2006 
Defendant had the right, pursuant to the Contract, to spccify those fields fiom 
vhich Plaintiff was to deliver 25,000 cwt yellow onions. Plaintiff presented no evidence 
:hallenging the validity of the Contract phrase "Buyer shall designate field($ but instead 
:hallenged Defendan,tys right to specify fields aftcr the Contract was executed, in August 2006. 
'anike testified that the Contract did not state when the specification of fields would or could take 
)lace. Plaintiffs counsel, on cross examination, attempted unsuccessfully to get Smith to admit 
hat the Contract did not give Defendant the right to specify fields in August. As Smith testified, 
he Contract does not srate when the specification or designation must take place. The provisions 
~EIdaho Code $ 28-2-3 11 (1) clarify this issue: 
An agreement for sale which i s  otherwise sufficiently definite . . . to be a contract is not 
made invalid by the fact that it leavesparriculars ofperformance to be specFed by one of 
theparties. Any such specification must be made in good faith and within limits set by 
commercial reasonableness. (Emphasis added), 
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The Contract left a panicular of performance, the designation of fields, to be specified by tIie 
Defendant. In so doing, however, the Defendant had the obligation to act in good faith and 
within limits set by commercial reasonableness. Defendant complied with both obligations. The 
letters written to Panike by Smith, Exhibits " E  and "F", demonstrate Defendant's good faith. By 
his absolute refusal to comply with the terms of the contract, Panike acted in bad faith. IJB didn't 
inquire of Smith why those Sp~cific fields had been specified; fiirthex, be mmade no effod to resolve 
the impasse that had arisen between the parties. Panike's only response was to adamantly refuse 
to deliver irom specified fields. Testimony from other area onion packers who themselves 
designate fields in mid-summer or at harvest clearly indicates that an August specification of 
fields is reasonable. The very terms of the Contract - "Buyer &&! specify field(s)" - when viewed 
in light of the prevailing trade practice indicates that Smith's August specification of fields was 
reasonable. 
In determining the meaning of the Contracf the Court must consider the provisions 
of Idaho Code $28-1-303 (c) and (d) which state: 
A "usage oftradc" is any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of 
observance in n place, vocation, or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be 
observed with respect to the transaction in question. The existence and scope of such a 
usage must be proved as facts. If it is established that such a usage is embodied in a trade 
code or similar record, the interpretation o f  the record is a question of law. 
A . . . .usage of trade in tlze vocation or trads in which t h q  are engaged or of which they 
are or shozlld be aware is relevant in ascertaining the meaning of the parties' agreement, 
may give particuiar meaning to specflc terms of the agreement, and may supplement or 
qualzfi the terms of the agreement. A usage of trade applicable in the place <n which part 
of the performance under the agreement is to occur ma.v be so utilized as to that part of 
the performance. (Emphasis added). 
Specification of onion fields is a method of dealing having such regularity of 
observance in the onion trade as ta justify an expectation that it would be observed with respect to 
the transaction in question. Not only should Panike have been aware of this practice, he testified 
that he was aware of it. Accordingly, this trade usage is to be considered in giving particular 
meaning to the specific terms of the Contract. Plaintiffs argument that the Contract did not give 
Defendant the right to specify fields after it was executed is without merit. 
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THE DEFENDANT HAD AN ABSOLUTE RIGHT 
TO REJECT PLAINTUFF'S NO%-COXFORMING TENDER 
Idaho Code Section 9 28-2-106(2) states: "Goods or conduct including any part of 
a performance are "conforming" or conform to the contract 
oblirarions under the contuac[," (Emphasis added). Onions delivered by Plaintiff conformed to 
the Contract only if they were delivered in accord with Plaintiffs obligation to deliver from fields 
specified by Defendant. Plaintiff rakes the position that the two rruck loads of onions it delivered 
to Defendant from non-specified fields met the 75% 3" minimum Contract requirement and werc 
therefore "substantially conforming." This position is predicated on the inspection of those 
onions wbich took place at Ap'pleton Produce. 
Tl~e 2,500,000 pounds of onions Plaintiff contracted to sell to Defendant were 
harvesred from non-specified fields. Two truck loads of those non-specif ed onions were 
inspected at Appleton Produce when Defendant properly rejected Panike's attempted delivery. 
Ultimately all 2,500,000 pounds were delivered to Appleton Produce. Plaintiffs Exhibit "5" sets 
forth the result of the inspection of only 8,369 pounds of ihe 2,500,000 pounds of onions. No 
other inspection records or certificates were admitted in evidence. There is no evidence that cbe 
2,500,000 pounds of onions from non-specified fields met all Contract specifications set forth in 
Paragraph 1. and 2. of the Contract. 
The Uniform. Commercial Code does not speak of "substantially confom.ing" 
goods. In the language of the UCC, goods are either "conforming" or "non-conforming". There 
is no middle ground. 
Idaho Code 3 28-2-601, which speaks of the buyer's rights on the delivery of goods 
wbich do not conform to the contract, reads as follows: 
Subject to the provisions of this chapter on breach in instalment contracts (section 
28-2-612) and unless otherwise agreed under the sections on contractual 
limitations of remedy (sections 28-2-718 and 28-2-719), if the goods or the tender 
of delivery fail in any respect to conform to the contract, the buyer may 
(a) reject the whole; or 
(b) accept the whole; or 
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(c) accept any commercial unit or units and reject the rest. 
(Emphasis added). 
Clcarly, while Defendant had the right to accept non-conforming goods, onions from non- 
specified fields, it had an absolute right to reject onions which were "not in accordance with the 
obligations under the contract." 
Smith inspected the Plaintiff's fields throughout the growing season and 
ietemined that certain of  Plaintiff's onion fields would better meet Defendant's contractual 
obligations. Smith specified these fields in his August 25,2006 letter to Panike. Quality, not 
value, was the basis of Defendant's specification of fields. 
Citing 5 28-2-601, the Idaho Supreme Court has stated that "If the goods fail in an 
wspect to conform to the contract, the buyer may reject them." Keller v. Inland Metals All 
Weather Conditioning, Tnc, 139 Idaho 233; 76 P.3d 977. (Emphasis added). In the Supreme 
2oun case of Figueroa v. Kit-Sun Company, 123 Idaho 149; 845 P.2d 567 (1992 Ida. App.) the 
Zourt cited $ 28-2-601 when it said: "If the goods or tl,e tender of delivery in a contract for the 
;ale of goods fail to confonn to the contract, the buyer may reject or accept the whole, or may 
lccept any commercial unit or units and reject the remainder." 
Hoff Cos. v. Dunner, 121 Idaho 39,822 P.2d 558 (Ct. App. 1991) demonstrates 
hc strict manner in 5 28-2-601 is to be interpreted and applied. In Hofi the contract entered into 
lenveen the parties required that the seller deliver not only goods but documents. The seller 
lelivered goods and some but nor all of the documents identified in the contract. The Court 
tated: 
The fact that a transaction was simple. or that the dispute concerned the failure to tender 
specified documents rather than a failure to deliver cbnforming goods, does not exempt a 
case from tbe UCC's uro~~isions but rather. the Code soccificallv ~rovides that wherc 
parties agree that tender requires the seller to deliver documenti, 'the seller must tender all 
such documents in correct t o m  and &her, tender of delivery is a condition to the buyer's 
duty to accept goods and to his duty to pay for them. 
Q the instant case, Plaintiff delivered several truck loads of onions which met only the Contract 
pecification of 75% 3" minimum. Plaintiff totally disregards the clear and unambiguous , 
inguage reserving to Defendant the rigbt to specify fields. Defendant's tender of onions from 
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non-specified fields was as defective as would have been a tender of onions with did not meet the 
2 I1 otl~er minimum specifications of Paragraph 1. or Paragraph 2. of the Contract. Plaintiff's tender 
ii of non-conforming onions gave Defendant the absolute right to reject. 
IV. 
THE DEFENDANT WAS DAMAGED BY PLAINTLFF'S BREACH 
7 II The last sentence of Paragraph 7. of the Contract states: "If grower fails to deliver 
8 
I/ buyer also retains the right to replace said produce at market price at the expense of the gro\ver." 
9 
l11hh0 Code 8 28-2-713 (1) states: 
13 




$18.00 cwt. x 25,000 cwt = $450,000.00 
l 4  I (Market price at breach) 
Subject to the provisions of this chapter with respect to proof of market price (section 25- 
2-723), thc measure of damages for nondelivery or repudiation by thc seller is the 
difference between the market price at the time when the buyer learned of the breach and 
the contract price together with any incidental and consequential damages provided in this 
chapter (section 28-2-715). but less expenses saved in consequcnce of the seller's breach. 
" 11 ~ e s s :  $1 18,750.00 (contract price to be paid Plaintiff) 
l6 11 Subtotal: $331,250.00 
l7 11 L n s  expeosea saved: $ 0  
11 Total Damages: $33 1,250.00 
l 9  I/ Had Plaintiff delivered conforming onions, Defendant would have expended $6.00 cwt, m pack 
20 R ~ e m  before shipping to its buyers. Pvrsuant to 9 18-2- 713 (1) the $6.60 per cwt. packing cost 
21 11 would normally be an t'expensc saved in consaquence of b e  seller's breach.. as Defendant would 
22 11 have to pay that same amount to pack tb,e replacement onions. Smith testified that 10,000 cwt. 
23 11 replacement onions purchased &om Ujiiys farm did not have to be packed a;. they had already bee* 
24 1 boxed. He %Ma testified that the p k e  paid Pernson Farms, $24.00 cwt., included the packing 
2s 1 fee Ycordingly, Defendant realized no savings by virtue of Plaintiffs breach. 
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DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO Ah' AWARD OF 
ATTORNEY FEES 
11 Defendant has, in irs Complaint and in its Answer to Plaintiff's Verified Complaint ( 
requested an award of attorney fees and costs. Defendant i s  entitled to an award of fees pursuant to 
Idaho Code S 12-120 (3): 
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill, negotiable 
instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, 
merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless ofhenviseprovided by 
law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney'sfee to be set by tlze court, 
to be taxed and collected as coscr. (Emphasis added). 
The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all transactions except transactions 
for personal or household purposes. The term "party" is defined to mean any person, 
partnership, corporation, association, private organization, the state of Idaho or political 
subdivision thereof. 
I I 11 As a matter of law, the Defendant is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees incurred in I 
12 










The Contract signed by Plaintiff and Defendant on January 13,2006, was valid and 
binding. Plaintiff questioned only tho validity of the phrase "Buyer shall designate fieid(s)" and 
that provision of the Contract giving Defendant the right to claim a lien on PlaintifPs crop or the 
proceeds thereof. Specification of fields is a recognized trade practice which may be used to 
20 
21 
interpret the meaning of the Contract. Specification of performance at a later date by one party 






This case focuses on the integrity of the written contract entered into between 
two parties in a commercial setting. If Plaintiff is allowed to breach its contractual obligation to 
deliver from specified fields without obligation to pay Defendant damages, the preseason sales 




The 2006-2007 onion season was unlike any preceding season. The shortage of 
onions resulted in higher market prices than at any previous time. Plaintiff, who ageed in January 
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2006 to sell to Defendant for $4.75 per cwt., was offered as much as $24.00 per cwt. Plaintiffwas 
motivated by the market to breach its contractual obligations. 
Defendant respectfully requests an award of damages, attomay fees and costs. 
Dated this 3 day of ~bvember, 2007. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
.fR I EXEREBY CERTlFY that on the 3day of November, 2007, I caused to be 
sewed a bue and correct copy of he foregoing document on the person set forth below by the 
method indicated: 
Lary Walker - U.S. Mail 
Attorney for Defendant - Overnight Mail 
P. 0. Box 828  Hand Delivezy 
Weiser, Idaho 83672 Fax Transmission 
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Delton L. Walker, ISB No. 5839 
Walker Law Offices 
232 East Main Street - 
Post Office Box 828 
Weiser, Idaho 83672 Filed-? 
Telephone: (208) 414-0390 SHARON WIDNER 3'.0q 1. M: 
Facsimile: (208) 4 14-0404 
Attorneys for Panike & Sons Farms, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
1 
PANE33 & SONS FARMS, INC., ) Case No. CV-2006-00567 J 
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FOUR RIVER PACKING CO., ) 




FOUR RIVER PACKING CO., 
an Idaho Corporation, 
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COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Panike & Sons Farm, Inc. (Panike) through their attorney of 
record, Lary C. Walker and submits this Post Trial Brief. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Panike submitted a trial memorandum setting out a summary of the facts and some 
applicable law. That brief is incorporated by reference and will not be recovered in this brief. 
At the close of the trial the court request the parties to submit their contentions and 
particularly address the issue of the right to "cure" provided in the Uniform Commercial Code. 
The Court indicated the factual contentions in this case were fairly clear and 
straightforward, thus a factual statement will not be further developed. 
LAW AND ARGUMENT 
1. RIGHT TO CURE 
The UCC clearly addresses the issue of cure under section 28-2-508 which section is 
entitled and reads as follows: 
"CURE BY SELLER OF THE IMPROPER TENDER OR 
DELIVERY--REPLACEMENT. (1) Where any tender or delivery by the 
seller is rejected because nonconforming and the time for performance 
has not yet expired, the seller may seasonably notify the buyer of his 
intentions to cure and may then within the contract time make a 
conforming delivery." 
The seller's right to cure is even strengthened further by the provisions of part (2) of the 
above section where it states: 
"Where the buyer rejects a nonconforming tender which the seller had 
reasonable grounds to believe would be acceptable with or without money 
allowance the seller may if he seasonably notifies the buyer have a further 
reasonable time to substitute a conforming tender." 
Therefore, and without waiving Panike's position, if we were to assume the court finds 
that the buyer, Four Rivers had a contract right to designate the field late in the season fiom 
which the onions were to be delivered and where, the contract specifies, "field run ... the onions 
described above must meet 75% three-inch minimum requirements," Panike has a right to cure 
by delivery of conforming onions. 
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The contract specifies no variety, no grade, other than field m, no color specifications, 
and the quality is spelled out in paragraph 11, which states: "all goods shall be sound, 
merchantable, free &om imperfections, rain damage, hail damage, disease, pest infections, etc.; 
all kind, quality, grade and pack above specified; and shall conform to State and Federal rules 
and regulations for such goods in force at point of delivery or shipment ..." (contract agreement 
Exhibit "I") 
The contract further provides that defects of 10% or more will result in a price reduction 
and other such remedies, however those provisions are of no consequences in this case, because 
the evidence was unrefuted that the entire 24,000 hundredweight of onions that Panike attempted 
to deliver to Four Rivers were inspected and exceeded the contract specifications in all 
particulars. (Exhibit) 
The contract does not specify a delivery date and in fact paragraph 13, the hand written 
into the form contract last paragraph states: 
"Four Rivers will give a field run contract for two contract years 2006-2007 
at 4.50 per CWT minimum 2007-2008 
Clearly under the terms of this contract the delivery date had not lapsed and was still 
open long after Panike expressed intention to deliver, after a telephone call to Four Rivers by the 
state inspector and Panike actually delivering two truckloads of onions to Four Rivers packing 
facility in Weiser, Idaho, as specified in the contract, so they could inspect for conformity to the 
contract. 
Under the clear language of the UCC, section 28-2-508, Panike had the right to cure the 
failure to deliver onions out of the designated fields so long as the onions conformed to the 
contract specifications, not a higher or different standard, but only as specified in the contract. 
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Had the contract quality specifications been compromised or were 10% or less, Four 
Rivers was duty bound by the terms of their contract to mitigate damages by applying the 10% 
formula as described in paragraph 3 of the contract. 
The contract clearly states: 
"The average percent of defects will be deducted from the CWT price at 
the rate of one cent for each percentage point of defects." See paragraph 2 
of the contract. 
The contract in paragraph 3, in referring to paragraphs 1 and 2, states, "Any onion 
accepted under this right of refusal will be renegotiated." This is mandatory language "will be 
renegotiated". 
Thus under the clear terms of UCC, and. under the Four Rivers contract there were 
mitigating remedies that Four Rivers was obligated to comply with before they have the right to 
sue for any type of damages. 
2. FOUR RIVERS CLAIM FOR DAMAGES: 
Four Rivers right to contract damages, or to recover consequential damages under the 
UCC has been addressed by our Idaho Supreme Court in Nezperce Storage Co. V. Zenner; 670 
P.2d 871, 105 Idaho 464, at 467 where the court stated: 
"there are certain limitations on the right to recover consequential 
damages under section 28-2-715(2)(a). First, the losses must have resulted 
from needs which the seller knew or had reason to know at the time of 
contracting." ... 
"The propriety of an award of consequential damages must also 
satisfy the second condition of LC. Section 28-2-715(2)(a), i.e., that they 
could not have been reasonably prevented by cover or otherwise ... 
(citations omitted) "the Plaintiffs were only required to take reasonable 
efforts to mitigate their damages, (citations) and the burden of proving that 
the damages could have been minimized was on the Defendants." 
(Emphasis added) 
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In this case, Panike clearly acted reasonably in their efforts to mitigate damages by 
delivering onions meeting all contract specifications relating to the onions themselves which 
Four Rivers purchased under their contract, with the exception of the field designation. 
Four Rivers witnesses attempted to show that they had entered into preseason contracts to 
sell onions of certain size, color and of the particular characteristics non of which was referenced 
or identified in the contract. There was not even testimony that these qualities were discussed 
orally at the time the contract was signed. 
3. REJECTIONS GIVES RIGHT TO CURE 
The UCC does not give a buyer an absolute right to reject goods, but there must be 
afforded to the buyer, "a right before payment or acceptance to inspect them at any reasonable 
place and time in any reasonable manner" section 28-2-513. 
In discussing the right of rejection, and the reasonableness, our Idaho Court of Appeals, 
in Figueroa V. Kit-San Co.; 845 P.2d 567,123 Idaho 149, at page with 158, 
"We also conclude that Kit-San's statement of rejection in May was 
sufficiently formal to notify H & H of Kit San's intent, and of the need for 
H& H to cure or remove the ~oods." (Emphasis added) 
This right to reject, however, was only addressed after the court reviewed substantial 
evidence in the Kit-San's case showing that the goods in fact did not conform to the contract 
specifications or representations of the parties. 
Further on page 159, under 28-2-105 (6), and 28-2-601 the court made the following 
"Partial acceptance is permitted whether the part of the goods accepted 
conforms or not. The only limitation on partial acceptance is that good 
faith and commercial reasonableness must be used to avoid undue 
impairment of the value of the remaining portion of the goods ... In this 
respect, the test is not only what unit has been the basis of contract, but 
whether the partial acceptance produces so materially adverse affect on the 
remainder so as to constitute bad faith." 
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The UCC requires reasonableness and good faith were the contract specifications are 
clearly spelled out. This contract gave Four Rivers no right to reject the goods that conformed 
with the terms of the contract. They first had a duty to negotiated or use the discount in the event 
of defects Over 10 % 
A standard for rejection, or permitting revocation was addressed by our Supreme Court in 
a case relating to a mobile home in the case of Jensen v. Siege1 Mobile Homes Group; 668 P.2d 
65, 105 Idaho 189, at page 192, where it states: 
"The standard for permitting revocation requires that nonconformity 
"substantially impairs" the value of the goods to the buyer and reflects the 
theory that one who has used goods for a significant amount of time 
should not be allowed to force used goods back on the seller unless the 
defects in the goods is substantial, as opposed to technical." 
The court went on to discuss a two-step standard in determining the existence of 
substantial impairment. Those steps however, in this case, are not applicable because the onions 
which Panike delivered were approved by the federal-state inspector to meet the contract 
specifications in all particulars. 
Four Rivers therefore was unreasonable in their rejection of conforming goods and 
responsible for damages sustained by Panike. 
The parties are bound by the terms of their contract, by the UCC, good faith and 
reasonableness standards and in revoking goods Four Rivers agreed to in the contract. The 
designation of the particular field was an attempt to reap a quality, and type of onions above and 
different than specified in the contract. 
In addressing a contract to furnish potatoes, our Idaho Supreme Court, in the case of 
Magic Valley Foods, Inc., v. Sun Valley Potatoes, Inc.; 10 P.3d 734, 134 Idaho 785, at Page 791, 
states: 
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"...the contracts between Sun Valley and Magic Valley did not include a 
requirement that Sun Valley trade checks with Rolland Jones as a 
condition of payment. In fact as the district court found, Rolland Jones 
was not a party to these contracts." 
While the contract states "Buyer will specie field(s), there was no provision in the 
agreement that allowed that to be a controlling factor designated by one party without a meeting 
of the minds late in the season. Further in addressing the contract terms at page 791, (supra), as 
it relates to section 28-2-610. the court states: 
"Under the language of this section, a demand by one or both 
parties for more than the contract calls for in the way of counter- 
performance is not in itself a repudiation nor does it invalidate a plain 
expression of desire for future performance. However, when under a fair 
reading it amounts to a statement of intentions not to perform except on 
conditions which go beyond the contract, it becomes a repudiation." 
While the contract between the parties provides "Buyer will specify field@)." the contract 
does not in any way indicate that after the contract agreement is signed one party can designate a' 
field with different quality and standards of onions than the contract specifies. 
Four Rivers demand for delivery of onions kom a field not specified or defined in the 
contract and then a refusal to accept conforming onions is a repudiation of the contract for which 
they are entitled to no damages and no recovery for going into the open market and purchasing a 
different quality of onion at a different time and season of the year. 
PANIKE'S DAMAGES FROM LIEN FILING 
Before Panike attempted to cure the rejection by Four Rivers, Four Rivers prepared and 
filed an agricultural services lien, which lien was not properly filed and therefore not 
enforceable. Four Rivers put on no proof as to the validity of the lien, no basis or justification 
for filing the lien and therefore provided no defense for the damages claimed by Panike. 
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Mr. Panike clearly testified that he had in excess of $140,000.00 of receivables that were 
delayed at least 60 days because of the problems caused by the lien and attorneys fees to resolve 
that issue. 
Mr. Panike testified that his farm operating loan accumulates interest at the rate of 9% per 
annum, therefore Panike was delayed in paying off $140,000.00 of his operating loan for the 60 
days for total damages of $2,100.00. This figure is derived by multiplying 9% interest per 
annum on $140,000 for 60 days. 
Mr. Panike testified, however, that he was able to sell the onions rejected by Four River 
for enough so he sustained no other damages. 
ATTORNEYS FEES 
Mr. Panike has the right for attorneys fees and costs under section Idaho code 12-120. 
If the court finds Panike the prevailing party, where this is a commercial transaction, for 
the purchase or sale of goods, the prevailing party shall be allowed reasonable attorneys fees to 
be set by the court to be taxed and collected as costs. Idaho code 12-120 (3). 
The attorneys fees issue at the District Court and on appeal was discussed by the Idaho 
Supreme Court in LicMey v. Max Herbold, Inc., 984 P.2d 697, 133 Idaho 209, at page 213, were 
the court states: 
"This case involves a dispute over an amount due under a commercial 
transaction. Consequently, an award of reasonable attorney fees to the 
prevailing party, both below and on appeal is mandatory under both I.C. 
4 12-120 (3) and the express provisions of paragraph 0 in the contract." 
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SUMMARY 
Four Rivers acted in bad faith and beyond the terms of the contract in attempting to reject all 
onions even onions meeting contract specifications and therefore entitled to no damages, as had 
they accepted the onions tendered by Panike they would not have needed to go buy any field run 
3-inch minimum sized onions to satisfy all the contract demands. 
Panike was able to market the rejected onions in a reasonably commercial manner 
adequate to recover all contract damages, resulting from Four Rivers breach of the contract. 
Four Rivers wrongfully rejected conforming goods and filed an agricultural services lien 
causing damages to Panike in the delay of receiving crop proceeds for 60 days and the amount of 
$2,I00.00. 
Panike, if the prevailing party is entitled to reasonable attorney fees and cost as 
determined by the Court pursuant to 12-120(3). 
DATED this the 3 day of November 2007. 
WALKER LAW OFFICE 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I DO HEREBY certify that on the +day of November 2007, I caused to be served on 
the following a true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below: 
Bruce H. Birch 
P.O. Box 157 
Payette, ID 83661 
By U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
By Overnight 
ByHand 
By Facsimile 642-9072 
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Bruce Birch for Four Rivers Packing Co. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 1 
OF LAW AND ORDER 
OOO%QS 
Statement of Facts: 
This matter came on for court trial on October 29, 2007. The case of Four Rivers 
Packing Co. v. Panike and Sons Farms, Inc. was originally brought in Payette County. Venue 
was transferred to Washington County and that case was consolidated with the above 
Washington County case by stipulation of the parties. Plaintiff further stipulated that it was not 
proceeding against Randy and Janine Smith in their individual capacities. 
Panike and Sons Farms, Inc. (Panike) raises onions. Four Rivers Packing Co.(Four 
Rivers) purchases onions from growers, then packs and resells them. On January 13, 2006, 
Panike and Four Rivers entered into a contract under which Panike agreed to deliver 25,000 
hundred weight of 75% three-inch minimum yellow onions to Four Rivers during the 2006-2007 
season at $4.75 per hundred weight, and a like amount at a minimum of $4.50 per hundred 
weight in the 2007-2008 season. Prior to signing the contract, the parties reviewed the contract 
together and mutually agreed to delete paragraph 6. The instant dispute arose as a result of the 
first sentence in paragraph 1 of the contract that states "[bluyer will specify field(s)." 
On or about August 15, 2006 Panike called Four Rivers to discuss water that was 
flowing from Four Rivers' property onto Panike's property. At that time, Four Rivers informed 
Panike of its decision to designate fields 5 and 7 as the fields from which its onions were to 
come. Greg ~anike,  the managing partner of Panike, refused. Several days later Panike received 
a letter from Four Rivers reiterating the designation of fields 5 and 7. He again rehsed. 
Ultimately ~ a n i k e  harvested fields 5 and 7 and placed them in its personal storage. 
On or about October 3, 2006, Panike attempted to deliver onions to Four Rivers. 
Because the onions were not %om the designated fields, the goods were rejected. Panike then 
had them delivered to storage and inspected. The onions were 89% three-inch minimums. As 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 2 
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they graded better than the onions called for under the contract, Panike asserts they were 
substantially conforming goods. Alternatively, Four Rivers asserts that they had the right to 
designate the fields from which their onions would come, and onions fkom any other field would 
be nonconforming and could be rejected for that reason. 
Analvsis 
I. Reiection and Cure 
The controlling law in this case is the UCC, as adopted by Idaho. Idaho Code $28-2- 
601 states in part: 
' ... if the goods or the tender of delivery fail in any respect to conform to the 
contract, the buyer may 
(a) reject the whole; or 
@) accept the whole; or 
(c) accept any commercial unit or units and reject the rest. 
Idaho Code 528-2-602 states: 
(1) Rejection of goods must be within a reasonable time after their delivery or 
. tender. It is ineffective unless the buyer seasonably notifies the seller. 
Idaho Code $28-2-508 states: 
(1) Where any tender or delivery by the seller is rejected because 
nonconforming and the time for performance has not yet expired, the seller may 
seasonably notify the buyer of his intention to cure and may then within the 
contract time make a conforming delivery. 
(2) Where the buyer rejects a nonconforming tender which the seller had 
reasonable grounds to believe would be acceptable with or without money 
allowance the seller may if he seasonably notifies the buyer have a further 
reasonable time to substitute a conforming tender. 
Finally, Idaho Code $28-2-106 states in pertinent part: 
'(2) Goods or conduct including any part of a performance are "conforming" 
or conform to the contract when they are in accordance with the obligations 
under the contract. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 3 
OF LAW AND ORDER 
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Four Rivers established through the combined testimony of Steve Walker, George 
Rodriguez, Floyd Johnson, Dennis Ujiiye, and Randy Smith that the designation of fields in mid 
to late summer is the normal practice in the industry. See LC. $28-2-31 1. As a result, they had 
the right to designate the fields from which their onions would come. When Panike attempted 
delivery of onions that did not come fiom fields 5 andlor 7, the onions did not conform to the 
terms of the contract and Four Rivers rightfully rejected the onions. See Keller v. Inland Metals 
All Weather Conditioning, Inc., 139 Idaho 233, 76 P.3d 977 (2003)(If the goods fail in any 
respect to conform to the contract, the buyer may reject them.). 
Upon the rejection of the onions, Panike had the right to make a conforming delivery. 
However, onioni from the nondesignated fields would never conform because they would not be 
"in accordance with the obligations under the contract." See I.C.528-2-106. Four Rivers offered 
the testimony of Randy Smith, who explained that Four Rivers filed a lien against Panike in an 
attempt to motivate the tender of conforming goods. Even so, onions from the designated fields 
were never tendered. Panike asserts that the goods need only be substantially conforming. 
However, the case and statutory law cited is distinguishable in that it presupposes an initial 
acceptance followed by a subsequent revocation. In this case, there was never an acceptance of 
the goods. Therefore, the reasoning offered is not applicable. 
II. Damages 
Turning to the issue of damages, Idaho Code $28-2-71 1 provides that "Where the 
... buyer rightfully rejects ... then with respect to any goods involved, and with respect to the 
whole if the breach goes to the whole contract.. .the buyer may cancel.. .and whether or not he 
has done so may in addition to recovering so much of the price as has been paid; (a) "cover" and 
have damages under the next section as to all the goods affected whether or not they have been 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 4 
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identified to the contract; or (b) recover damages for nondelivery as provided in this chapter." 
Keller v. Inland Metals All Weather Conditioning, Inc. 139 Idaho 233,238-239, supra. 
Here, Four Rivers seeks damages under subsection (b): damages for nondelivery. 
Idaho Code 528-2-713 provides that the buyer's damages for nondelivery is the difference 
between the market price at the time when the buyer learned of the breach and the contract price 
together with any incidental and consequential damages provided in this chapter (section 28-2- 
715), but less expenses saved in consequence of the seller's breach. Market price is to be 
determined as of the place for tender or, in cases of rejection after arrival or revocation of 
acceptance, as of the place of arrival. Incidental damages as outlined by LC. 528-2-715 include 
expenses reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation and care and custody of goods 
rightfully rejected, any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions in 
connection with effecting cover and any other reasonable expense incident to the delay or other 
breach. Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include any loss resulting from 
general or particular requirements and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had 
reason to know and which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise; and injury 
to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty. 
At trial, the uncontroverted testimony of Janine Smith, who owns a one-half interest in 
Four Rivers, was that the market price of three-inch minimum yellow onions as provided for 
under the contract was $18 per hundred weight on October 3, 2006. Thus, market price for the 
onions at the time of the breach was $450,000. The price Four Rivers would have paid Panike 
pursuant to the contract was $4.75 per hundred weight, or $1 18,750. 
Under this contract, Four Rivers would have also expended $6 per hundred weight to 
pack these onions. When purchasing onions to fill their contracts, 10,000 hundred weight 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 5 
OF LAW AND ORDER 
@QP.i,,t? u ~ U 9  
purchased &om Ujiiye Farms for $22 per hundred weight were already packed. Therefore, there 
was a savings of $2 in expense per hundred weight on this first 10,000. The cost for the 
remaining onions was $24 per hundred weight, which included the packing fee., thus, there was 
no savings to Four Rivers on this 15,000 hundred weight. Thus, the total expenses Four Rivers 
saved totaled $20,000. Based on the foregoing, Four Rivers' damages are $450,000 less 
$1 18,750, less $20,000, for a total of $311,250. 
III. Attornev Fees 
In consideration of the respective claims of the parties, the Four Rivers is the prevailing 
party in a comr'nercial transaction pursuant to LC. $12-120(3) and is therefore entitled to 
attorneys fees and costs. Mr. Birch shall prepare a judgment accordingly. 
~is ir ic t  Judge 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 6 
OF LAW AND ORDER 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order was forwarded to the following persons on this day of 
Lary Walker 
Walker Law Offices 
232 East Main Street 
Weiser, ID 83672 
Bruce Birch 
Birch Law Office, Chtd. 
143 1 South Main Street 
Payette, ID 83661 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 7 
OF LAW AND ORDER 
@Q&T2&'4 w "4- 
Bruce H. Birch 
BlRCH LAW OFFICE, CHTD. 
39 South Main Street 
PO Box 157 
Payette, Idaho 83661 
Telephone: (208) 642-9071 
Facsimile: (208) 642-9072 
ISB# 2645 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
PANIKE & SONS FARMS, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
k a s e  No. 2006-00567 
JUDGMENT 
RANDY SMITH and JANINE SMITH, j 
husband and wife, individually and in 
their separate capacity, dba FOUR 







. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
FOUR RIVERS PACKING CO., 
an Idaho Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. j Case No. cv 2007-00725 
PANIKE & SONS FARMS, INC., 
Defendant. 
TRIAL in this matter came before the Court on October 29,2007. Panike & 
28 JUDGMENT - 1 
Sons Farms, Inc was represented by Lary Walker, Attorney at Law, and Four Rivers Packing 
Company, an Idaho corporation, was represented by Bruce H. Birch. Based on the evidence 
adduced at trial, Judgment is hereby entered against Panike & Sons Farms, Inc. 
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the law and by reason of the premises aforesaid, IT 
IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Four Rivers Packing Company 
does have and recover from Panike & Sons Farms, Inc. the sum of Three Hundred and Eleven 
Thousand and Two Hundred and Fifty ($3 11,250.00) Dollars, together with attorney fees in 
the amount of $16,680.00, and costs in the amount of $1,194.79, for a total Judgment balance 
due Four Rivers Packing Co. in the amount of $329,124.79 together with Plaintiffs accruing 
costs and interest on said ing at the rate of 10.00 %per m u m  from date hereof. 
Dated ay of January, 2008. 





























CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on theeday of January, 2008, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document on the person set forth below by the 
method indicated: 
Lary Walker - X U.S. Mail 
Attorney for Plaintiff Overnight Mail 
P. 0. Box 828 - Hand Delivery 
Weiser, Idaho 83672 - Fax Transmission 
Bruce H. Birch X U . S .  Mail 
Attorney for Defendant - Overnight Mail 
P. 0. Box 157 - Hand Delivery 
Payette, Idaho 83661 - Fax Transmission 
SHARON WIDNER 
Clerk of the District Court 
JUDGMENT - 3 
Christopher C. Burke, ISB No. 2098 
Emil R. Berg, ISB No. 5025 
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER P.A. 
950 West Bannock Street, Suite 900 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 319-2600 
Facsimile: (208) 319-2601 
Email: cburke@greenerlaw.com 
eberg@greenerlaw.com 
Lary C. Walker, ISB No. 1303 
Walker Law Offices, PLLC 
232 East Main Street 
P.O. Box 828 
Weiser, ID 83672 
Telephone: (208) 414-0390 
Facsimile: (208) 414-0404 
Email: walker - law@justice.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellantrnefendant-Appellant 
Panike & Sons Farms. Inc. 
W THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
PANIKE & SONS FARMS, INC., I 
Plaintiff-Appellant, Case No. 2006-00567 
v. 
RANDY SMITH and JANINE SMITH. / NOTICE OF APPEAL 
husband and wife, individually and in their 
separate capacity, dba FOUR RIVERS 




PANIKE & SONS FARMS, INC., 
FOUR RIVERS PACKING CO., an Idaho 
Corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant. I 
Case No. CV 2007-00725 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 ~ ~ ~ % % ~  
TO: (a) THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS AND PLAINTIFF- 
RESPONDENT: 
Randy Smith and Janine Smith 
dba Four Rivers Packing Co. 
(Defendants-Respondents) 
Four Rivers Packing Co. 
(Plaintiff-Respondent) 
@) THEIR ATTORNEY: 
Bruce H. Birch 
Birch Law Offices, Ctd. 
1431 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 157 
Payette, ID 83661 
Telephone: (208) 642-9071 
Facsimile: (208) 642-9072 
(c) THE CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY. 
1. The above-named appellant, Panike & Sons Farms, hc., hereby appeals against 
the above-named respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final Judgment, entered in 
the above-entitled consolidated action on January 28,2008, by the honorable Stephen W. 
Drescher, district judge, presiding. 
2. The appellant Panike & Sons Farms, lnc., has a right to appeal to the Idaho 
Supreme Court and the Judgment described in paragraph 1, above, is appealable pursuant to Rule 
1 l(a)(l), I.A.R. 
3. The appellant now intends to assert the following issues on appeal, provided this 
list shall not prevent the appellant from asserting other issues on appeal: 
(a) Did the district court err in ruling in favor of respondents when the 
appellant tendered delivery of onions that met the contract specifications in all respects, but the 
respondents rejected the delivery? 
(b) Did the district court e n  in holding that the provisions of the contract 
under which respondents were to purchase onions from appellant allowed the respondents to 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 00@%26 
18895-001 (235906.doc) 
designate a particular field &on which the onions were to come approximately seven-and-a-half 
months after the contract was signed? 
(c) Did the respondents prove either the fact or amount of damages resulting 
from appellant's alleged breach of contract according to the applicable legal standards? 
(d) Was the parties' contract ambiguous and subject to conflicting reasonable 
interpretations? 
(e) Did the district court err in not construing the parties' contract strictly 
against respondent, the party that drafted it? 
(f) Did the district court enter sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of 
law following the trial to the court? 
(g) Did the district court err in failing to address appellant's claim for 
damages as a result of liens wrongfully filed or asserted by respondents? 
(h) Should appellant be awarded its reasonable attorney fees for the appeal, 
pursuant to Idaho Code 5 12-120(3)? 
4. To the knowledge of appellant, no order has been entered sealing all or any 
portion of the record. 
5. (a) A reporter's transcript is requested. 
(b) The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the 
reporter's transcript: The entire reporter's standard transcript as defmed in Rule 25(a), I.A.R. 
6 .  The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's 
record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.: 
(a) Pre-Trial Memorandum (filed by Mr. Birch for respondents on 
October 24,2007); 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
(b) Amended Pre-Trial Memorandum (filed by Mr. Birch for respondents on 
October 24, 2007); 
(c) Trial Memorandum (filed by Mr. Walker for appellant on October 26, 
2007); 
(d) Closing Argument of Four Rivers Packing Company (filed by Mr. Birch 
on November 9,2007); and 
(e) Post Trial Brief (filed by Mr. Walker on November 9,2007). 
7. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter. 
(b)(l) That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the reporter's transcript. 
(c)(l) That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid. 
(d)(l) That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Rule 20, I.A.R. 
DATED THIS 7th day of March, 2008. 
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER P.A. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
WALKER LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Lary C. Walker 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-AppellantiDefendant- 
Appellant Panike & Sons Farms, Inc. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 7th day of March, 2008, a true and correct copy of the 
within and foregoing instrument was served upon: 
Bruce H. Birch [7 U.S. Mail 
Birch Law Offices, Ctd. 13: Facsimile 
P.O. Box 157 [7 Hand Delivery 
Payette, ID 83661 [7 Overnight Delivery 
[Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents] Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
Denece Graham U.S. Mail 
1675 E. 9th Street [7 Facsimile 
P.O. Box 670 [7 Hand Delivery 
Weiser, ID 83672 [7 Overnight Delivery 
[Court Reporter] Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
Lary C. Walker [7 U.S. Mail 
Walker Law Offices, PLLC [Zi Facsimile 
232 East Main Street B Hand Delivery 
P.O. Box 828 0 Overnight Delivery 
Weiser, ID 83672 
[Co-Counsel for Panike & Sons, Inc.] 
Emil R. Berg 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 5 
IN THE DISTRICT IClAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON-' -' 
1 )*:;!reme Court ~0.3% 
PANIKE & SONS FARMS, INC., 1 
PlaintiffIAppellant, ) Case No. CV 2006-00567 
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1 w - vs. r:? w 
1 3% .."">-, 
1 RANDY SMITH and JANINE SMITH " g z a  :- 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
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husband and wife, individually and in their 1 - - -,., " n separate capacity, dba FOUR RIVERS 1 OF APPEAL .% m :-sp.,- 
PACKING CO., 1 g :;zg$ 
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DefendantsIRespondents. .), -2 693 
1 ch -.I 
) 
FOUR RIVERS PACKING CO., an Idaho 1 
Corporation, 1 
1 
PlaintiffIRespondent, ) Case No. CV 2007-00725 
vs. 1 
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Appeal from: Third Judicial District, Washington County. 
Honorable Stephen W. Drescher presiding. 
CLERKS CERTIFICATE OF 
PPPEAL 1 
Case number from court: CV 2006-00567 & CV 2007-00725; 
consolidated February 26, 2007 with 
an Order in CV 2007-00725. 
Orders or judgments appealed from: JUDGMENT 
signed and filed on January 28, 2008. 
Attorney for Appellant: 
Attorney for Respondents: 
Emil R. Berg 
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER P. A. 
Lary C. Walker 
WALKER LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Bruce H. Birch 
BIRCH LAW OFFICES, CHD. 
Appealed by: Panike & Sons Farms, Inc. 
Appealed against: Randy Smith and Janine Smith, husband and wife, 
Individually and in their separate capacity, dba Four 
Rivers Packing Co. 
Notice of Appeal filed: March 7,2008.. 
Appellate fee paid: March 7,2008 1$86.00. 
Was District Court Reporter's Transcript requested? Yes. 
If so Name of Reporter: Denece Graham. 
SHARON WIDNER, , 
Clerk of the District Court 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF 
PPPEAL 2 
In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 






RANDY SMITH and JANINE: SMITH, husband ) 
, 
and wife, 
individually and in their separate capacity, dba ) ORDER 
FOUR ) 




FOUR RIVERS PACKING CO., an Idaho ) 
corporation, ) NO. 35062 
1 
Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ) 
1 
PANLKE & SONS FARMS, INC., ) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. 
The Notice of Appeal in the above captioned matter filed in this Court March 11, 
2008 , requested that a Reporter's Transcript be prepared. However, the Notice of Appeal failed 
to comply with Idaho Appellate Rule 17 in that it did not specify by date and title the heasings 
required to be prepared for purposes of this Appeal: therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant shall file an AMENDED NOTICE OF 
APPEAL which complies with Idaho Appellate Rule 17, and shall specify by date and title the 
hearing(s) required to be prepared for purposes of this Appeal. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDER that Appellant shall serve the Reporter($ with a copy 
of the Amended Notice of Appeal and shall indicate in the Amended Notice of Appeal which 
reporter(s) was served. 
ORDER FOR AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - DOCKET NO. 35062 - Page 1 of 2 
esElnw :22 ,us  
- 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court within fourteen (14)days 
from the date of this Order. In the event an Amended Notice of Appeal is not filed, this appeal 
may proceed on the Clerk's Record ONLY. 
DATED this 1 4 ~ ~  day of March 2008. 
For the Supreme Court 
cc: Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
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Christopher C. Burke, ISB No. 2098 
Emil R. Berg, ISB No. 5025 
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER P.A. 
950 West Bannock Street, Suite 900 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 3 19-2600 
Facsimile: (208) 3 19-2601 
Email: cburke@greenerlaw.com 
eberg@greenerlaw.com 
Larv C. Walker. ISB No. 1303 
~ a h c e r  Law offices. PLLC 
232 East Main ~treei  
P.O. Box 828 
Weiser, ID 83672 
Telephone: (208) 414-0390 
Facsimile: 1208) 414-0404 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff-AppellantDefendant-Appellant 
Panike & Sons Farms, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, LN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
PANIKE & SONS FARMS, lNC., 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
RANDY SMITH and J A W  SMITH, 
husband and wife. individuallv and in their 
separate capacity,'dba FOUR .RIVERS 
PACKING CO., 
Defendants-Respondents. 




PANIKE & SONS FARMS, INC., 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 2006-00567 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Case No. CV 2007-00725 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 @QQzg& 
TO: (a) THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS AND PLALNTIFF- 
RESPONDENT: 
Randy Smith and Janine Smith 
dba Four Rivers Packing Co. 
(Defendants-Respondents) 
Four Rivers Packing Co. 
(Plaintiff-Respondent) 
(b) THEIR ATTORNEY: 
Bruce H. Birch 
Birch Law Offices, Ctd. 
1431 South Main street 
P.O. Box 157 
Payette, ID 83661 
Telephone: (208) 642-9071 
Facsimile: (208) 642-9072 
(c) CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY. 
1. The above-named appellant, Panike & Sons Farms, Inc., hereby appeals against 
the above-named respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final Judgment, entered in 
the above-entitled consolidated action on January 28,2008, by the honorable Stephen W. 
Drescher, district judge, presiding. 
2. The appellant Panike & Sons Farms, Inc., has a right to appeal to the Idaho 
Supreme Court and the Judgment described in paragraph 1, above, is appealable pursuant to Rule 
1 l(a)(l), I.A.R. 
3. The appellant now intends to assert the following issues on appeal, provided this 
list shall not prevent the appellant h m  asserting other issues on appeal: 
(a) Did the district court err in ruling in favor of respondents when the 
appellant tendered delivery of onions that met the contract specifications in all respects, but the 
respondents rejected the delivery? 
(b) Did the district court err in holding that the provisions of the contract 
under which respondents were to purchase onions from appellant allowed the respondents to 
68" Q6 AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 @Qw&cba 
designate a particular field from which the 01 .ons to come approximately seveu-and-a-half 
months after the contract was signed? 
(c) Did the respondents prove either the fact or amount of damages resulting 
from appellant's alleged breach of contract according to the applicable legal standards? 
(d) Was the parties' contract ambiguous and subject to conflicting reasonable 
interpretations? 
(e) Did the district court err in not construing the parties' contract strictly 
against respondent, the party that drafted it? 
(f) Did the district court enter sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of 
law following the trial to the court? 
(g) Did the district court err in failing to address appellant's claim for 
damages as a result of liens wrongfully filed or asserted by respondents? 
(h) Should appellant be awarded its reasonable attorney fees for the appeal, 
pursuant to Idaho Code 4 12-120(3)? 
4. To the knowledge of appellant, no order has been entered sealing all or any 
portion of the record. 
5. (a) A reporter's transcript is requested. 
(b) The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the 
reporter's transcript: The entire reporter's standard transcript as defined in Rules 2 5 ( a ) u  
I.A.R., which in this case consists of the transcriut of the court trial held on or about October 29, 
2007. -
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's 
record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.: 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 @Q@&;,zG 
(a) Pre-Trial Memorandum (filed by Mr. Birch for respondents on 
October 24,2007); 
(b) Amended Pre-Trial Memorandum (filed by Mr. Birch for respondents on 
October 24,2007); 
(c) Trial Memorandum (filed by Mr. Walker for appellant on October 26, 
2007); 
(d) Closing Argument of Four Rivers Packing Company (filed by Mr. Birch 
on November 9,2007); and 
(e) Post Trial Brief (filed by Mr. Walker on November 9,2007). 
7. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been sewed on the reporter. 
(b)(l) That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the reporter's transcript. 
(c)(l) That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid. 
(d)(l) That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be sewed pursuant 
to Rule 20, I.A.R., including the court reporter. Denece Graham. 
DATED THIS %=day of March, 2008. 
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER P.A. 
Emil R. Berg u 
WALKER LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Lary C. Walker 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant/Defendant- 
Appellant Panike & Sons Farms, Inc. 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 7 t h - m d a y  of March, 2008, a tme and correct copy of 
the within and foregoing instrument was served upon: 
Bruce H. Birch 
-Birch Law Offices, Ctd. 
P.O. Box 157 
Payette, ID 83661 
[Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents] 
Denece Graham 
1675 E. 9th Street 
P.O. Box 670 
Weiser, ID 83672 
[Court Reporter] 
Lary C. Walker 
Walker Law Offices, PLLC 
232 East Main Street 
P.O. Box 828 
Weiser, ID 83672 
[Co-Counsel for Panike & Sons, Inc.] 
Dorotlw Beaver 
Idaho Su~reme Court 
P.O. Box 83720 
451 West State Street 
Boise. ID 83720 
IDe~uty Clerk of the Idaho Supreme Court] 
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OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
-, ::?:erne Cccrt ~o.afi$&~, 
1 
PANIKE & SONS FARMS, INC., 1 
) 
PlaintiffIAppellant, 1 Case No. CV 2006-00567 
) 
RANDY SMITH and JANINE SMITH 
1 
husband and wife, individually and in their 
1 
) AMENDED CLERK'S 
separate capacity, dba FOUR RIVERS 1 CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL 
PACKING CO.. 1 
DefendantsIRespondents. 
MAR 7 4 2038 
FOUR RIVERS PACKING CO., an Idaho 
Corporation, 
PlaintiffIRespondent, Case No. CV 2007-00725 
VS. ) 
Appeal from: 
Case number from court: 
Third Judicial District, Washington County. 
Honorable Stephen W. Drescher presiding. 
AMENDED CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
OF APPEAL 1 
CV 2006-00567 & CV 2007-00725; 
consolidated February 26,2007 with 
an Order in CV 2007-00725. 
Orders or judgments appealed from: 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
Attorney for Respondents: 
JUDGMENT 
signed and filed on January 28,2008: 
Emil R. Berg 
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER P. A. 
Lary C. Walker 
WALKER LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Bruce H. Birch 
BIRCH LAW OFFICES, CHD. 
Appealed by: Panike & Sons Farms, Inc. 
Appealed against: Randy Smith and Janine Smith, husband and wife, 
Individually and in their separate capacity, dba Four 
Rivers Packing Co. 
Notice of Appeal filed: March 7,2008. 
Amended Notice of Appeal filed: March 20,2008. 
I 
Appellate fee paid: March 7,2008 1 $86.00. 
Was District Court Reporter's Transcript requested? Yes. 
If so Name of Reporter: Denece Graham. 
Estimated Number of Pages: Unknown. 
Dated: 02/. t a ~ g  
Clerk of the District court 
AMENDED CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
OF APPEAL 2 
@fjQ,'3,3Q 
In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 






RANDY SMITH and JANWE SMITH, husband ) 
and wife, individually and in their separate ) 
capacity, dba FOUR RIVERS PACKING CO., ) 
) 
Defendants-Respondents. 
......................................................... ) 1 
FOUR RIVERS PACKMG CO., an Idaho 1 
corporation, 1 
O R D E ~ G R A N T ~ G  MOTION 
FOR EXTENSION OF TIME BY 
CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT 
Supreme Court Docket No. 35062 




) Ref. No. 083-207 
) 
v. 1 
PANIKE & SONS FARMS, INC., j 
1 
Defendant-Appellant. 1 
A MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME BY CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT was 
filed with this Court by Deputy Clerk of the District Court on May 22, 2008, requesting the 
Court to allow an extension of time until July 24, 2008, to prepare and serve the Clerk's Record 
upon counsel. Therefore, good cause appearing; 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Deputy Clerk of the District Court's MOTION FOR 
EXTENSION OF TIME be, and hereby is, GRANTED and Deputy Clerk Lucy Elerick shall be 
ALLOWED NINETY (90) DAYS from the date of this Order TO PREPARE AND SERVE THE 
CLERK'S RECORD upon counsel. 
DATED this 2 day of May 2008. 
By Order of the Supreme Court 
cc: Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk @Qeaa~ 

Date: 7/1/2008 Tb'vd District Court - Washington County 
Time: 04.42 PM ROA Report 
Page 1 of 2 Case: CV-2007-0000725 Current Judge: Stephen W Drescher 
User: ELERICK 
Four Rivers Packing Company vs. Panike .Sons Farms Inc 
Four Rivers Packing Company vs. Panike & Sons Farms Inc 
Other Claims 
Date Judge 
2/27/2007 New Case Filed - Other Claims Stephen W Drescher 
Plaintiff: Four Rivers Packing Company Appearance Bruce H Birch Stephen W Drescher 
Defendant: Panike & Sons Farms inc Appearance Lary C Walker Stephen W Drescher 
Filing: J IB - Special Motions Change Of Venue With Prior Appearance Stephen W Drescher 
Paid by: Walker, Lary C (attorney for Panike & Sons Farms Inc) Receipt 
number: 0005355 Dated: 2/27/2007 Amount: $9.00 (Cashiers Check) 
Complaint Filed Stephen W Drescher 
Summons Filed Stephen W Drescher 
Acknowledgment Of Service Stephen W Drescher 
Request For Trial Setting Stephen W Drescher 
Notice of Taking of Deposition of Greg Panike Duces Tecum (Birch) Stephen W Drescher 
Special Appearance for the Limited Purpose of Contesting Jurisdiction Stephen W Drescher 
(Walker) 
Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3) (Walker) Stephen W Drescher 
Notice of Hearing (Walker) Stephen W Drescher 
Amended Notice of Hearing (Walker) Stephen W Drescher 
(Scheduled for 02/02/2007 01 :30 PM) 
Notice of Intent to Take Default (Birch) 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss (Birch) 
Stephen W Drescher 
Stephen W Drescher 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue Stepnen W Drescher 
P~rsbant to Ruie 12(b)(3) and Lack of Jurisdiction (Walker) 
Motion for Entry of Default (Birch) 
Answer (Walker) 
Stipulation to Change Venue and Consolidate (Birch) 
Order (Granting Change of Venue) 
Copies to: BirchlWalker 
Previously Payette County Case #CV 2006-1063 
3/23/2007 Notice of Service of Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories and Request fol 
Documents (Walker 
Response To Request For Trial Setting (Walker) 
5/8/2007 Order Setting Case for Trial and Pretrial 
Copies to: WalkerlBirch 
Hearing Scheduled (Civil Pretrial Conference 09/24/2007 01 :30 PM) 3 
day JT set for 10/29/07 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 10/29/2007 09:OO AM) 3 day JT 
9/24/2007 Hearing result for Civil Pretrial Conference held 9/24/2007 10:30 PM 
Hearing Held 
(3 day JT set for 10/29/07) 
1011 912007 Motion to Vacate and Reschedule Trial (Birch) 
Stipulation to Vacate and Reschedule 
Notice of Unavailable Dates (Birch) 
Pretrial Conference Order Copies to: 
WalkerIBirch QQQ232 
Stephen W Drescher 
Stephen W Drescher 
Stephen W Drescher 
Stephen W Drescher 
Stephen W Drescher 
Stephen W Drescher 
Stephen W Drescher 
Steohen W Drescher 
Stephen W Drescher 
Stephen W Drescher 
Steohen W Drescher 
Stephen W Drescher 
Stephen W Drescher 
Stephen W Drescher 
Stephen W Drescher 
Date: 7/1/2008 Tbt-d District Court - Washington County 
Time: 04:42 PM ROA Report 
Page 2 of 2 Case: CV-2007-0000725 Current Judge: Stephen W Drescher 
Four Rivers Packing Company vs. Panike Sons Farms lnc 







-~ p~ ~ 
Witness and Exhibit List (Walker for Panike) Stephen W Drescher 
Stipulation to Waive Trial by Jury (and to be tried by the Court) Stephen W Drescher 
Hearing Scheduled 3 day Court Trial Stephen W Drescher 
10/29/2007 09:OO a.m. 
Pre-trial Memorandum (Birch for Four Rivers with witness & exhibit list) Stephen W Drescher 
AMENDED Pre-trial Memorandum (Birch for Four Rivers with witness & Stephen W Drescher 
exhibit list) 
Trial Memorandum (Walker) Stephen W Drescher 
Hearing result for Court Trial held on 10/29/2007 09:OO AM: Court Trial Stephen W Drescher 
Started 3 day JT 
Closing Argument of Four Rivers Packing Company (Birch) Stephen W Drescher 
Post Trial Brief (Walker for Panike & Sons) Stephen W Drescher 
Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order Stephen W Drescher 
Copies to: WalkerIBirch 
Civil Disposition entered for: Panike & Sons Farms Inc, Defendant; Four Stephen W Drescher 
Rivers Packing Company, Plaintiff. 
order date: 1/7/2008 
STATUS CHANGED: Closed Stephen W Drescher 
Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs Stephen W Drescher 
Judgment Stephen W Drescher 
Copies to: Walker/Birch 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Taking Acknowledgments, Including Seal Paid Stephen W Drescher 
by: Birch Law Offices Receipt number: 0009819 Dated: 2/8/2008 Amount: 
$2.00 (Cashiers Check) 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Comparing And Conforming A Prepared Stephen W Drescher 
Record, Per Page Paid by: Birch Law Offices Receipt number: 0009819 
Dated: 2/8/2008 Amount: $1.50 (Cashiers Check) 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Certiiying The Same Additional Fee For Stephen W Drescher 
Certificate And Seal Paid by: Birch Law Offices Receipt number: 0009819 
Dated: 2/8/2008 Amount: $1 .OO (Cashiers Check) 
Panike & Sons Farms Inc's Notice of Association of Counsel (Greener Stephen W Drescher 
Burke Shoemaker PA) 
Notice of Appeal Stephen W Drescher 
Order (Appellant to file an Amended Notice of Appeal - Rule 17 - Stephen W Drescher 
suspended to 4128108) (or Clerk's Record due in 14 days) 
AMENDED Notice of Appeal (Berg) Stephen W Drescher 
Transcript on Appeal (Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings of 10/29107) Stephen W Drescher 
Motion for Extension of Time by Cierk of District Court was faxed to the Stephen W Drescher 
Supreme Court 
Order Granting Motion for Extension of Time by Clerk of District Court Stephen W Drescher 
Appeiiant's Notice of Substitution of Counsel (Walker substituted as sole Stephen W Drescher 
counsel) (Berg, Burke and Shoemaker are terminated on appeal per the 
request of client) 
Bruce H. Birch 
BIRCH LAW OFFICE, CHTD. 
143 1 South Main Street 
PO Box 157 
Payette, Idaho 83661 
Telephone: (208) 642-907 1 
Facsimile: (208) 642-9072 
ISB# 2645 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




FOUR RIVERS PACKING CO., ~ a s e ~ o .  *L :c. L J 
an Idaho Corporation, 1 
) &h+--' 623 3-243- 
Plaintiff, ) P- 
VS. COMPLAINT 
) 
PANIKE & SONS FARMS, INC., 1 Fee Category: A. 1. 
) Fee: $88.00 
Defendant. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
COMES NOW the Plaintiff and for a cause of action against the Defendant 
complains and alleges as follows: 
PARTLES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
The Plaintiff is an Idaho corporation which maintains its primary place of 
business in Weiser, Washington County, State of Idaho; further, that Plaintiff contracts with 
COMPLAINT - 1 
C:\CoteRSuite8WOUR RIVERS PACKING COVANII..dPLt~INGS~COMPWNTWNT44~pd 
area growers for the purchase of onions which it processes for resale. 
a. 
The Defendant is an Oregon corporation which maintains its primary place of 
business in Ontario, Malheur County, State of Oregon; further, that the Defendant raises 
agricultural produce in the State of Oregon for sale to produce processors or on the open 
market. The registered agent for the Defendant is William H. Panike. 
Ill. 
That amount in controversy is greater than the sum of ten thousand dollars 
($10,000.00) and this claim therefore exceeds the jurisdictional limits of the magistrate's 
division and thereby satisfies the jurisdictional prerequisites of the district court. 
IV. 
Based on the above allegations and pursuant to Idaho Code Section 5-401 et 
seq., venue is proper in this action. 
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
v. 
On or about the 13'h day of January, 2006, the Plaintiff and Defendant entered 
into a field run contract entitled "Contract To Buy Or Handle" (Contract herein), a copy of 
which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and by reference made a part here. By the terms of the 
Contract, Defendant agreed to sell Plaintiff 25,000 hundred weight of onions from its 2006 
onion crop and 25,000 hundred weight of onions from its 2007 onion crop. 
lv . 
Defendant contracted to sell 2006 and 2007 onions to Plaintiff for the price of $4.75 per 
:OMPLAINT - 2 
>\Corel\SuitoS\FOVR RIVERS PACKING CO\PANIKE\PLEAD1NGS\COMPL~TT4.wpd 
hundred weight. 
v. 
Pursuant to the terms of the Contract, Randy Smith, Plaintiffs general manager, 
notified Defendant in writing of those fields from which it was to harvest and deliver the 
25,000 hundred weight of onions necessary to meet its contractual obligation; further, that the 
Defendant was to begin delivery to Plaintiffs Weiser, Idaho facility on September 20,2006. 
See Exhibits "B" and "C" attached hereto and by reference made a part hereof. 
VI. 
On September 15,2006, the Defendant, acting by and through Greg Panike, notified 
Randy Smith that it would not deliver onions from the fields previously designated by Mr. 
Smith in Exhibit "C", further, the Defendant did not deliver or attempt to deliver any onions to 
Plaintiff on or before September 20,2006. 
VD;. 
Plaintiff notified Defendant in writing that its refusal to deliver onions from the 
ields designated by Plaintiff constituted a breach or a repudiation of its contractual obligation. 
See Exhibit "D" attached hereto and by reference made a part hereof. 
vm. 
On of before September 20,2006 Plaintiff had entered into contracts for the resale of 
he onions which were to be delivered by Defendant; further, that by virtue of Defendant's 
efusal to honor the terms of the Contract, the Plaintiff was required to purchase onions on the 
)pen market at market price to meet those contractual obligations. The market price at that 
ime was approximately $12.00 per hundred weight or such other amount as may be proven at 
:OWLANT - 3 
;\Corel\Suite8\FOUR RIVERS PACKING COWANIKE\PLEADNGS\COMP~Tr4.wpd 
1 
511 




6 11 onions were not harvested from those fields designated by Plaintiff 
On October 3,2006, Greg Panike drove two trucks loaded with onions to Plaintiff's 
"1 Since October 3,2006, the Defendant has not delivered or attempted to deliver any 
l1 ll CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
9 
10 
(BREACH OF CONTRACT) 
XI. 
onions to Plaintiff: 
l6 I1 specified onions from Defendant at the Contract price, said onions to be delivered beginning 
14 
15 
,, 11 September 20,2006, 
The Plaintiff was ready and willing to honor its contractual obligation to purchase 
l9  P Defendant breached the terms of the Contract by refusing to deliver onions from fields 
20 1 specified by Plaintiff to it's Weiser facility beginning September 20,2006. As a direct and 
21 
22 
25 ll The Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs incurred in prosecuting 
proximate cause of Defendant's breach, Plaintiff has been damaged in the amount of 
23 
24 




this action, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-121 and other applicable law in the amount of 
28 COMPLAINT - 4  
C:\coreWuiteS\FOUR RIVERS PACKING CO\PANIKE\PLEADMGS~COMPLAMT.4.wpd 
$10,000.00 if this matter be not contested and such other sum as the court deems just and 
equitable if this matter is contested. 
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays for judgment as follows: 
1. For recovery from the Defendant in the amount of $182,000.00 or such 
other sum as may be proven at trial herein. 
2. For recovery of Plaintiff's attorney fees, costs and disbursements 
incurred herein. 
3. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and 
equitable in the premises. 
Dated this d-7 day of October, 2006. 
COMPLAINT - 5 
\U(ara\c\CcieRSuite8WOUR RIVERS PACKING COU'ANIKRPLEADMGS\COMPLAMT.4.wpd 
Q00138 
FOUR RIVERS PACKING CO, INC. 
3 
4 
COMPLAINT - 6 
\Wra\c\CoroiEu!tcSVOUR IVERS PACKlNG CO\PANIKE\PLEADINGS\COMPLAMT 4 wpd 
I, Jan Smith, being first duly sworn, on my oath, depose and say that I am the 
secretary-treasurer of and that I am authorized to act for and on behalf of the Plaintiff named 
herein; that I have read the foregoing Complaint, know the contents thereof and believe the 
same to be true and correct. 
OS/15/2004 12:35 FAX 20854987"Q FOUR RIVERS 
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FOUR RIVERS PACWYG C8. 
P. 0. Box 8- 
Weiser, ID 83672 
(208) 549-8300 Fax: (208) 549-8290 
August 15,2006 
Panike & Son Fms ,  he. 
416 Peach Road 
Ou&ioO R 97914 
Dear Greg: 
As a valued conhct grower for Pour Rivers Packin& we wodd Ih lo tab lbb 
a m ~ e s t  opportMity to thank you for your past m e  and look forward to this year'- ' 
I have been touring the area on a Tegulat basis to wtch the propss of your Mu'on 
crop and will be in your area in the next few days to designaw the fie!& W &M 'aa; 
required to fulfill your signed contract as stipulated in paragraph 1 prior to my harvast. 
Wc -41 discuss when they need to be harv& and delivered to the sbd & tbzt time. 
If you find h t  you ate wanting to barvest or selI prim to our m d i  re_girx@ 
field seldon, please call my cell at (208) 861.0912 or the office iit (208) 549-8300, SO 
as not to oreate a &ct rep& your WM 
T b d  you again for your past patronage. 
FOUR RIVERS PACMIPU'G CO, 
P. 0. BOX 8 
Weiser, ID 83672 
Penike & Son Farms, hc. 
416 Peach Road 
Ontario, OR 97914 
To b&om It WIay Concern: 
Pmumt to my conversation with Greg on Augut IS, 2006, +&is Wer h3 m 
re&m our fieId(s) designation as discussed with Itim and io am0i-e :&k p i q g q k  
one. (1) of  your signed contnrct. 
*- . . 
The iield(s) designated to fulfill the 25,000 WT of o o i m  &is S - 5s:G IC ;LO..- 
acres), 2 - field 11 (3.0 acres). In the went that the yield om of aese %% Ed& Zca xt 
coverthe 25,000 CWT, the balance is designated to come out of fieid 5 ( 2 3  z m )  is&e 
Mom. Please fnd a map attached with designated fieids mCicIed v,% yc1.faw 
M&Ii@er. 
I f you have any questions, please don't hesitate to call my cc:! at (22%) $5i-%3I',! 
or ihs office at (208) 549-8300. 




I*." V.4 *A.  Y l A l V l L  
f '-IRCH LA w OFFICES,  CHI^ 
1431 Sorrth Main Street 
Post O f f i e  Box 157 
Payezte, ID 83661 
Teleph Facsimile: (208) 642-9072 
Licensed in Idaho and Oregon 
September 15,2006 
Greg Panike 
Panike & Sons Farms, hc .  
416 Peach Road 
Ontario, Oregon 97914 
Re: ContraEt for sale of onions to Four Rivers Packing Co. 
Dear Mr. Panike: 
This office represents Four Rivers Packing Company, Inc. Last year you entered into a two year field 
run contract to deliver onions (approximately 25,000 hundred weight) to my client at the contract price 
of $4.75. That contract allows my client to specify the specific fields to be harvested and delivered to 
Four Rivers Packing Company for storage and later processing. You were notified in writing by letter 
dated August 25,2006, of the specific fields of onions which you are to harvest and deliver to my 
client. Today you advised Randy Smith that you do not intend to deliver these onions. Please be 
advised that by your actions you have repudiated or breached your contractual obligation. 
If you fail to honor the terms of your contract, my client is entitled to recover from you the difference 
between the contract price of $4.75 per cwt. and $12.00 to $15.00 per ctvt., the market price for onions 
comparable in size and quality to those you agreed to deliver. My client will seek recovery of 
damages together with all attorney fees and costs incurred to prosecute their damage action. In 
addition, my client will seek an order of the court requiring your compliance with the contract for the 
upcoming crop season. 
- 
DEMAND IS HEREBY MADE UPON YOU TO RETRACT YOUR REPUqIATION AND TO 
HONOR THE TERMS OF YOUR CONTRACT WITH FOUR RIVER PACKING COMPANY, 
INC. BY DELIVERY OF THOSE SPECIFIC FIELDS OF ONIONS EARLIER SPECIFIED IN 
WRITING BY MY CLIENT. 
Yours sincerely, 
I BHB: kab 
pc: Four Rivers Packing Co., Inc. 
Lary Walker 
Lary C. Walker, ISB No. 1303 
Delton L. Walker, ISB No. 5839 
Walker Law Offices 
232 East Main Street 
Post Office Box 828 
Weiser, Idaho 83672 
Telephone: (208) 414-0390 
Facsimile: (208) 414-0404 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT CO 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR T f E  COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
FOUR RIVER PACKING CO.. 
) %7-Q7a,5 
) Case No. CV2884-1-863- 






PANIKE & SONS FARMS, INC., 1 
) 
Defendant. ) 
COMES NOW, the Defendant, PANIKE & SONS FARMS, INC. and answer 
Plaintiffs Complaint and allege, deny and respond as follows: 
1. Defendant denies each and every allegation in said Complaint not here in 
specifically admitted. 
I. PARTIES, JURISDICTION & VENUE 
2. Defendant admits the allegations of paragraph I, 11, 111 and IV. The venue is 
admitted only after the stipulation in order changing venue to Washington County. 
Page 1 of 6 ANSWER 
11. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
3. Defendant admits the allegations of paragraph V and VI as set out on page 2 of 
the complaint; 
4. Defendant denies the allegation of paragraph V and VI as set out on page 3 of 
the complaint, VII, and VIII; 
5. Defendant denies the allegation of paragraph IX and X and by way of 
affirmative defense alleges that the Defendant did deliver onions in a11 respects 
meeting the terms of the contract, with the exception of the field designations as 
Plaintiff did not comply with the terns of the contract by designating the fields 
at the time of planting. Further by way of affirmative defense, Plaintiff was 
prepared to, and attempted to delivered onions meeting the quality, size and 
grade of onions pursuant to the terms of the contract as full compliance and 
mitigation of any potential need, expense or claimed damages for Plaintiff to 
purchase other onions on the open market. 
III. CLAJM FOR RELIEF 
(BREACH OF CONTRACT) 
6 .  Defendant denies the allegation of paragraph XI, XII, XIII, subject to the same 
affirmative defenses as set out in paragraph 5 above. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
1. Failure of Consideration: As Defendant's first affirmative defense Defendant 
alleges that there was no meeting of mind or provisions in the contract allowing the designation 
of specific onion fields late in the season without specific contract terms or specific 
consideration. 
Page 2 of 6 ANSWER 
2 .  Waiver: As Defendant's second affirmative defense, the Defendant alleges that 
Plaintiff failed to designate specific fields at the time the contract was negotiated and executed 
and therefore waved any right to subsequently attempt to designate specific fields. 
3.  Latches: As Defendant's third afflrmative defense, the Defendant alleges that the 
Plaintiff is barred by the doctrine of latches for claiming any validity to the lien they attempted 
to file and claim against the Defendant as a result of their pleading the same in this complaint, 
as a mandatory claim against the Defendant. 
4. Assumption of Risk: As Defendant's fourth affirmative defense, the Defendant 
alleges that the Plaintiff's by their rejection of the onions meeting the contract specifications in 
all particulars, with the exception of Plaintiffs attempt field designation Plaintiff to assumed the 
risk and costs of having to purchase onions on the open market, which would not have been 
necessary but for their rejection of the onions Defendant attempted to deliver. 
5 .  Estoppel: As Defendant's fifth affirmative defense the Defendant alleges that 
because the Plaintiff did not designate the fields at the time of the contract execution or by the 
time the onions were planted, Plaintiff is estopped from a later attempt to designate, after 
Defendant has planted onions for himself and other processors, where there is a lack of 
specific contract intent, timing, terms, or provisions allowing for such a late-season 
designation. 
6 .  Estoppel: As Defendant's sixth affirmative defense, the Defendant alleges that 
for the Plaintiff rejected defense delivery of onions meeting the contract size, specifications, 
and qualities, which would have, had the Defendant allowed to deliver the same, eliminated 
Plaintiff having to purchase onions on the open market, Plaintiff is estopped from seeking 
damages or compensation from the Defendant. 
Page 3 of 6 ANSWER 
7.  Accord and satisfaction: As Defendant's seventh affirmative defense Defendant 
alleges that Plaintiff's rejection of the onions of the precise quality, size and specifications of 
the contract, but for the field designation, the Defendant was denied the reasonable opportunity 
to fully accord and satisfy the contract. 
8. Uniust enrichment: As Defendant's eighth affirmative defense, the Defendant 
alleges that due to the attempted designation of specific fields by the Plaintiff at the end of the 
growing season, the Plaintiff, without specific contract provisions, or any consideration 
attempted to designate particular fields which were planted by the Defendant with a variety of 
onions Defendant was raising for other purposes and processors, which were of a larger and 
greater market value at that season, then were designated in the Plaintiff's contract, the 
delivery of such as onions to the Plaintiff from the designated fields would have resulted in 
substantial unjust enrichment to the Plaintiff without fair compensation to the Defendant. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, the Defendant prays for judgment against the Plaintiff as follows: 
1. That Plaintiff take nothing by their complaint. 
2. That Defendant be awarded relief under this answer, including one or more of the 
affirmative defenses above set forth. 
3. For reasonable attorneys fees and costs incurred in this action, including the costs 
and expense incurred in this action attempting to remove the same to Washington County, and 
including this litigation has consolidated. 
Page 4 of 6 ANSWER 
4. For such other and further relief as is just and proper under the circumstances of 
this case. 
DATED this the day of February, 2007 
WALKER LAW OFFICE /i 
Defendant demand for trial by jury. 
Page 5 of 6 ANSWER 
CERTJFICATE OF SERVICE 
I DO HEREBY certify that on the & day of February 2007, I caused to be served on 
the following a true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated 
below: 
Bruce H. Birch 
P.O. Box 157 
Payette, ID 83661 
Page 6 of 6 ANSWER 
By U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
By Overnight 
@ By Facsimile 642-9072 
ORIGINAL 
Bruce H. Birch 
BIRCH LAW OFFICE, CHTD. 
143 1 South Main Street 
PO Box 157 
Payette, Idaho 83661 
Telephone: (208) 642-9071 
Facsimile: (208) 642-9072 
ISB# 2645 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
PED -1 
THIRD JiJD!CIAC DlSTRlST Coil%.?' 
I FEB282il07 / I 
A . M .  P.EV1. 
u 27. 1 
SHARON WiDNER a. 
Clerk District Court 3) 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF I 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
a~~r,~Ua\5i 
FOUR RNERS PACKING CO., 1 Case No. CViXHHWS- 





PANIKE & SONS FARMS, INC., 1 
Defendant. 1 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * a * * * * *  







NOW THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED and this does ORDER that venue 
in this action be transferred to Washington County at which time this case shall be consolidated 
ORDER - 1 
C:\Corei\Suite8\ORDER CHANGE VENUE CONSOLDA?E.wpd 
1 11 with Washington County Case N o  Case No. 2006-00567, Panike &Sons Farms, h e  v Randy I 
I Smith and Janine Smith, husband and wye, individually and in their separate capacity, dba 
11 Four River Packing Co. 
-? 
u d a y  of February, 2007. Dated thi - 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the & day of February, 2007,I served a true and 
correct copy of the within and foregoing document on the following persons in the manner set 
forth: 
Bruce H. Bkch 
Attorney at Law 
P. 0. Box 157 
Payette, Idaho 83661 
[ ] United States mail, f i s t  class postage prepaid. 
[ ] Facsimile transmission. 
[XI Hand delivery (courthouse drop box) 
[ ] Overnight mail. 
Lary C. Walker [XI United States mail, first class postage prepaid. 
Attorney at Law [ ] Facsimile transmission. 
P. 0. Box 828 [ ] Hand delivery 
Weiser, Idaho 83672 [ ] Overnight mail. 
Sk?e of Idaho 
Couilty of Payeite SS 
I hereby certify that the fureg~i?? 
inr;tru.m, . ~ t  is 2 ;.-un and xrrect ccpy of the 
oric;i?;.l c:: ii!o in :his p;i:ice, 
Dated .2 -,2h - 0 7 
BETTY J. DRESSEiJ 
Cisrk o f  the District Court and 
Deputy 
C:\Coiel\Sui{e \ORDER CHANGE VENUE C0NSOLIDATE.wpd 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
By: 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
PANIKE ti SONS FARMS, INC., i 
PlaintiffIAppellant, ! 
) Supreme Court Case No. 35062 
-vs- ) 
) Civil No. CV 2006-00567 & 
RANDY SMITH and JANINE SMITH, 1 CV 2006-00725 
husband and wife, individually and in their 





1 CLERK'S CERTIFICATE TO 














PANIKE & SONS FARMS, INC., 
) 
) 
I, Sharon Widner, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for Washington County, do hereby certify that the foregoing Clerk's 
Record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction and 
contains true and correct copies of the pleadings, documents and papers designated to be 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE TO 
THE RECORD AND EXHIBITS 1 
included under Rule 28, I.A.R. of the ldaho Appellate Rules, the Notice of Appeal, and the 
Amended Notice of Appeal. 
I CERTIFY that Plaintiffs Exhibits 1, 3, 4, 5, & 8 and Defendant's Exhibits E, F, H, I, 
M, & S as listed in the Certificate of Exhibits (C 1 & 2 )  are herewith certified, submitted and 
incorporated in this record as directed in I.A.R. 31 of the ldaho Appellate Rules. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal 
this day of 3 u ) w  ,2008. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE TO 
THE RECORD AND EXHIBITS 2 
)I S b  ac\ Y\l\hn* + 
SHARON WIDNER, 
Clerk of the District Court 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
PANIKE & SONS FARMS, INC., ! 
PlaintiffIAppellant, 
) 
) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
TO COUNSEL 
-vs- ) 
) Supreme Court Case No. 35062 
RANDY SMITH and JANINE SMITH; ) 
husband and wife, individually and in their ) 
separate capacity, dba FOUR RIVERS 
PACKING CO., ) 
) 
DefendantslRespondents. ) 







PANIKE & SONS FARMS, INC., 1 
Defendant/Appellant. ) 
I, SHARON WIDNER, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Washington, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by United States Mail, a copy of the CLERK'S RECORD and 
the REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT to each of the attorneys of record in this cause as 
follows: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
TO COUNSEL 1 
Lary C. Walker 
WALKER LAW OFFICES 
232 E Main 
P.O. Box 828 
Weiser, ldaho 83672 
Attorney for Appellant 
Bruce Birch 
BIRCH LAW OFFICES 
1431 S Main 
P. 0. Box 157 
Payette, ldaho 83661 
Attorney for Respondent(s) 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal 
of said court this* day of s\\\y , 2 0 0 9 .  
  re.^\> 
SHARON WIDNER 
Clerk of the District Court 
BY: # &g,w:\El:'"'ck 
Deputy Court Clerk 
I 
cc: Mr. Stephen W. Kenyon 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
TO COUNSEL 2 
